Naval War College Review

Volume 30
Number 4 *Autumn*

Article 1

1977

Fall 1977 Full Issue

The U.S. Naval War College

C-10

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

Fall 1977

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

FOREWORD

The *Naval War College Review* was established in 1948 by the Chief of Naval Personnel in order that officers of the Navy and Marine Corps might receive some of the educational benefits available to the resident students at the Naval War College. The forthright and candid views of the authors are presented for the professional education of the readers. Articles published are related to the academic and professional activities of the Naval War College. They are drawn from a wide variety of sources in order to inform, to stimulate and challenge the readers, and to serve as a catalyst for new ideas. Articles are selected primarily on the basis of their intellectual and literary merits, usefulness and interest to servicewide readership and timeliness. Reproduction of articles in the *Review* requires the specific approval of the Editor, *Naval War College Review* and the respective author. *Review* content is open to citation and other reference, in accordance with accepted academic research methods. The thoughts and opinions expressed in this publication are those of the authors and are not necessarily those of the Navy Department or of the Naval War College.

Manuscripts must be submitted in typewritten form, double-spaced or triple-spaced. Manuscripts are submitted at the sender's risk, and the *Naval War College Review* assumes no responsibility for the return of the material, although as a matter of practice every effort will be made to return manuscripts not accepted for publication. No financial compensation is paid for articles accepted for publication. In submitting an article, the sender warrants that it is original, that it is the sender's property, and that it has not been published elsewhere.

The editorial offices of the *Naval War College Review* are located at the Naval War College, Newport, R.I. 02840. Published quarterly, distribution is generally limited to: U.S. Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard commands and activities; Regular and Reserve officers of the U.S. Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard of the grade 0-3 and senior; military officers of other services, foreign officers, and civilians having a present or previous affiliation with the Naval War College; and selected U.S. Government officials. Correspondence concerning *Review* matters should be directed to its editorial offices

CONTENTS

Volume XXX, Number 2/Sequence Number 265 Fall 1977

Cover: Mount Fujiyama from the deck of U.S.S. *South Dakota* (BB 57), Tokyo Bay, 27 August 1945. Official U.S. Navy photo.

BOARD OF ADVISORS
TO THE
PRESIDENT, NAVAL WAR COLLEGE

DR. DAVID M. ABSHIRE	*Chairman, Center for Strategic and International Studies Georgetown University*
VICE ADMIRAL JAMES F. CALVERT, USN (RET.)	
MR. RICHARD BEVERLEY CORBIN, JR.	*J. Walter Thompson Company*
ADMIRAL CHARLES K. DUNCAN, USN (RET.)	
MR. MALCOLM S. FORBES	*President, Forbes Incorporated*
LIEUTENANT GENERAL WILLIAM K. JONES, U.S. MARINE CORPS (RET.)	
MR. LYMAN B. KIRKPATRICK, JR.	*Professor of Political Science Brown University*
ADMIRAL HORACIO RIVERO, USN (RET.)	

PRESIDENT'S NOTES

This issue of the *Review* is being published as our 378 resident students are settling into the 1977-78 Academic Year. I'll not burden these notes with statistical tables but I am pleased to report that the officers (and their civilian counterparts from other government agencies) of this student body come to the Naval War College with magnificent records and unquestioned potential for future success. I am confident that seminars will be lively and challenging and that this year's student results, however measured, will follow the pattern of the students' uniformly outstanding past achievements. I recognize that not every officer has the opportunity to attend the Naval War College. For these officers, the College's Center for Continuing Education has several interesting and valuable programs available. Descriptive information and an application form may be found at the back of this issue.

After a 1-year suspension (to permit holding the first Conference of the Naval Command College) the Naval War College hosted another successful Current Strategy Forum on 27-29 June. This year's theme was "U.S. Policies and Naval Forces in the Pacific, 1977-1985." Two hundred and thirty-two distinguished civilian guests and 35 flag and general officers attended several stimulating addresses and met a number of times in small seminars with students to discuss theme-related topics. Publication deadlines preclude printing any of the Forum papers in this issue, but the *Review* hopes to be able to include one or more in the next issue to afford our readers a sample of the Forum's flavor.

In this issue are several important and timely articles and reviews. For our resident students, in particular, but for all students of war—and peace—the article on Clausewitz by Professor Jim King, recently of the Naval War College faculty, is highly recommended. Speaking frankly, reading Clausewitz, despite the valuable lessons to be learned, can be a chore. Reading King on Clausewitz is not a chore but a positive intellectual delight.

The Editor of the *Review* always strives for balance of substance in each issue and I note another interesting balance this quarter—a balance of authors. Included are naval officers, officers of other services, and civilians; professors from the War College and professors from other institutions; independent writers; Research Scholars (associated with the College's Center for Advanced Research); and students, including a student in the Naval Staff Course (for intermediate grade international officers). This remarkably broad

range is not by design but it does contribute to the quality of the *Naval War College Review*.

Journals, the *Review* included, depend, obviously, on their authors for such stature and respect as they may have with their readership; they also depend, not so obviously, on the intelligence, judgment, and discrimination of their editors. For the past 2 years LCDR B.M. (Tony) Simpson III has provided those qualities and more to his editorship of the *Review* and the *Review*—indeed, the Naval War College—has benefited greatly thereby. Thus it is with a sense of loss that I announce that Tony retired from active naval service on 30 June past. His friends will be pleased to know that he is remaining in Newport to work on those books of naval strategy that he thought he would have time for when he became Editor. I expect to see his name in the Table of Contents of a future issue. Succeeding Tony as Editor is CDR W.R. Pettyjohn, USN. Bill, who was Executive Assistant to the Dean of Academics here at the College before assuming his present position, has an extensive background in diverse surface warfare, management, and educational fields, and enjoys a well-deserved reputation for his scholarly writing and crisply incisive editorial talent.

H. Hardisty
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy
President, Naval War College

For nearly 150 years Carl von Clausewitz' unfinished masterpiece On War has confounded, baffled and even inspired students; has been misinterpreted by both civilian and military readers; and it has provided the intellectual starting point for modern defense studies and strategic theory, especially the concepts of limited war and the use of force as an instrument of national policy. Clausewitz sought to explain war; to give us a theory so that we could understand among other things why wars differ; why their courses are unpredictable; what factors are most important and why. Clausewitz' analysis is a descriptive theory and so far no subsequent study has approached let alone rivaled it for depth of analysis and breadth of scope. Recently a new biography of Clausewitz has been published, as well as a new translation of On War. Taken together both books are an important and significant contribution to our understanding of a theory of war, which is the conceptual bedrock upon which the military profession is based.

ON CLAUSEWITZ:

MASTER THEORIST OF WAR

by

James E. King

Often called a philosopher, Clausewitz did not aspire to that title. Indeed, in his great treatise, *Vom Kriege,* though he thought well enough of it to describe it as "revolutionary," he several times drew a line between the subject on which he considered he was engaged and philosophy, to the writing of which he laid no claim. His name for his subject was *Kriegstheorie* or theory of war.

The appearance of the long-awaited new English—or, more accurately, Anglo-American—translation of *Vom Kriege,* following by a few months the publication of a biography of its author by one of the translators (and editors), marked 1976 a banner year for students of Clausewitz and his thought on war. The new translation, from the Princeton University Press, is a reader's feast. It contains not only introductory essays by both the translators and editors, Peter Paret, Professor of History at Stanford, and Michael Howard, Fellow of All Souls, Oxford, but also a third introductory essay *and* a 70-page "Guide to the Reading of *On War*" by the dean of American strategic scholars, Bernard Brodie, Professor of Political Science at the University of California, Los Angeles.*

*Carl von Clausewitz, *On War,* Michael Howard and Peter Paret, Introductory trans. essays by Peter Paret, Michael Howard, and Bernard Brodie, with a commentary by Bernard Brodie (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976). Cited as *On War* in this article; when necessary it will be identified as the Howard-Paret trans.

To the introductory essays, the reader's guide, and the *piece de resistance* of this banquet, the new translation itself, this review will return later. It is appropriate to look first at the earlier of the two works, Peter Paret's *Clausewitz and the State.**

I

The biographical study is an extraordinarily rich analysis of the growth from childhood to maturity of the most searching and creative mind that has ever preoccupied itself with the study of war. The work is further enriched by an examination of the influence on that mind of impressions from the past and from contemporaries, some of the latter equally brilliant in their different ways, all against the violent tapestry of European history in the first third of the 19th century.

Paret explains his choice of the title, *Clausewitz and the State,* in his introduction and then returns to the theme repeatedly throughout the work. Its gist is that Clausewitz, like many of his contemporaries, was engaged in the rediscovery of "the value of political power." As a young man this rediscovery was associated with a fervent Prussian patriotism, for Clausewitz combined an idealist's interest in the reform of the state as an institution essential to the development of individual talents and the promotion of public welfare (by providing education and even, to some degree employment and disaster relief) with his concern for the power of his state.

> A class-structure based on legal privilege appeared to him to deprive the political leadership of potential sources of ability and energy it could ill afford to lose. The strength of the monarchy would increase if its subjects could identify their interests more closely with those of the government. By rationalizing and humanizing its institutions, by learning to protect and educate its citizens more equitably and efficiently, the state would better carry out its mission of making civilized life possible, of justifying itself by providing scope for the full and harmonious development of the individual, and of responding to the urge for self-preservation and growth innate in every political organism.[1]

In later life, after the humiliating defeat of Prussia by Napoleon in 1806 and the subsequent frustration of the reformers by a timid and indecisive monarch, who usually heeded the advice of the more traditional Junkers who surrounded him, Clausewitz became a disillusioned Machiavellian realist for whom the Kingdom of Prussia was no longer "the realization of an ethical idea [but little more than] a historical reality whose first duty [was] to maintain itself."

> Under the pressure of circumstances he put off earlier hopes for pedagogic, social, and political developments, and now interested himself primarily in the diplomatic and military power of the state.[2]

*Peter Paret, *Clausewitz and the State* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1976).

Clausewitz' changing emotional relations with his state are unremarkable except insofar as he himself is worthy of remark. We might remember that it was well over a half century since Frederick the Great, calling himself "the first servant of the State," had recognized the separate existence and "person" of the state apart from himself as ruler by divine right.[3] By the first quarter of the 19th century the nation-state had left its infancy behind and was entering upon its prime of youth. Having long since assumed responsibility for defense and for the economy on its territories, it was beginning to assume responsibility for the education and welfare of its citizens. To be sure, the nation-state and the European middle class, who were its champions, would suffer the recurrent frustrations of youth and nearly another century would pass before the former would be fully realized with the latter generally in control. So the exasperation of Clausewitz and his fellow reformers with the conservative reaction that swept over Prussia after the final defeat of Napoleon was also not untypical.

Indeed, from one perspective Clausewitz' Prussia was the quintessential European absolute monarchy. Furthermore, even more than most of the European states of the time it was a state made for war, a "war state," and deserved the title, "Sparta of the North." The peasants tilled the soil and did all the dirty work, including service as private soldiers in an army that sought to reduce them to automata, dying and killing on order with no opportunity to think for or of themselves. The middle class ran the shops, taught school, managed the industries a mercantilist government had established for the support of its army, and staffed the lower and middle levels of the state bureaucracy. The landowners, the nobility with the "von" before the family name, ruled as hereditary masters and as magistrates over the peasants, both on their estates and in the army where the nobles served as officers. The nobility also staffed the higher ranks of the civil service and filled most of the positions as counsellors and advisors to the monarch. Over all ruled the King and commander-in-chief, who reserved to himself virtually all decisions affecting the army, down to the assignments (and marriages) of its officers of all ranks. With this burden on his shoulders, in addition to general responsibility for all the civil operations of the state, the Prussian King had little if any time for projects or interests not concerned with the management of the army, and its support. Add the eccentric character of the abler Prussian Kings, among whom Frederick II alone had interests apart from the Army, and the label "Sparta of the North" seems a not unfair one.

Nevertheless, the label was inaccurate, or at least inadequate. In fact, Clausewitz' Prussia was not just a war state, there was also something of Athens in her makeup. For Clausewitz' lifetime coincided with the golden age of modern German scholarship, science, letters, and music—and in that age Prussia played a remarkably active, indeed a leading part. Schiller, Herder, and Kant, the pioneers of the *Aufklaerung*, the German counterpart of the French "Enlightenment," flourished during Clausewitz' childhood and died (only a year apart) when he was in his twenties. But among his own contemporaries were many men, of many pursuits, who were the equals of the 18th-century pioneers. Neither Goethe, nor Beethoven, nor Heine, among the greatest names of the time, was a Prussian, but most of the remaining names on such a list were, at least for parts of their lives: the philosophers

Hegel, Fichte, Schelling, Schleiermacher, and Mendelssohn; the poets and dramatists Arnim, Brentano, Kleist, and Schlegel; the great economist, Friedrich List; the historian, Ranke; the Humboldt brothers, Alexander the biologist and Wilhelm the educational reformer; finally, the political reformers Stein and Hardenburg and the military reformers Scharnhorst and Gneisenau. With nearly all of these men Clausewitz was acquainted, some were his close associates, even personal friends. Nor was Clausewitz the only Prussian Army officer to be so favored, for among his contemporary colleagues there were a few with equal access to the intellectual leaders of Prussia, including several who were better known in his lifetime than he.

During a period that was a crucial one in Clausewitz' life, the years of the reaction to the reform movement that followed the defeat of Napoleon in 1815, the atmosphere in Berlin became so oppressive that German intellectuals of the contemporary liberal stripe no longer felt at home there. Even so, despite ups and downs, and despite the fact that none of the great Hohenzollern monarchs was distinguished as a patron of German arts, letters, and scholarship (Frederick II, the "philosopher king" of the French Enlightenment, was no exception because his language was French and his cultural interests were European rather than German), from the end of the Seven Years War in 1763 Prussia persisted in forging the position of leadership in these fields it had attained by the time of the unification of Germany in 1870. Perhaps nothing bespeaks this persistence better than the fact that the University of Berlin was founded (through the efforts of Wilhelm von Humboldt and with the philosopher Fichte as the first rector) in 1810, during the darkest years of Prussian history, when the defeated kingdom, having lost a third of its territories and been compelled to reduce its armed forces by three-fourths, lay at the mercy of Napoleon.

This brilliant company with whom Clausewitz was associated was by no means of a single mind. On the contrary, the European, German, and specifically Prussian intellectual scenes were as divided as the contemporary political scene. In the background were the two great intellectual forces of the Enlightenment and the romantic reaction against it, only superficially described as reason versus feeling. Clausewitz and nearly all his contemporaries bore the mark of both. There were, to be sure, differences among them that could be identified as placing individuals at various points on the continuum between rationalist and romantic poles. Among the contemporary military writers, for example, as among other intellectuals of the day, one might venture to adopt the terms of the familiar Fichtean or Hegelian dialectic as a device for identifying and distinguishing three distinct positions.

If we adopt this device, the position we should call *thesis* is that which exhibits the strongest imprint of the Enlightenment. It is characterized by emphasis on reason as the controlling force, at least potentially, in human affairs, by belief in natural law, in natural religion (i.e., deism—the nationalists' theology), in the idea of progress as a rationale of history, in the rights of man, and in such deliberately engineered institutional devices to preserve those rights as written constitutions. Among military writers the identifying mark of this position was the wish to make a science of war by

reducing its conduct to rules both explaining its past and prescribing its future. Of this persuasion the principal German example was the Prussian military historian and commentator, Baron Heinrich von Bülow. Outside of Germany the same preference can be seen in the far more sophisticated works of Clausewitz' most distinguished professional adversary, the Swiss Banker turned soldier and theorist of war, Antoine Henri Jomini.

Opposed to this rationalists' position as *antithesis* were the ideas of those thinkers and writers who derided or denounced the role of reason in human affairs, preferring traditional legality to rationally inferred natural law, faith and emotion to reason as the basis of religion, history to progress, and traditional to engineered political institutions. Among German military writers this was the general disposition of the Prussian military historian George Heinrich von Berenhorst, a veteran of the Seven Years War and commentator on the wars of Napoleon to whom the very thought of war as a science was an absurdity. In his works on the great captains of war, such as Frederick the Great and Napoleon, Berenhorst denied the very possibility of a theory of war by insisting that their success was owed, "not to any system that could be copied by others, not to any grasp of 'principles,' but to energy, to genius, and to luck."[4]

Finally, representing the *synthesis* of the thesis and antithesis just adumbrated, was the position of those who considered themselves inspired by the best in both the great intellectual movements of the age. They honored the mathematicians and scientists for their great achievements but considered human affairs only minimally quantifiable. At the same time, while they recognized those affairs as marked by uncertainty rooted in such irrational causes as human emotion, they did not consider the mind foreclosed from understanding and even improving society, its institutions, and its activities (such as war). This was Clausewitz' persuasion.[5]

Contrasting appreciations of history are perhaps the best indications of the three positions. To the classicists of the Enlightenment history was often little better than a contemptible and demeaning chronicle of human folly and evil redeemed by the enobling and reassuring Idea of Progress with its promise of human salvation in an ultimately rational if earthly Jerusalem. To the romantics of the Counterenlightenment history assumed varied forms. To some it was a sad record of decline and corruption from a more innocent if primitive earthly paradise; to others the decline was from a Golden Age, usually identified with ancient Athens and the Roman Republic. But history could also be thought of as a developing force, having almost a life of its own, from which all manner of moral lessons might be derived, from the Teutonic virtues of "blood and iron" to the rules by which a warlike people evolve from primitive tribal conquests to the building of empires. To Clausewitz history was none of these. If correctly derived it was a record of mankind's past errors and triumphs, a chronicle from which means and ends, causes and effects, might be inferred, providing approximate but useful guides for current decisions. History, in short, was *experience*, the only "laboratory" available for the study of human affairs including war.

Clausewitz spent much of his professional effort in that laboratory, writing far more on history (mainly military history though always with a "strategic"

slant) than on the theory of war or on contemporary politics, which was his third subject. In his lifetime he published little, though enough to earn himself some modest renown as one of Prussia's leading military intellectuals. The bulk of his works, including his great treatise *Vom Kriege*, was published posthumously, initially by his wife, Marie, and brother-in-law, Lt. Gen. Count Friedrich von Bruehl, and other close associates, eventually by a small but growing company of scholars over the next century and a half down to our biographer, Peter Paret himself.

II

Carl Philipp Gottlieb von Clausewitz was born 1 June 1780.* A member of the slowly rising German middle class, he was the descendant of a line of Protestant ministers and civil administrators. One of the latter was his father, Friedrich Gabriel von Clausewitz, a minor civil servant (a small-town tax collector) who, in his youth, during the Seven Years War, had served as an apprentice officer in the Prussian Army. Though the father claimed to be of the nobility, upon the return of peace, after promotion to the rank of lieutenant, he was separated from the army because his claim of nobility was not recognized by Frederick the Great. Yet the family was not without distinction, for the lieutenant's father, and Carl's grandfather, Benedikt Gottlob Clauswitz, had attained the professorship of theology at the University of Halle, which was one of the highest positions a member of the middle class could hope to achieve in the Prussia of Frederick II.

Professor Clauswitz neither used the mark of nobility, "von," nor spelled his name with an "e" in the middle. Moreover, he died in 1749, a full generation before his famous grandson was born. Fifteen years later (but still many years before Carl's birth) his widow married a Prussian officer of unquestioned noble heritage whose seven sons by an earlier marriage were officers in the army. The connection did not avail to preserve the military career of Professor Clauswitz' son, Carl's father. But it was by the agency of the noble stepgrandfather and stepuncles that Carl and two of his brothers, Friedrich Volmar and Wilhelm Benedikt (after the death of Frederick the Great in 1786) were enabled to enter the Prussian Army as officer cadets.

All three had successful military careers, attaining the rank of major general. The two older brothers retired with the courtesy rank of lieutenant general as Carl would probably also have done had he survived to retirement. These careers, doubtless reinforced by Carl von Clausewitz' own long if troubled association with the royal family and his marriage to a countess, eventually, in 1827, won for the family official recognition of its claim to noble status.

Carl von Clausewitz' career can (and must, in the interests of economy of space) be briefly outlined. He was born into what was evidently a warm family relationship greatly influenced by the Pietist strain of German Protestantism, of which his grandfather had been a leader. The connection

*The precis on Clausewitz' life and career that begins here is mainly taken from Paret, *Clausewitz and the State, passim.*

imbued him with a sense of inner security, a determination to make the most of his talents by education (including self-education), loyalty to the Prussian monarchy, and a compassionate outlook on humanity. After spending a few short years in the local school in the town of Berg, where he was born, in the spring of 1792 the boy, Carl, not yet 12 years old, was taken off by his father and delivered as an officer apprentice to the presitgious 34th Infantry regiment of the Prussian Army, of which one of his stepuncles was colonel. In that regiment, which maintained a school for its officer candidates and young officers, he continued his education, witnessed his first combat (in the War of the First Coalition shortly after his 13th birthday), and won his commission. From the regiment, having distinguished himself as officer and student, he was sent to the school for infantry and cavalry officers in Berlin in 1801, the year that Gerhard von Scharnhorst, a Hanoverian officer who had recently entered the service of the Prussian King, assumed control of the school, which he was to turn into the leading Prussian Army school for the education of its officers.

Thus began the first of Clausewitz' three periods in Berlin, which were to represent successively higher peaks of his professional and scholarly life. Graduating in 1803 at the head of his class, Clausewitz continued in an association with Scharnhorst, his first great model, mentor, and friend, that was to continue until the latter's death in 1813. At the same time, the young officer was appointed by his King, Frederick William III, adjutant (military aide) to Prince August of Prussia, who was a nephew of Frederick the Great and Frederick William's cousin. Clausewitz' duties to the Prince were undemanding and the association opened doors to him that had hitherto been closed. It was during the next 3 years, then, that he first began making contacts with the intellectual as well as the social life of the Prussian capital—and to do his own writing, including a long study of Gustavus Adolphus' campaigns of 1630-1632 and a critical review of one of the books of Heinrich von Bülow. The latter was the first and one of the few of his works to be published in his lifetime. It was also during these years that he met Marie von Bruehl, who was to become his wife 5 years later.

This springtime of Clausewitz' professional career ended in 1806 when, Frederick William III and his ministers having contrived, first, to isolate Prussia from its potential allies and then to involve it in war with Napoleon, Clausewitz and Prince August, who was commanding a battalion of grenadiers, marched with the main Prussian force to defeat at Auerstadt. Captured by the French 2 weeks later, Clausewitz and his Prince were to pass the next 8 months as the "supervised guests" of the French Government in various places in France and then a further 2 months in Switzerland (where they were the guests of Mme. de Stael) awaiting passports. There were further delays in and around Berlin, then occupied by the French, before Clausewitz succeeded, in April 1808, in rejoining the court and Scharnhorst in Koenigsberg, East Prussia.

In Koenigsberg and then back in Berlin (in October 1809), Clausewitz became heavily engaged in Scharnhorst's efforts to reconstruct and reform the Prussian Army. These duties continued but in 1810 other responsibilities and honors were added. First, in the spring of 1810 Clausewitz was appointed

military tutor to the Crown Prince. Then, in the summer, he was appointed to the general staff and also to the faculty of the *Kriegsschule* from which he had graduated 7 years earlier. In December 1810, having obtained the permission both of her mother and of the King (the former very reluctantly), Clausewitz married Marie von Bruehl. By then he was fairly launched on the second of his productive Berlin periods, during which he was to write his *Principles of War*, actually an essay summarizing his instruction for the teenage Crown Prince and his younger brother.[6]

Just as the uninspired, uninspiring, and indecisive leadership of Frederick William III and his ministers had involved an isolated Prussian monarchy in war with the Empire of Napoleon in 1806, so, 6 years later, the same inept direction of the affairs of the monarchy resulted in its becoming an ally of its conqueror. The Franco-Prussian Treaty of 24 February 1812 was considered intolerable by many of the Prussian officer corps, including most of the reformers around Scharnhorst. Among the older officers a number retired or became inactive; among the young some 30, including Carl von Clausewitz, resigned their commissions and went off to join the forces of the Tsar, Prussia's formal enemy but traditional friend and ally.

Clausewitz' brief career as a Russian Army officer was interesting and instructive (he was present at Borodino and witnessed the slaughter of the Grand Army and its camp followers at the crossing of the Berezina) but otherwise unproductive—until Tauroggen. There, in December 1812, Clausewitz drafted the famous convention and shared in the conduct of the negotiations by which Lieutenant General von Yorck took his forces out of the war against the Russians. As his troops comprised more than half the corps commanded by Marshal Macdonald, which was guarding the north (or northwest) flank of the retreating Grand Army, Yorck's action so weakened the corps that the French were compelled to abandon East Prussia. There, in Koenigsberg, early in 1813, initially in defiance of his King, Yorck, assisted by vom Stein, Clausewitz, and other Prussians in Tsarist uniform, began the rebuilding of the Prussian Army.

After the Prussian King's reluctant declaration of war on Napoleon, in March 1813, Clausewitz, still a Russian officer, found himself once again working for Scharnhorst, this time in Silesia. In the spring campaign of 1813 Clausewitz served as a Russian liaison officer on Blücher's staff. In that capacity he was present at the battle of Grossgoerschen where Scharnhorst received the wound that was to prove fatal (and, indeed, was lightly wounded himself). Later in the year, Clausewitz was assigned to the Army of the North, which placed him on a sideshow front and caused him to miss the great battles of Dresden and Leipzig (August and October 1813) and Napoleon's defeat. In such action as he saw, however, Clausewitz distinguished himself, and he was promoted to full colonel in the Russian Army. He retained that rank when, in April 1814, he was finally readmitted to the Prussian Army.

In the final campaign of the Napoleonic wars, after the French Emperor's return from Elbe, Clausewitz served as chief of staff of Thielmann's corps, covering the right (east) flank of Blücher's army. The Corps, heavily engaged at

Wavre against the superior forces of Marshal Grouchy, was successful in preventing the latter from reinforcing Napoleon but was itself forced into retreat on, of all days, the day of Waterloo, 18 June 1815.

After Napoleon's abdication Clausewitz served briefly in the Prussian army of occupation in France then returned to Germany where he became chief of staff to the commanding general on the Rhine. His first commander in this position was August Wilhelm Neidhardt von Gneisenau (who had been Blücher's chief of staff at Waterloo and had been made a count and awarded an estate). Gneisenau had been a close associate of Scharnhorst and a leader among the army reformers; he was to be Clausewitz' closest friend and most loyal patron for the remainder of their lives.

Clausewitz continued to serve on the Rhine for 3 years and then returned to Berlin for the third time, in December 1818, as Director (administrative head) of the *Allgemeine Kriegsschule* with rank of major general. It was while in that undemanding position, from 1819 to 1830, in the most productive of his three Berlin periods, that he wrote and partially revised *Vom Kriege*. In the latter year, at his own request, he was given another assignment. He had held this position only a few months when, later in the year, he was again assigned as chief of staff to Gneisnau, by then a *Feldmarshall*, who had been called back to active duty from retirement to command Prussian forces watching the Polish border during the insurrection of 1830 in that country. Gneisenau had been unsuccessfully urging the King to appoint Clausewitz chief of the general staff; when he asked for Clausewitz to head his own staff he was more successful. In the course of the following year, 1831, both the Field Marshal and his chief of staff died of the cholera that was spreading into Prussia from across the Polish border.

Though Clausewitz never had the chance to distinguish himself as a major commander his military career was, nevertheless, highly successful. Paret disputes the commonly expressed opinion that Clausewitz was embittered by his failure to achieve greatness as a commander, pointing out that when he sought employment with other governments (as he did on several occasions) he put himself forward as an experienced staff officer. On the other hand, Paret seems a bit too hard on Frederick William III, to whom Clausewitz, in moments of depression, charged his failure to receive more interesting and promising assignments and greater recognition. It is not surprising that the King should have felt strongly about the young upstart, however brilliant, upon whom he had lavished favors and trust, including the military education of his heir, and yet who was so free with his criticisms and so sure of his own judgment that he defied his monarch and joined the nominal enemy at a crucial juncture in the life of the kingdom. But it was that same King, though he subsequently kept the headstrong military intellectual at arm's length, who appointed Clausewitz to the high positions he held after his return from Russia, honored him for his achievements, bestowed noble rank upon him and his family, and might well, in the end, have made him head of the Prussian general staff as Gneisenau urged, if the Field Marshal and his brilliant protégé had lived a few years longer.

Carl von Clausewitz cannot, then, be considered a failure in his chosen career even if the heights of martial glory were denied him. Was he,

nevertheless, a whining neurotic obsessed by his disappointments? This is the impression some of his biographers have offered. Paret is in vigorous disagreement. Clausewitz, he says, did complain of his fate on occasion. In general, though, his mind was fundamentally healthy, much more so than his body. His biographer takes satisfaction in citing the hard original works of scholarship on which Clausewitz was engaged just when he was sharing some of his more morbid reflections with his wife and a few close friends. By contrast, Paret reports at length on Clausewitz' several chronic ailments and recurrent intervals of ill health. These seem to have had no adverse effects on his career beyond ending it prematurely—Paret says that he died of a heart attack brought on by a mild case of the cholera—but doubtless contributed to the pessimism frequently expressed in his journals and personal correspondence.

Peter Paret says of his biography:

> Despite admirable studies of facets of Clausewitz's thought, the literature is still so fragmented and contradictory in its findings that the need to return to the sources and to the historical environment cannot be doubted. That is what I have tried to do in this book. . . .
>
> In many respects what I have written is little more than a preliminary outline, which might help others go farther. If I have explored some topics in detail—for instance, Clausewitz's early education, which has been largely ignored—I am far from claiming to have analyzed in depth each of the many aspects of his life, of his scholarship, and of his theories.[7]

Obviously, any review of his book must be even more selective. In what follows, then, only a few of the aspects of Clausewitz' career that Paret probes in-depth will be considered and those chosen for examination will be concerned almost exclusively with Clausewitz' theory of war. At the same time, the reviewer will hesitate neither to impose his own interpretations on the biographer's judgments nor to introduce elements of that career omitted from examination by the biographer when doing so seems appropriate.

III

Paret's search for the elements of Clausewitz' theory of war in his earlier writings, each of which is examined in its historical and career context, is a major contribution to a better understanding of his thought. The search begins with Clausewitz' study of Gustavus Adolphus' campaigns of 1630-1632, which was referred to earlier. This study was written during Clausewitz' first years in Berlin, after his graduation from Scharnhorst's college and before the war of 1806. Included in the biographer's search are also a number of essays on "strategy" written at about the same time and a review of one of the books of Heinrich von Bülow. Neither the paper on Gustavus Adolphus nor the essays were published in Clausewitz' lifetime. The review was an exception. The first of the very small number of his works that Clausewitz did publish, it appeared anonymously in a journal in 1805.[8] In these works Paret discovers early versions of several of the ideas that are

salient in Clausewitz' later and more mature writings on war, notably his focus on individual experience and on the immaterial in war, especially "the moral and psychological qualities of the commander." Paret also notes the rejection both of the rationalist conceptions prominent in the works of Bülow (and of Jomini) and of the rampant irrationalism of Georg Heinrich von Berenhorst.

Thus, as Paret shows, from the very earliest phase of his theorymaking Clausewitz sought a melding of the quantitative and the immeasurable, of the material and the psychological, of the predictable and the accidental, of the empirical and the abstract, to produce a theory that reflected war as it was at the time (and, in some respects, had always been)—not of war as it should be or would be if commanders but adhered to the principles and obeyed the rules laid down for them by the theorist. To achieve this melding (and thus to accomplish what Hans Rothfels has characterized as his "Copernican revolution" in military theory) Clausewitz employed a number of different tools of analysis.[9] Paret observes that he derived some of them, including notably his concept of "genius," from Kant or, as he says " . . . more accurately [from] the aesthetic theories of the German Enlightenment. . . . "

> Possibly in Kant's *Critique of Judgment*, but certainly in Kiesewetter's lectures on *Critique*, Clausewitz had learned that "genius is the talent (natural ability) that establishes rules for the arts. Since this talent, as an innate creative ability of the artist, is itself part of nature, we might also express ourselves in this manner: Genius is the innate psychological power *(ingenium)* through which nature establishes rules for the arts."[10]

A part of the solution, then, to the problem of theorymaking on a subject as fraught with psychological and other sources of uncertainty and disorder as war was to borrow from that branch of philosophy that attempts to explain what is meant by "the beautiful"—usually as applied to the fine arts. It seems likely (though Paret does not say so) that Clausewitz was attracted to aesthetics by the resemblance he perceived in the roles of the military commander and the artist, to whom, if he was successful, genius was also commonly attributed. Clausewitz was also aware of the inadequacy of the analogy: in aesthetics there is no enemy!

This excursion into the theory of aesthetics yielded one of the dicta for which Clausewitz is known: " . . . what genius does is the best rule, and theory can do no better than to show how and why this should be the case.[11] As Paret says, Clausewitz "meant by genius the harmonious combination of qualities needed for supreme achievement in a particular area of activity."

But this is not the whole story. For genius is not a law unto itself, even if that is the impression one receives from some of Clausewitz' comments on the subject. Genius is not genius unless it "works," is successful, and every would-be genius must prove himself in situations only partially subject to his control. Further, as Paret explains, Clausewitz obtained more than just the idea of genius from Kantian aesthetics. He also obtained the concept of "means and purposes" and with it some conception of how genius does work.[12]

In choosing aesthetics as a useful analogy, Clausewitz was not arguing that war *is* an art. Indeed, he explicitly rejected that conclusions, saying that even for purposes of comparison commerce is a better fit because commerce is at least concerned, as war is, with conflicts "of human interests and activities." He added that "politics" is an even better analogy. The essence is that "in war the will is directed at an animate object that *reacts.*"[13] Consequently, no one-sided perspective, ignoring the parallel actions of the opponent, can be fully satisfactory. On the other hand, theory must begin somewhere. Paret quotes probably the best explanation for the approach that Clausewitz chose from an essay "On Art and Theory of Art," which he says was probably written during the reform era (1808-1815) though it was not published until 1941.[14]

> To combine purpose and means |in the arts| is to create. Art is the capacity to create; the theory of art teaches this combination to the extent that concepts can do so. Thus we may say: Theory is the representation of art by way of concepts. We can easily see that this constitutes the whole of art, with two exceptions: *talent,* which is fundamental to everything; and *practice.* The latter cannot be achieved through theory; consequently it is practice and exercise that distinguishes practical from theoretical instruction.[15]

It was the theoretical, of course, that interested Clausewitz—from which he was seeking to develop his theory of war by analogy. Maintaining this distinction, Paret quotes from another of his essays written before *On War:* " . . . the function of theory is to educate the practical man, to train his judgment, rather than to assist him directly in the performance of his duties."[16]

Paret summarizes the analysis in terms of means and purposes in Clausewitz' theory of war as follows:

> The common properties of individual cases spring from the relationship between energy and intention. Their recognition alone makes possible the conceptualization of dynamic universals. Principles of action and maxims are always subordinate to the understanding of the entire field of activity. . . .
>
> . . . laws which identify the relationship between parts of a whole are necessary and valid in the analytic, cognitive process. They lose much of their validity in the realm of action, since specific actions do not follow laws, or rules derived from them. . . . The analysis of means and purposes, however, does permit generalizations of some practical value.[17]

Let us now see if it is possible to represent what is being said by the biographer in simpler language. We should begin by recognizing that while he is writing about *theory* in the passage quoted, he also has in mind the *action* the theory is intended to reflect. We must next recognize that the concept of means and purposes does not get us very far. It is an approach, not a solution. It does not yield propositions, the expected product of theory, directly.

Instead, it is a structure, a methodological device for putting our analysis in order so as to focus on efforts made and purposes achieved without attributing to their relationship invariable ("scientific") causality. We shall see later that despite all the fine-spun examination of the neoidealist influences in which Paret engages to explain how Clausewitz evolved his theory, to the latter himself it is the results that matter. How it comes out determines whether genius has made the correct decisions, whether, indeed, genius *is* genius.

The Evolution of Clausewitz' Theory. The analysis starts as follows. In the study of war (as in aesthetics, but the analogy will not be pursued further here) among the elements common to particular instances (wars, battles, etc.), are the means employed, the purposes (aims or objectives) for which the means are employed, and the decisions made by the employer of the means—hereafter referred to as the commander. When a series of such instances is examined (as in military history), observed at firsthand, or experienced, certain patterned recurrences (universals) become apparent amid the "infinite diversity of combinations." Considered as a whole and synthesized into a single image, these patterns enable us to identify and characterize war itself. Considered separately, some of the patterns appear in the form of causal relations, indicating various ways in which the available means have been employed to achieve desired ends (by commanders in past or current wars). Owing to the nature of the insights on which these causal perceptions are based, they are not reducible to invariable rules (or laws) that may be used to guide the conduct of military operations, or for the formulation of authoritative theoretical guides to action.[18] Nevertheless (in Paret's language in the passage quoted above), " . . . the analysis of means and purposes . . . does permit generalizations of some practical value."[19]

Paret explains:

> In theory as well as in history, the identical phenomenon may be either means or purpose, depending on the context and one's point of view. In tactics—the part of war related to the particular battle—the fighting forces are the means, victory is the purpose. In strategy—the part of war related to the use of battle for the purpose of the war—victory is the means to attain this purpose. War as a whole is the means to fulfill the political purpose. . . . By analyzing each aspect of military planning and execution for its relationship to the military aim, and by extension to the war's political purpose, theory can assign each particular means to its proper place in the over-all structure of war, and evaluate its effectiveness.[20]

As to the causal relations referred to, they may be readily illustrated by citing some of the major conclusions of the Clausewitz theory. One of his rare summations of these appears in the unfinished note he seems to have written to accompany the manuscript of *On War* into storage when, in 1830, he was preparing to take up his duties with Gneisenau on the Polish border. In that note, after alluding to "the obvious fact that a whole range of propositions can be demonstrated without difficulty," he provided a listing from which the following items are extracted:

> . . . that defense is the stronger form of fighting with the negative purpose, attack the weaker form with the positive purpose; . . . that victory consists not only in the occupation of the battlefield, but in the destruction of the enemy's physical and psychic forces, which is usually not attained until the enemy is pursued after a victorious battle; . . . and that every attack loses impetus as it progresses.[21]

How then are these "generalizations of some practical value" arrived at and what purpose do they serve? It is reasonable to assume that the answers will differ depending upon the perspective, whether of the commander or the theorist of war (though a given individual might be both). Beginning with the former, it may be postulated that the commander carries around with him a store of knowledge of war, some part of which is comprised of his collection of patterned recurrences, or generalizations, such as we are considering. It may also be posited that he will have obtained these from various sources, presumably in part from his own study and the instruction he has received, and in part from his experience and observation of war. Clausewitz added that as the potential knowledge of war is so vast, the commander's store of *useful* knowledge is necessarily selective–he cannot and need not know all there is to know about war. Indeed, all he needs is the comparatively simple knowledge appropriate to his exercise of command.[22] Furthermore, although he may have acquired some of his knowledge from instruction and *may* be able to communicate what he knows–for example, by serving as an instructor in military schools or writing books on war–it is not essential to his role as a commander that he be able to communicate what he knows, nor even that he be wholly conscious of it.

What *is* essential is, first, that he have the requisite talent (genius) to apply his knowledge flexibly, whatever its source, and, second, that this knowledge of his subject (war) be so thoroughly assimilated that it becomes almost second nature, "a genuine capability" (which Clausewitz also called "judgment"), with the result that when he acts (makes his military decisions) he may do so *as if by instinct,* even though we know, from Clausewitz, that his understanding of war, gained by study and reflection, will have become an "active ingredient" of that capability. Clausewitz says, in the course of his discussion, that the commander-in-chief "need not be a learned historian nor a political commentator . . . [but] no great commander was ever a man of limited intellect."[23] Evidently, the process of assimilation by which the commander's knowledge is transformed into capability is the equivalent of the process in the arts by which *practice* transforms the artist's *talent* into the *skill* (or genius) that creates.[24]

If we turn now to the theorist we see him having to follow the steps taken by the commander, though with some important differences. The theorist also begins with means and purposes and then looks for the patterns (universals and their relations) in the detail (the particulars). But as a theorist he is more interested in understanding and in communicating his understanding than in doing. Consequently, he *must* articulate what he perceives; he must be able to communicate his theory to others, and he must think more comprehensively.

The requirement for more comprehensive thinking, though an obvious part of the effort to understand and to communicate, sets the theorist farther apart from the commander. In Paret's terms, it launches him in search of those "laws" that are "valid in the analytic, cognitive process" though of limited validity "in the realm of action."[25] In Clausewitz' language the objective is "to analyze everything down to the basic elements, to *incontrovertible truth.*"[26] But the distinction may also be conceived in less arcane terms. The performance of the theorist *qua* theorist is measured by standards different from those applied to the commander because his function and his objective are different. His success is not determined by performance under the stress of war but by his skill and compelling logic in *evaluating* the performance of commanders. This he does not only by *comparing* commanders with one another but also by measuring them against theoretical criteria of his own devising. Thus theory permits its skillful user to stand apart from and in effect *above* the decisions that manifest military genius. Theory does this because it endows the theorist, or anyone who possesses the requisite talent and is using his theory correctly, with "wider horizons" from which to judge the decisions of even the best military commanders, the most creative military geniuses.[27] If this was not so, theory would have nothing to offer the military commander, it would neither "train his judgment" nor "guide him in his self-education."[28] We might also add: Neither would a theory that did not provide this superior perspective have justified Clausewitz in criticizing the decisions of Frederick the Great and Napoleon, the commanders whose military genius he most readily acknowledged.[29]

"Critical Analysis." Clausewitz had said that for what he called *Kritik* (which Howard and Paret translate as "critical analysis" but would be better translated as "strategic" or "operational analysis") it is essential to pursue the analysis of actual events until the realm of "incontrovertible truth" is reached. He had also said that this would be impossible without a theory "to set a limit to [the analyst's] inquiries." He later explained what he meant by this when he said that "critical analysis is not just an evaluation of the means actually employed, but of all possible means–*which first have to be formulated, that is, invented.*"

> One can, after all, not condemn a method without being able to suggest a better alternative. No matter how small the range of possible combinations may be in most cases, it cannot be denied that listing those that have not been used is not a mere analysis of existing things but an achievement that cannot be performed to order *since it depends on the creativity of the intellect.*[30]

Having laid this foundation for the role of the theorist–in his capacity as a strategic or operational analyst–Clausewitz said, later in the same discussion, that in distributing praise or blame the analyst should always try to put himself in the commander's place. But he must also recognize that this can only be done imperfectly as he will "always lack much that was present in the mind of the commander." At the same time, the analyst may be expected to know more of military history and he will possess the enormous advantage of knowing the outcome. In any case, he added (making a gesture such as

advisors and critics have doubtless made down through the ages), the analyst need not, and would not, "lay claim to the talent of a Frederick or a Bonaparte." Instead, however, he "must be allowed to profit from the wider horizons available to [him]."

> To judge even the slightest act of talent, it is necessary for the [analyst] to take a more comprehensive point of view, so that he . . . reduces subjectivity to a minimum, and so avoids judging by his own, possibly limited, standards.
>
> If the analyst points out that a Frederick or a Bonaparte made mistakes, it does not mean that he would not have made them too. He may even admit that in the general's place he might have made far greater errors. What it does mean is that he can recognize these mistakes *from the pattern of events* and feels that the commander's sagacity should have seen them as well.[31]

Clausewitz also said that the fact that knowledge of the results would be a part of the analyst's judgment did not mean that his judgment was inadmissible. Indeed, quite the contrary, for evaluation of the decisions of military commanders *in the light of the results obtained* was of the essence of the analyst's function.

> Success enables us to understand much that the workings of human intelligence alone would not be able to discover. That means that it will be useful mainly in revealing intellectual and psychological forces and effects, because these are least subject to reliable evaluation, and also because they are so closely involved with the will that they may easily control it.[32]

Paret does not include an examination of Clausewitz' view of the theorist's critical or analytic role, as expounded in Book II, Chapter 5 of *On War*, in his account of the development of Clausewitz' theory of war. Instead, he follows the thread of that development by examining the concept of *friction in war*, observing that Clausewitz had produced the concept around 1806 at the same time that he was producing his concept of *genius in war* and adding that the two concepts "reappear essentially unchanged in *On War*."[33]

Friction. Paret points out that Clausewitz conceived friction in two senses, physical and psychological, and the latter as by far the more important. "All war presupposes human weakness, and seeks to exploit it."[34] Thus–

> . . . a battle-hardened, experienced army may be compared to a lubricant that reduces the friction of the various human and organizational parts of the machine; but for the engine to operate efficiently more is required: intellectual and psychological forces, "moral qualities," genius.[35]

In other words, at least on the psychological side, the same factors that account for friction are available to overcome it. As Paret explains;

> These factors . . . reside in the talent of the commander [i.e., in his military genius], the military virtues of the army, and the spirit of society as reflected in its soldiers, popular influences which Clausewitz enumerates as enthusiasm, fanatic energy, faith, political beliefs.[36]

> It is the creative employment of intellectual and psychological strengths that alone can overcome friction, exploit chance, and turn the imponderable into an asset: . . .[37]

Napoleon and his postrevolutionary France bulk large in the background of this thinking. For friction is not only what makes war difficult (despite its simple appearance in theory or "on paper") it is also what Napoleon excelled by overcoming and exploiting. So to surmount one's own friction and to exploit the friction of one's enemy was to approach Napoleonic standards of excellence in warmaking. It was also to conduct war more as he conducted it, all-out, with the sole objective of military victory. Thus it is obvious why friction, or rather the failure to use it successfully (or as well as Napoleon did), could be regarded as that which distinguished ordinary wars from wars that were considered "true" or "perfect" wars because they were wars conducted as the French "god of war" made war.[38]

We return now to the psychological factors, which both account for the most significant elements of friction and make it possible for those elements to be overcome. We are greatly indebted to Paret for explaining how Clausewitz incorporated these nonmaterial or psychic elements into his theory.[39]

Early in his account the biographer observes that Clausewitz complained about the dearth of usable psychological theory and expresses his agreement, saying: "In one sense, the discussion of psychological elements constitutes the weakest part of *On War* . . . Clausewitz's general analysis of psychological forces suffers because too often these are discussed only in the context of genius."

> But if Clausewitz was precluded by the state of psychology in his time from incorporating a clinically and logically consistent theory of feelings and behavior into *On War*, the importance and originality of his attempt to do so is not diminished.[40]

Paret further observes that earlier writers on war had noted the importance of feelings but, regarding them as "essentially unfathomable," had then ignored them. "Clausewitz, on the contrary, contends that psychological factors form a major element of war . . . and that consequently theory must deal with them."[41]

In his chapter on "Superiority of Numbers," Chapter 8 of Book III of *On War*, Clausewitz said: "European armies are comparable in equipment, organization, and training. Such differences as may exist are to be found in the spirit of the troops and the ability of the commander."[42] The passages from his biography reviewed and quoted in the preceding paragraphs illustrate Paret's endeavor to show how this Clausewitzian insight was incorporated

into the theory of war under the rubric of friction and how the commander's "capability" (judgment or genius), supported by the "military virtue of the army," may spell the difference between success and failure in war. In brief, the message is that despite the great importance that Clausewitz attributed to numerical superiority he nevertheless insisted that the *better* army--that is, the force (and commander) that is superior at overcoming its own and exploiting its enemy's friction—rather than the stronger or the more aggressive, may win.

Absolute War: The First Model. Examination of Clausewitz' theory next moves logically to his concepts of *absolute war* and of *war's political purpose.* Internal evidence and the testimony of Clausewitz' notes of 1827 and 1830 on the status of the *On War* manuscript and his plans for revising it both indicate that neither of these concepts assumed the forms with which we are familiar (from Chapter I, of Book I) until near the end of Clausewitz' career as a writer and theorist. Indeed, though he clearly perceived, described, and identified the unbridled tendencies of Napoleonic war both in earlier writings and in the unrevised drafts of *On War,* it seems indisputable that the abstract concept of absolute war was not formulated until Clausewitz came to the writing of Book VIII or even until he had completed the manuscript and was engaged in making his revisions—including revisions of Book VIII. Similarly, it is highly probable that the final version of the concept of political purpose was developed at the same time. This places their formulation between 1827, when Clausewitz completed the draft, presumably by writing the books of *On War* that he described as mere "outlines," that is, Books VII and VIII, and began his revisions, and 1830 when he prepared the manuscript, as revised, for storage and possible posthumous publication.[43]

To be sure, there are passages in Book VI, which are not among the revised parts of *On War,* where the term "absolute war" is actually employed. The first of these occurs in Chapter 28, the title of which is "Defense of a Theater of Operations—Continued." In this chapter, as in so many other places in *On War,* Clausewitz was discussing the difference between Napoleonic wars and the more frequent wars of lesser intensity in military history. At one point, early in the chapter, he said: "We shall, therefore, start by considering the kind of war that is completely governed and saturated by the urge for a decision—of true war, or absolute war, *if we may call it that."*[44] The words emphasized *(wenn wir uns so ausdruecken duerfen)* suggest that this was the first occasion in the drafting of *On War* when the expression "absolute war" was used. Clausewitz would hardly have displayed such diffidence over an expression he had already introduced into his discussion. This conjecture seems at least partially confirmed by the fact that when the same expression occurs in Chapter 30 of Book VI, in the phrase "in the *absolute* form of war" *(in der absoluten form des Krieges),* it is without the apology.[45]

Paret introduces the concept of absolute war into his biography at the stage just prior to its arrival at its final form. He says he proposes to describe its characteristics from a "new point of view." He therefore compares it to the methodology of the modern German philosophical school of "phenomenology." The essence of the matter seems to be that the members

of the school derive their (phenomenological) abstractions, not from experience (by inductive generalization) nor even by examining the same phenomenon in various settings, but by analysis of the properties of a single intuitively conceived phenomenon. Thus, while recognizing that Clausewitz "combined intensive analysis of the structure of war itself with broad historical comparisons," Paret continues.

> Basically, however, he took a single phenomenon, varied it in imagination to see what properties were essential to it and what properties could be removed in thought without affecting its essence.[46]

The analogy is useful though it may seem a bit contrived when we reflect that Edmund Husserl (1859-1938), the founder of the phenomenological school, was born a quarter of a century after Clausewitz' death. Also abstractions of the kind that interested Clausewitz were readily available from contemporary German philosophers. On the other hand, the Husserlian parallel does have the virtue of opening the subject of war "in the abstract" with the correct emphasis on Clausewitz' ultimate use of the abstraction mainly as a "regulative idea" (in Paret's phrase) rather than, as so often happens in historical and less sophisticated critical accounts of his work, with the emphasis on "true" or "perfect" or "pure" war as a teleological "ideal" of which Napoleonic war is the model.[47] Unfortunately, because his own view of the matter changed while he was writing *On War* (indeed while he was engaged in his last revisions) Clausewitz was not consistent in his use of the concept, with the effect that the casual or uncritical reader may, indeed, be left in doubt whether he conceived absolute war as the perfection that all wars approximate and towards which all wars move if correctly conducted, or merely as a convenient cognitive device for achieving agreement and understanding on (in Paret's words) "the only feature that distinguished war from all other human activities," or as a combination of the two.

That feature Clausewitz originally referred to rather vaguely as "true war" or as the "nature" or "essence" of war but after he had formed the purified concept he labeled it specifically "absolute war" and thereafter referred to it by that label or by one of a few equally specific synonyms, notably "war in the abstract" or "war to the extreme." What he meant by it, as he explained in Book I, Chapter I of *On War*, was not just the element of violence in war but the necessity of winning the violent encounter to avoid being defeated. To achieve the image he wanted Clausewitz did, indeed, as Paret says, strip war of all its aspects—material, social, psychological, institutional, organizational, historical, and political—leaving nothing but two fictional individual combatants, each seeking to dominate the other in order to avoid being dominated. He suggested that we think of these combatants as wrestlers, and added: "Each of them tries by physical force to compel the other to do his will: his immediate aim is to *throw* his opponent in order to make him incapable of further resistance. *So war* is an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will."[48] Furthermore, to make doubly certain that his reader would understand that the two opponents were unrestrained and had no motives but to dominate each other by violent means, Clausewitz added later in the chapter that absolute war had no temporal context, no past and no future (hence it was "uninfluenced by any previous estimate of the

political situation it might bring about"), and no duration as it consisted "of a single decisive act or set of simultaneous ones."[49]

This absolute war concept may be regarded as the distilled essence of that synthesized image of war considered as a whole. It was suggested earlier that Clausewitz expected both his commander and his theorist of war to derive from their study, observation, and (possibly) experience of real war. The distinguishing characteristic of war in this conception, it bears repeating, was a violent conflict, interaction, tending to extreme efforts, each of the unhampered belligerents being rationally motivated to commit its energies and resources with the utmost dispatch and to the limit of its capabilities in order to avoid being overcome and dominated by the other. In today's language, in what he called an "interaction" tending "to the extreme," Clausewitz was invoking the image of "automatic" escalation—an escalation of military violence resulting solely from the innate dynamic of armed conflict, as opposed to "deliberate" escalation, which is conceived as a strategic and tactical choice.

The Model Amended. With this highly abstract concept as his starting point, in Book I, Chapter I Clausewitz proceeded to analyze war in reality by reintroducing and examining separately the various factors he had eliminated to form his abstraction. Essentially, what he did was to amend his abstract model, first by making it social instead of individual (thereby reintroducing all the sources of delay and uncertainty associated with organizational operations); second, by reintroducing the temporal element, not only the material factors that contribute to delays but also history (the background of the conflict) and experience (including the knowlege the opposed commanders have of each other); and, finally, by reintroducing the factor of political purpose, the "stakes," as we might say, which contribute to the determination of the scope and intensity of actual wars.[50] The product of this exercise is a situation in which the different varieties of friction (though the word "friction" is not employed in this chapter) and uncertainty reign, in which each of the belligerents, "using the laws of probability," can estimate how the other is likely to proceed "and acts accordingly," and in which history (the background), the capabilities of the commanders, and the objectives of the state all play crucial roles.

Clausewitz hastened to add, however, that none of these modifications of the abstract concept adequately accounts for the interruption or suspension of military activity in an ongoing war. His explanation in Book I, Chapter I, why this is the case, attributing pause in war to the greater strength of the defensive and to the ever-present uncertainty of war, is not among the more luminous in *On War*.[51] Perhaps this is the reason why Paret does not work his way through the first chapter of *On War* to complete his exposition of Clausewitz' theory.

However that may be, what the biographer does, after presenting the abstract concept of absolute war by means of his Husserlian parallel, is to make an excursion through several others of Clausewitz' works of the period just before the writing of *On War* was begun. His survey comes briefly into focus on an essay he says that Clausewitz probably wrote in 1817, "On

Progression and Pause in Military Activity." Paret describes this essay as the basis for ideas expressed in the chapter on "The Suspension of Action in War" in *On War*, Book III, Chapter 16, as well as in other parts of the treatise.

The major question addressed in the brief essay, from Paret's account, was why wars progress so slowly and last so long, with frequent and sometimes prolonged pauses, in view of the apparent lesson from the wars of Napoleon "that any interruption in violent activity goes against the nature of war." The explanations offered were both the historic context—that "war consists in a relationship of two opposing sides, whose perceptions, emotions, and judgment affect each other's actions and reactions"—and also certain inherent characteristics of war in reality, which Clausewitz compared to "ratchet wheels, pendulums, or counterweights." Paret's brief discussion is not as precise as it might be but among the factors mentioned are uncertainty, the imperfect knowledge of the commanders on both sides of their own and of the enemy position, and, again, the greater strength of the defensive.[52] Together with the political factor, these are considerations that enter into both the earlier version of the explanation for the duration of war in *On War*, that in Book III, Chapter 16, and the presumably definitive version in Book I, Chapter 1.

Following this excursion into its immediate background, Paret finally comes to *On War* itself. He outlines its structure and makes some general observations, for example, on how the treatise "contains little on the ethics of violence and barely refers to the possibilities of irrational political leadership" and on why it does not treat the naval side of war.[53]

He then returns to his examination of the relations between abstract and actual (or, as he prefers to say, between "true" and "real") war and, for that purpose, to the question of progression and pause in war.[54] This time he addresses his inquiry to Chapter 16 of Book III, "The Suspension of Action in War," where the argument roughly parallels (and anticipates) that in Book I, Chapter 1.[55] The conclusion, in Paret's language, is that "inactivity of both sides at the same time appears contradictory to the nature of war." That, however, is the theory. In fact, as Paret also observes: "History shows that pause is the rule and action the exception in war."[56] How do we explain the paradox? Clausewitz listed three "determinants" to explain the pauses in actual wars. As Paret summarizes them they are: "human fear and indecisiveness, which are intensified in war; imperfect insight into reality, which leads to errors in judgment; and the greater strength of the defensive." Clausewitz then added, though, that these determinants are inadequate to explain long periods of inactivity such as occurred in most wars before Napoleon's time. To explain that phenomenon (continuing Paret's summary) Clausewitz invoked "weak political motives, which may be so feeble that they turn war into a fragmentary thing [*das sie den Krieg zu einem Halbdinge machen*]"[57] Clausewitz continued:

> These factors [i.e., weak political motives] can become so influential that they reduce war to something tame and half-hearted. War often is nothing more than armed neutrality, a threatening attitude meant to support negotiations, a mild attempt to gain some small advantage

> before sitting back and letting matters take their course, or a disagreeable obligation imposed by an alliance, to be discharged with as little effort as possible.[58]

He added that in his own day many theorists saw "in this type of conflict . . . the real, authentic art of war." To them the wars of Napoleon appeared as "crude brawls that [could] teach nothing and that [were] to be considered as lapses into barbarism." But he also said that this conception was "as petty as its subject." The lesson of the French Revolution—and even of Frederick the Great (who "surprised the Austrians in the quiet of their antiquated ways of war and shook their monarchy to its foundations")—could not be ignored. "Woe to the government, which, relying on half-hearted politics and a shackled military policy, meets a foe who, like the untamed elements, knows no law other than his own power!"[59] In sum, the explanations offered for the pauses in war in Book III, Chapter 16 do not suggest that when he wrote the chapter Clausewitz had modified his teleological conception of Napoleonic war as the prototype or perfect model of all war into his later more cognitive concept of absolute war.[60]

Political War: The Second Model. Paret, indeed, explains that "for many years" Clausewitz had argued that all wars, whatever their purpose, "must be waged with supreme effort" even though, as early as 1804, he was prepared to distinguish between wars "waged to destroy one's opponent, to terminate his political existence," and wars waged to weaken the opponent sufficiently so that one could "impose conditions [on him] at the peace conference."

> Yet while drawing this distinction, he denied that limited aims justified a limitation of effort. In his notes for *Strategy* as well as in the essay for the crown prince some years later, he argued that even if no more was intended than compelling the opponent to agree to terms, his power and will to resist must be broken. For political and social as well as for military reasons, the preferred way of achieving victory was the shortest, most direct way, and that meant using all available force.

Paret goes on to say that until 1817 "these arguments retained what might be called formal supremacy in Clausewitz' writings even as he was coming to appreciate that they were one-sided." The biographer insists, however, that the essay, "On Progression and Pause," written in that year, indicated that Clausewitz "was no longer content to impute the modification of military activity wholly to the force of friction."[61] Paret says further that by the mid-1820's "Clausewitz was convinced that often in the past limited conflicts had occurred, not because the protagonists' means precluded greater effort or because their leadership or will had faltered but because their intentions were too restricted to justify anything more. A war fought for limited goals was not necessarily a modification or corruption of the theoretical principle of absolute war." Paret's attempt to support this claim from Book III, Chapter 16, presumably written in the mid-1820's, is not wholly successful, as we have seen, probably because Clausewitz' ideas on this point were still changing and therefore neither clearly conceived nor precisely stated. Paret is on safer ground, though, when he adds that in his "Note of 10 July 1827" and "in his last version of Chapter 1 of Book I," Clausewitz declared that

> . . . a second type of war existed that was as valid as absolute war, not only in the field but also philosophically. Limited wars might be a modification of the absolute, but need not be, if the purpose for which they were waged was also limited. Violence continued to be the essence, the regulative idea, even of limited war fought for limited ends; but in such cases the essence did not require its fullest possible expression. The concept of absolute war had by no means become invalid and it continued to perform decisive analytic functions; but it was now joined by the concept of limited war.[62]

Paret argues further that this limiting effect of war's political purpose also performs a "regulative function" in Clausewitz' mature theory. He therefore labels it a *second absolute.*

> Instead of a single absolute [Clausewitz] now posited a pair of absolutes. Reality, the limitation of violence, need no longer be an imperfect version of the ideal; depending on the purpose of the particular war, and on the manner in which it was waged, reality might closely reflect the ideal—even more closely in a limited war than in an absolute conflict.[63]

Paret characterizes the creation of this second absolute as the "final correction of the regulative idea on which [Clausewitz] theories of war were based." He also says that it was "perhaps Clausewitz's most impressive intellectual and psychological achievement." With these judgments there is no quarrel. In calling the creation a second *absolute,* however, Paret is surely mistaken. The first of the two concepts—that of armed violence unlimited by nature until one combatant achieves domination over the other—was conceived (at least in its final revised version in Book I, Chapter 1) as the philosophic *idea* or essence of war. This Paret himself emphasizes several times, the second concept—of limitation of war in proportion to the interests at stake on the opposed sides—was obviously based upon an empirical generalization. This Clausewitz repeatedly insisted upon, as, for example, in the Note of 10 July 1827 itself where he said that "This distinction between the two kinds of war is a matter of actual fact."[64] We might say that Clausewitz was identifying the related concepts of *escalation* and *proportionaltiy,* both of which he considered essential to an understanding of war as it is in reality.[65] But the two concepts are not of the same character. There is a parallel (which Paret does not remark) with Clausewitz' concept of means and ends—if we conceive the former as being inherently unlimited (i.e., undirected) until the latter intervene to give their employment purpose. There would also appear to be at least an approximate model in German philosophy. That model is Kant's distinction between *pure* and *practical* reason, with Clausewitz' absolute war serving as a transcendental category of pure reason—a form of cognition without which reality cannot even be perceived, much less comprehended—and his concept of effort proportional to ends serving as the (rational) law of practical reason to bring the comprehension into harmony with the reality of human experience.

Curiously, in his biography Paret devotes comparatively little attention to Clausewitz' proposition that war is the instrument of policy, though what he

has to say on the subject is of interest. For example, he makes the odd remark that only with the formulation of the dual nature of war did that proposition become "theoretically and empirically accurate." He then says:

> But however Clausewitz's statement is interpreted, the reader of *On War* will find himself in accord with its author if he gives the political motives and character of war more prominence than they receive in much of the text, and, further, if he amends the unrevised sections to the effect that limited wars need not be a modification, but that theoretically as well as in reality two equally valid types of war exist.
>
> The practical point that emerged from the concept of the dual nature of war was not the commonplace that men fight for political reasons but that each specific conflict should be shaped and guided by the kind and intensity of its political motives. Violence should express the political purpose, not replace it.[66]

Commenting that "men who readily acknowledged the political roots of war found it difficult to follow Clausewitz to this conclusion," Paret next passes to a brief but valuable discussion of Clausewitz' two famous letters to his friend von Roeder, of 22 and 24 December 1827, in which he sought to dispose finally of the idea that Napoleonic war was the model for all time to come.

> If we wish to derive an art of war from the history of war—undoubtedly the only way an art of war can be established—we must not minimize the testimony of history. . . . We must not allow ourselves to be misled into regarding war as a pure act of force and of destruction. . . . We must recognize that war is a political act, which is not wholly independent, that it is a true political instrument, which does not act on its own but is controlled by something else: by the hand of politics.[67]

Paret lets the passage speak for itself.

And so it does. Nevertheless, it must still be considered curious—and regrettable—that in a book entitled *Clausewitz and the State*, of which a major theme—some readers might say *the* major theme—is Clausewitz' troubled relations with his own state, including his defection to the nominal enemy at one crucial juncture of his military career, there is no explanation of why the master theorist's own experience was in no way reflected in what he had to say about war's political purposes in his major theoretical treatise. Paret's only direct comment (in a paragraph in which it is mingled with observations on Clausewitz' attitude towards the ethics of war) is as follows:

> *On War* . . . barely refers to the possibilities of irrational political leadership, though passages point to the importance of [the issue]. . . . The question of rational, responsible political leadership pertained to the theory of politics, not of war, even if the delusions of a dictator or of an entire society led to insane and suicidal destruction.[68]

Though probably justified, this comment hardly seems to dispose of the matter.

To this reader of *On War,* the lesson to be derived from the theory is that *from the military perspective* the state could do no wrong. This is putting it a bit simplistically; Clausewitz did say that the government could err if it failed to take adequately into account the conditions and limitations of the military's services to the state. But he distinctly did *not* say that when this occurs the military should take the bit in their teeth and either defect as individuals or revolt in a body. Instead, he stated repeatedly and in a variety of ways in just those parts of the treatise that were the last to be written and revised that the military were the servants, the instruments, of policy—regardless of the substance, even the prudence, of that policy. Indeed, he also said, quite explicitly, that policy might be inept, imprudent, even corrupt, without ceasing to be the master the military serve.

> Policy, of course, is nothing in itself; it is simply the trustee for all [interests of the community] against the outside world. That it can err, subserve the ambition, private interests, and vanity of those in power is neither here nor there. In no sense can the art of war ever be regarded as the preceptor of policy . . ..[69]

Finally, to forestall the suggestion that the military might on occasion say what the interests of the community were, Clausewitz added the following:

> Subordinating the political point of view to the military would be absurd, for it is policy that creates war. Policy is the guiding intelligence and war only the instrument, not vice versa. No other possibility exists then, than to subordinate the military point of view to the political.[70]

Paret of course recognizes the incomplete and uneven character of *On War.* But in one of his earlier and briefer synopses he says of the work:

> . . . whatever the pitfalls of his rigorous logic and of the view of the political and social world contained in *On War,* they did not prevent Clausewitz from developing an analytic scheme whose decisive characteristics are realism, balance, and comprehensiveness, and that is sufficiently flexible to accommodate opinions very different from those held by the originator.[71]

In his final comment he returns to the focus he has chosen to give his biography, *Clausewitz and the State,* saying in part:

> . . . on the state [Clausewitz] wrote as a historian and commentator, not as a theorist. . . . The bond between his political and military writings, which assume such different forms, lies rather in their common motive—the search for understanding . . . it is evident that his need to explore certain components of his existence in a logical, objective manner was as strong as his drive to demolish the military dogma of the society and state in which he grew up. Together they helped him shed the emotional trappings of the idealization of the

> state, which earlier had exerted such compelling power over him, and they enabled him to formulate the first theory of war that looked beyond the operational to include its political and psychological aspects, and that rejected all time-bound and geographic standards. . . . He never completed his theoretical work . . .; nor did he achieve his highest ambitions for external recognition. Nevertheless, his life demonstrates a unity of motives and effort, a harmonizing of inner needs and achievements, a mastery of reality through understanding.[72]

I have been critical of the biography on a few particulars and I have presumed to impose upon my review of it—rather of a sample of it, for I have only touched upon one of its many themes—my own conception of how some of the more puzzling elements of Clausewitz' theory may best be comprehended. I would add, here at the end of my examination of the biography, a word of regret that the references to *On War* in *Clausewitz and the State* were set in type before the Howard-Paret translation was in page proofs, and for that reason they are to the German edition of 1952 (the sixteenth, which returned to the text of the first). The result is that the references are very difficult to use; I would also add a bitter reproach that the biography contains no subject index, which, for so complex a study, imposes a very real burden on the serious student. But I shall end on quite a different note. The biography is a fine achievement. No one who admires Clausewitz and his ideas, or who thirsts for a better understanding of a great man and his time, should deny himself the privilege of immersion in it. And an immersion it must be, for *Clausewitz and the State* is nobody's light reading. On the contrary, it is so rich and comprehensive that it demands an effort on the part of the reader worthy of that of the author. But the book is distinctly worth that effort.

IV

The new translation begins with a Translators' Note and the three introductory essays by Paret, Howard, and Brodie. The translated text follows. At the end comes Brodie's 70-page commentary, "A Guide to the Reading of *On War*." It will be possible in this review to do no more than mention a few of the merits and shortcomings of this festive board.

The Translators' Note indicates that the major reason for producing an "entirely new translation" was "the growing interest in Clausewitz's theoretical, political, and historical writings in recent years." The Note also states that the translation is based on the first German edition of 1832, "supplemented by the annotated German text published by Professor Werner Hahlweg in 1952, except where obscurities in the original edition—which Clausewitz himself never reviewed—made it seem advisable to accept later emendations." The earlier English translations (that by Col. J.J. Graham of the Royal Army of 1876 and that by Professor O.J. Matthijs Jolles of the University of Chicago of 1943) are referred to, the earlier one being described as containing "a large number of inaccuracies and obscurities" and being written in a "dated style," the latter as being "more precise."

Peter Paret's introductory essay, "The Genesis of *On War*," is a masterly condensation of much of his book, *Clausewitz and the State*, though mainly

of those parts that lead to and examine the content of *On War*. It will serve admirably to introduce the beginner to the psychological elements in Clausewitz' theory, which are among both the most important of its elements and the most difficult to comprehend. Paret also explains that Clausewitz insisted that violence was the essence of war because, even after the wars of Napoleon, he was "responding to the surprisingly numerous theorists who continued to claim that wars could be won by maneuver rather than bloodshed."[73]

Michael Howard's essay, "The Influence of Clausewitz," is a readable and useful survey of the reception of Clausewitz' military writings in Germany, elsewhere in Europe, and ultimately in the United States (and Japan). Howard also surveys the various editions and some of the translations of *Vom Kriege*. He explains how the myth of Clausewitz as the proponent of aggressive warfare developed out of the perverse admiration in which his works were held by his successors in the Prussian-German officer corps later in the 19th century and how this myth influenced his reception in France—which was enthusiastic but misinformed—and in England—which was, until very recently, generally hostile (when Clausewitz was not summarily dismissed as obscure). On Clausewitz in the United States, Howard points to the dominance of Jominian influence in American military circles until World War I and then cites examples of both Clausewitzian and un-Clausewitzian American military thinking since then. George Marshall's determination to concentrate Allied military efforts "at the decisive point, northwest Europe," in World War II is his example of the first; Douglas MacArthur's statement that "when politics fails and the military takes over, you must trust the military . . . " in the course of his conflict with President Truman during the Korean War, is his example of the second.[74]

Brodie's essay, "The Continuing Relevance of *On War*," describes Clausewitz' treatise as "not simply the greatest but the only truly great book on war."[75] Brodie nevertheless regrets Clausewitz' venture into abstraction—by introducing the concept of "absolute war" into his theory—but offers the soothing assurance that this venture " . . . poses no problems that cannot be explained with relatively few words and it virtually disappears after [the] early pages [of *On War*]."[76] Brodie also confronts the question whether Clausewitz' writings are "dated," citing the master theorist's own limitation of the military history used in *On War* to a period of roughly 75 years and then asking how we can hope to gain from a work that was written twice that long ago. The answer he suggests to his own question is essentially not only that war is "different from everything else," as Clausewitz said, but also that Clausewitz has written for the ages, leaving behind "some ideas and admonitions [that] are immediately recognized as pertaining today [though also some that are] useful only for the better understanding of military or political history."[77]

The new English translation of *Vom Kriege*, to which (with various introductory notes and prefaces from the first edition) the next 566 pages are devoted, should be a boon to all students of Clausewitz whose working language is English and who have either (a) been put off by the somewhat antique flavor of the older translations or (b) have been helplessly annoyed at

being told that those translations, when only they were available, were based upon a "corrupt" German edition. Yet readers of the older translations may be surprised to find how little the more familiar passages from *On War* have changed. For example, war is still "nothing but a duel on a larger scale . . . an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will." (Jolles said "adversary" instead of "enemy.") The familiar passage " . . . war is not merely a political act but a real political instrument, a continuation of political intercourse, a carrying out of the same by other means" (Jolles) is more felicitously worded: " . . . war is not a mere act of policy but a true political instrument, a continuation of political activity by other means." The passages that are most often cited by his hostile critics to prove Clausewitz the proponent of total war and German aggression retain their old flavor. For example, the familiar sentence, "Let us not hear of generals who conquer without bloodshed" (Jolles) is more freely translated but the meaning is the same: "We are not interested in generals who win victories without bloodshed."

The new translation is not, however, without faults, both of commission and of omission. Only one of these will be mentioned here, an instance of our translators' failure to profit by the opportunity to correct a longstanding mistranslation. The issue was one of choosing between English equivalents and concerns connotations rather than literal meanings, but the case in point is a serious enough one so that the fault of omission is at least a minor tragedy.

That case involves what is possibly Clausewitz' most famous dictum—it is certainly his most important one: War is the continuation of politics by other means. In one variant or another, this is the form in which the dictum occurs in all three of the standard English translations except when, in Book VIII, Chapter 6B, Clausewitz spelled out most carefully what he meant. In that case a significant change occurs in the wording:

> We maintain . . . that war is simply a continuation of political intercourse, *with* the addition of other means. We purposely use the phrase *"with* the addition of other means" because we also want to make it clear that war in itself does not suspend political intercourse or change into something entirely different.

This is the wording in the new translation, which differs from the older standard translations mainly in substituting "addition" for "admixture."

Now, while the two statements, the shorter one with "*by* other means" and the longer one with "*with* other means," may be literally the same, the connotations of the two prepositions used are distinctly different. In English usage, the preposition "by" permits, even suggests, *replacement* or *substitution* while the preposition "with" (even when *not* qualified by "the addition of") clearly connotes a *supplementation,* an *additional* component. Consequently, it is difficult to escape the conclusion that the shorter statement of the dictum conveys an impression that the longer one modifies or corrects. Furthermore, while it would be an exaggeration to claim that the wording of the dictum in the shorter form was responsible for the misinterpretation of Clausewitz by which strategy (his "war") has actually

been held to replace politics in wartime (despite his explicit statements to the contrary), it does seem probable that the connotations of the shorter form have militated against the correction of that misinterpretation in the minds of generations of English-speaking readers of *On War.*

The ambiguity and therefore the occasion for misinterpretation does not lie in the German text. The word that Clausewitz used in both cases–indeed, in all cases where the relations of war and politics were being discussed–is precisely the same, *mit* meaning "with." If Clausewitz had meant to say that war actually displaces politics (instead of the exact opposite) he presumably would have used the German preposition *durch,* which is correctly translated "by" (as well as "through"). Col. J.J. Graham mistakenly chose to use "by" in the shorter versions of the dictum and "with" only in the longer version when he made the first translation of *Vom Kriege* in the 1870's and all English translators since then have been sheep on his trail.

Bernard Brodie's second contribution to the Princeton University Press publication of the new translation of *Vom Kriege,* "A Guide to the Reading of *On War,*" comes after the translation proper–possibly to symbolize the author's hope that serious students will read Clausewitz for themselves before coming to him for help (though he suggests various ways in which it might be used). The Guide is not a synopsis, so it is in no sense a substitute for reading the text. On the other hand it is a thorough commentary, which goes through the text book by book and chapter by chapter, touching on most of the significant parts of the discussion. Clearly it is meant mainly for the novice Clausewitzian, the beginner at absorbing and comprehending *On War,* and for such it should prove invaluable. It is especially embellished by Brodie's facility for citing apt parallels from more recent experience, a facility he describes in his introductory essay as though it is a virtually universal talent instead of one in which he particularly excels.

Unfortunately, the reviewer's mind boggles at the task of summarizing such a commentary. I have noted Brodie's gift for deriving especially suitable historical parallels. I might also note his comparative disinterest in the niceties of Clausewitz' theorymaking with which Paret's biography is so much concerned. This may be esteemed a blessing or condemned as a fault depending on the reader's preferences. Presumably, for the beginner Brodie's more "pragmatic" approach to Clausewitz will make the initiation less painful. I can say for myself, despite a keener interest in theory than Brodie professes, that I profoundly regret that his Guide was not available to me when, largely by the inspiration of his earliest writings, I was first introduced to Clausewitz years ago.

At the same time, I cannot let the occasion pass to mention one instance in which Brodie all but misses an opportunity to enrich his Guide for the benefit of his readers. That instance concerns Chapter 6 of Book VI, the title of which is "Scope and Means of Defense." In this chapter Clausewitz considers, among other things, the contribution that allies may make to the defensive side in war. The paragraphs he devotes to this topic are of especial interest because they represent, almost uniquely in *On War* and (as one gathers from Paret's intellectual biography) rarely anywhere else in his

writings, a venture on Clausewitz' part into the theory of international relations.

The subject brought up is the European balance of power, about which Clausewitz had some interesting things to say. His principal observation was that the European community of states was *not* a "systematically regulated balance of power and of spheres of influence" but rather a complex of "major and minor interests of states and peoples interwoven in the most varied and changeable manner" of which the net effect was a tendency to preserve the status quo. He said that this kind of balance was certain "to emerge spontaneously whenever a number of civilized countries are in multilateral relations." He also observed that the fact that there were historical instances of individual states in such a community becoming so powerful that they could virtually dictate to the rest did not "disprove the tendency on the part of the common interests to support the existing order."

> The fact that Europe, as we know it, has existed for over a thousand years can only be explained by the operation of these general interests; and if collective security has not always sufficed to maintain the integrity of each individual state, the fact should be ascribed to irregularities in the life of the system as a whole which instead of destroying were absorbed into it.

As the recent partition of Poland was a challenge to this conception of "general interests" and "collective security," Clausewitz was at pains to explain and justify it. The reason he gave was that Poland was not, as we should say today, a "viable" polity. "Poland had not really played a political part for a century or so; she had merely been a cause of dissension among other states. Given her condition and the kind of constitution she had, she could not possibly maintain her independence." The system served to assist in preserving the integrity of its members, he said, but it was "asking too much when a state's integrity must be maintained entirely by others." In any case, he concluded, because of the mutually protective nature of the community:

> . . . we believe we have shown that as a rule the defender can count on outside assistance more than the attacker; and the more his survival matters to the rest—that is, the sounder and more vigorous his political and military condition—the more certain he can be of their help.[78]

Brodie notes and summarizes Clausewitz' argument but with less emphasis than might have been expected in view of its novelty, coming from the master theorist *of war*. Brodie also does not remark upon the rejection of a simple power balance and the offering in its place of a virtually organic community held together by a complex web of "major and minor interests of states and peoples," which, though formed "spontaneously," reacts to threats to its integrity rationally and even with discrimination. One is reminded of contemporary ideas regarding European order that were identified a little later (if not, indeed, in Clausewitz' lifetime) as the Concert of Europe. One is also reminded of conceptions of "legitimacy" and of other bases of European equilibrium by which 20th-century scholars such as Henry Kissinger and George Liska have sought to explain the relative stability of Europe from the wars of Napoleon to World War I.[79]

NOTES

1. Paret, *Clausewitz and the State,* pp. 6f.

2. *Ibid.,* p. 338.

3. On this see Friedrich Meinecke, *Machiavellism: The Doctrine of Raison d'Etat and Its Place in Modern History,* Douglas Scott, trans. (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1957), pp. 308-310.

4. Quoted from Michael Howard's essay, "Jomini and the Classical Tradition in Military Thought" in Michael Howard, ed., *The Theory and Practice of War: Essays Presented to Capt. B.H. Liddell Hart* (London: Cassell, 1965), p. 9.

5. For Paret's appreciation of Clausewitz' intellectual position (which he characterizes, without explanation, as "neo-Classicist") the best reference is Paret, *Clausewitz and the State,* pp. 149f.

6. *Die wichtigsten Grundsaetze des Kriegfuehrens zur Ergaenzun meines Unterrichtss bei Sr.Koeniglichen Hoheit dem Kronprinzen,* 1812. The essay is available as Carl von Clausewitz, *Principles of War,* trans. and ed. with an introduction by Hans W. Gatzke (Harrisburg, Pa.: The Military Publishing Company, 1942).

7. Paret, *Clausewtiz and the State,* p. 9.

8. Clausewitz' study on Gustavus Adolphus was published in Vol. IX of his posthumous works. The miscellaneous papers were published by E. Kessel as *Strategie aus dem Jahr 1804, mit Zusaetzen von 1818 and 1809* (Hamburg, 1937). The Bülow review appeared as "Bemerkungen ueber die reine und angewandte Strategie des Herrn von Bülow" in the journal *Neue Bellona,* v. LX, No. 3, 1805.

9. See Rothfels' essay, "Clausewitz," in Edward Mead Earle, ed., *Makers of Modern Strategy* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1943), p. 101. Paret's analysis of the elements in Clausewitz' theory parallels but greatly expands Rothfels' seminal essay.

10. Paret, *Clausewtiz and the State,* p. 161. The quotation is presumably from Kiesewetter's outline of the Kantian critiques: *Darstellung der wichtigsten Wahrheiten der kritischen Philosophie* (Berlin, 1824), pp. 402-403. Rothfels concurred in this attribution to Kant; see his essay referred to in the preceding note, p. 101, footnote 25.

11. *Ibid.,* p. 161; Clausewitz, *On War,* Book II, chap. 2, p. 136.

12. Paret, *Clausewitz and the State,* pp. 161-168, 370-372.

13. *Ibid.,* p. 162. For Clausewitz' own discussion on the same point, see *On War,* Book II, chap. 3, pp. 148-150.

14. W.M. Schering, ed., "Ueber Kunst und Kunsttheorie," *Geist und Tat* (Stuttgart, 1941).

15. *Ibid.,* p. 159. Quoted in Paret, *Clausewitz and the State,* p. 163.

16. From his "Strategic Critique of the Campaign of 1814 in France," written in 1816 and published in his posthumous works, v. VII, pp. 359-361, quoted in Paret, *Clausewitz and the State,* p. 359.

17. Paret, *Clausewitz and the State,* p. 165.

18. Paret quotes from Clausewitz' essay on "Art and the Theory of Art" passages as follows: "... the properties of purposes and means ... are the sole *source* of all rules. ... Rules for *individual cases* have no place in theory, since theory cannot exhaust all possible cases ... action in the individual case can be determined only by purpose and means. If we wish to combine several cases under a common point of view, it can be done only by resorting to *purposes and means.*" Paret, *Clausewitz and the State,* pp. 164f, from *Geist and Tat,* pp. 161f. As we might say, there are no universal laws that govern individual cases in the reality of war and no empirical generalizations of sufficient validity to serve the same purpose. We might also add that while our generalizations seek to approximate statistical probabilities, our sample (universe) is both too ill-defined and too limited to permit more than rough approximations.

19. Paret, *Clausewitz and the State,* p. 165.

20. *Ibid.,* p. 372. Paret's reference is to Book I, chap. 2 and Book VIII.

21. Clausewitz, *On War,* p. 71 in the Howard-Paret 1976 trans. Cf. Paret, *Clausewitz and the State,* p. 376.

22. "Knowledge in war is very simple, being concerned with so few subjects, and only with their final results at that. But this does not make its application easy." Clausewitz, *On War,* Book II, chap. 2, p. 146, the discussion being on p. 144.

23. *Ibid.,* pp. 146f. Cf. the "unfinished note" referred to earlier in which Clausewitz said that "all great commanders have acted on instinct," which was all they

needed "as far as action is concerned." He went on to say, however, that the situation is different if they also need to persuade others in a discussion; for that purpose there was also a need "for clear ideas and the ability to show their connections with each other," in other words, for theory. Clausewitz, *On War*, p. 71 of the Howard-Paret 1976 trans.

24. Paret says: "Ability is achieved when knowledge almost ceases to exist independently and is assimilated into the individual's attitude and habits . . . [thus] judgment, derived from study and experiences, replaces knowledge." Paret, *Clausewitz and the State*, pp. 371f.

25. *Ibid.*, p. 165; from Paret's summary of Clausewitz' analysis in terms of means and purposes quoted earlier.

26. Clausewitz, *On War*, Book II, chap. 5, p. 156. "Incontrovertible truths" *(unzweifelhaften Wahrheiten)* is an unfortunate choice of words as Clausewitz was not writing about propositions to which no exceptions exist, as he explains later in the same chapter.

27. " . . . a working theory is an essential basis for criticism. Without such a theory it is generally impossible for criticism to reach that point at which it becomes truly instructive—when its arguments are convincing and cannot be refuted." Clausewitz, *On War*, Book II, chap. 5, p. 157. This function of theory and of the theorist is implicit throughout *On War*. It is discussed most explicitly in this chapter. "Critical Analysis," pp. 156-169. For "wider horizons" see p. 165.

28. *Ibid.*, Book II, chap. 2, p. 141. It should be added, though, that Clausewitz was once again overstating his case. As his "propositions that can be demonstrated without difficulty" are not rules to which there are no exceptions in individual instances, his analysis neither can nor needs to explore all possible outcomes of all possible choices. See also p. 158 where he said: "An analyst should never use the results of theory as laws and standards, but only—as the soldier does—as *aids to judgment*."

29. It should not need to be added that a given individual might be both a commander and a theorist. Clausewitz appears to have considered it unlikely that anyone would excel at both callings but nothing in his writings precludes the possibility of this occurring.

30. Clausewitz, *On War*, Book II, chap. 5, p. 161. Emphasis added. The reader may have the feeling that he is reading an early 19th-century rationale for the policy sciences—or that Clausewitz is anticipating by 150 years the claim of Albert Wohlstetter and others that the essential function of systems analysis is the invention of systems. See, for example, Charles J. Hitch, *Decision Making for Defense* (Berkeley, Ca.: University of California Press, 1965), p. 54.

31. Clausewitz, *On War*, pp. 146-166. The long quotation is from p. 166, emphasis added.

32. *Ibid.*, pp. 166-168.

33. Paret, *Clausewitz and the State*, p. 373. See also pp. 197-202 on Clausewitz' use of the friction concept in his essay of April 1812 for the Crown Prince, "The Most Important Principles for the Conduct of War (etc.)," cited earlier. Evidently in that essay, for the first time, Clausewitz emphasized that friction, whatever its source, "had a psychologically inhibiting effect and consequently could be overcome only by psychic energy." *Ibid.*, p. 197.

34. Clausewitz, *On War*, Book IV, chap. 10, p. 256, quoted in Paret, *Clausewitz and the State*, p. 373.

35. Paret, *Clausewitz and the State*, p. 373.

36. *Ibid.*, p. 373, paraphrasing *On War*, Book III, chap. 4, p. 186.

37. *Ibid.*, citing *On War*, Book III, chap. 3.

38. In Book VIII, chap. 3A, on p. 583 of the Howard-Paret trans., Clausewitz referred to Napoleon as "the God of war himself."

39. Paret's discussion on this subject is largely concerned with what Clausewitz called *die moralische Groessen*, literally something like "psychic dimensions" or "psychic forces," in Book III of *On War*. On p. 373, Paret translates the German expression as "moral and psychological *values*."

40. Clausewitz, *On War*, pp. 373-375. The quotations are from p. 375.

41. *Ibid.*, p. 375. Paret adds that Clausewitz tried to do this "by formulating the concepts of moral qualities and of genius, which in conjunction with the concept of friction at least enabled him to fit psychology and creativity into his analysis of the structure and processes of war."

42. *Ibid.*, p. 195.

43. For Paret's views on the uncertainty of Clausewitz' revisions after 1827 see *Clausewitz and the State*, p. 381, footnote 61. See also his comment on Rothfels' views on the subject in his introductory essay, "The Genesis of *On War*" in the Howard-Paret 1976 trans., p. 4, footnote 1. For the "Two Notes by the Author on his Plans for Revising *On War*," see the Howard-Paret trans., pp. 69-71.

44. Clausewitz, *On War*, pp. 488f.

45. *Ibid.*, p. 501.

46. *Ibid.*, p. 358.

47. Paret, *Clausewitz and the State*, p. 368.

48. Clausewitz, *On War*, Book I, chap. 1, section 2. Emphasis from the German. The wrestlers' analogy serves to indicate that Clausewitz did not mean to equate winning with the annihilation of the opponent forces. On this see *On War*, Book I, chap. 2, p. 90.

49. *Ibid.*, section 6, p. 78. Having imposed these conditions it was, of course, inconsistent of Clausewitz to say, as he did in Book III, chap. 16 and in Book VIII, chap. 2, p. 580, that Napoleonic war *was* absolute war. He later corrected his error, for example, in Book VIII, chap. 3, where he said that "absolute war has never in fact been achieved. . . . ," p. 582.

50. *Ibid.*, Book I, chap. 1, sections 6-11, pp. 78-81. Section 11 shows how the political object affects the military object, with significant qualifications. It thus introduces a consideration ("point of view") which, according to Book VII, Chap. 6B, Clausewitz had seen no need to introduce into *On War* "at the start." This suggests, at the very least, that the passage in Book VIII was written before Book I, chap. 1 was revised. See *On War*, p. 606.

51. *Ibid.*, Book I, chap. 1, sections 12-15, pp. 81-83. Clausewitz argued that if delaying the action is an advantage to one side, continuing it will be an advantage to the other so long as their stakes in the outcome are in a condition he called "polarity." This he defined to mean that each loss by one is an equivalent gain by the other, the situation we call "zero-sum." He also said that as there would be no war at all unless at least one side was an aggressor, there would also be no peace as long as either side believed that a period of inactivity would improve the opponent's position.

52. Paret, *Clausewitz and the State*, pp. 361ff.

53. On the ethics of violence, Paret says: "Presumably it was Clausewitz's special sense of realism that prevented him from dealing with [it]." Presumably he is referring to Clausewitz' conviction that state actions are motivated almost entirely by considerations of security, and quite properly so. "He never questioned the right of political communities . . . to defend themselves, and even to increase their strength if this could be achieved without seriously damaging the international environment." On the neglect of the naval side of war Paret says that Clausewitz knew he was no expert and was for that reason reluctant to extend his analysis to naval warfare. "His propositions on the nature of war, on the role of theory, and on the interaction between war and politics apply to the seas as much as to the land, without this needing to be explicitly stated." Quotations from p. 365.

54. For his discussion of "true" versus "real" war see *ibid.*, p. 368.

55. Clausewitz, *On War*, pp. 216-219.

56. Paret, *Clausewitz and the State*, p. 366. In this discussion Paret glides over Clausewitz' "principle of polarity," that zero-sum element inherent in his conception of war noted in an earlier footnote, which is the source of much of the obscurity in Book I, chap. 1 and the sole reference to which in Book III, chap. 16 is no clearer.

57. *Ibid.*, p. 367; the citation is to *On War*, p. 218. Clausewitz also said that the part played by these weak political motives makes things difficult for the theorist, for "the more these factors turn war into something half-hearted, the less solid are the bases that are available to theory; essentials become rarer, and accidents multiply." See also Book VI, chap. 30, pp. 516f. for an elaboration; Book VIII, chap. 6A, p. 604 for another mention.

58. Clausewitz, *On War*. p. 218.

59. *Ibid.*

60. The internal evidence also supports the supposition that Clausewitz had not yet refined his concept of unbridled warfare, for the key terms—"absolute war," "war in the absolute (or in the abstract)," "war to the extreme"—are not employed.

61. Paret, *Clausewitz and the State*, p. 377. The reference to "his notes for *Strategy*" is to a collection of papers written while Clausewitz was a student in Scharnhorst's college in Berlin, or shortly afterwards around 1804. "The essay for the

crown prince" is, of course, "the most important Principles for the Conduct of War, to supplement my Lessons to His Royal Highness, the Crown Prince," April 1812, cited earlier.

62. *Ibid.*, pp. 377f. The "Note of 10 July 1827" referred to appears in the Howard-Paret trans. of *On War* on pp. 69f. That Clausewitz' theory had come to encompass "two kinds of war" is much clearer in the "Note" than it is in Book I, chap. 1.

63. *Ibid.*, pp. 380f.

64. Clausewitz, *On War*, p. 69.

65. Paret himself places the concept of absolute war under the rubric of escalation. See, for example, Paret, *Clausewitz and the State*, p. 381. Neither Paret nor, for that matter, Clausewitz actually uses the term "proportionality." The idea, however, is amply reflected in the latter's words, especially in the following from Book I, chap. 2 of *On War*: "Since war is not an act of senseless passion but is controlled by its political object, the value of this object must determine the sacrifices to be made for it in *magnitude* and also in *duration*. Once the expenditure of effort exceeds the value of the political object, the object must be renounced and peace must follow." Emphasis in the German. Both the idea and the word "proportionality" have a long history in international law and both played major roles in the debates on limited war in the nuclear era in the 1950's and 1960's. Perhaps the most explicit example is Pierre Gallois, *The Balance of Terror: Strategy for the Nuclear Age* (Boston, Mass.: Houghton Mifflin, 1961).

66. Paret, *Clausewitz and the State*, pp. 378f.

67. *Ibid.*, p. 378. The translation is Paret's own from the letter of 24 December 1827.

68. *Ibid.*, p. 365.

69. Clausewitz, *On War*, Book VIII, chap. 6B, pp. 606f.

70. *Ibid.*, p. 607.

71. Paret, *Clausewitz and the State*, p. 370.

72. *Ibid.*, pp. 439f.

73. Clausewitz, *On War*, p. 20.

74. *Ibid.*, pp. 41-43.

75. *Ibid.*, p. 53.

76. *Ibid.*, p. 47.

77. *Ibid.*, p. 56.

78. *Ibid.*, pp. 373-376.

79. Kissinger's views on this subject are developed in his book, *A World Restored: The Politics of Conservatism in a Revolutionary Age* (New York: Grosset's Universal Library, 1964), originally published with the subtitle, *Castelreagh, Matternich and the Restoration of Peace, 1812-1822* (Boston, Mass.: Houghton Mifflin, 1957); Liska's in his book, *International Equilibrium: A Theoretical Essay on the Politics and Organization of Security* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1957).

BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY

A graduate of Harvard University and Balliol College, Oxford, James E. King has served with the U.S. Government in Washington, D.C. and West Germany, the Johns Hopkins University and the Institute for Defense Analysis. From 1972 to 1977 he was Director, Strategic Research at the Naval War College.

Much attention has been given to the role of seapower and naval forces in the conduct of war. The Navy's combat capability is obvious and its rationale is increasingly discussed in terms both of the deterrence of conflict and of the political uses of seapower. Political and technological changes affecting the international environment may require a revision in how we think about the use of naval forces short of war.

THE EVOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL ORDER AND THE FUTURE OF THE AMERICAN NAVAL PRESENCE MISSION

by

James A. Nathan and James K. Oliver

The evolution of the concept of seapower and more specifically, American naval theory, can be understood within the general framework and its gradual acceptance of how Mahan saw the relationship among national power, foreign policy, and seapower. Yet, Mahan's comprehensive notion of command of the sea was not fully realized for the United States until World War II when, in Mahan's words, the "overbearing power" of a "great Navy" did indeed drive the Japanese Navy from the Pacific seas even as earlier the German U-boats' *guerre de course* of late 1939 through early 1943 had been suppressed. Following some initial ambivalence, American foreign policy after World War II moved to its now familiar globalist posture. Thus, the U.S. Navy retained and even enlarged during the 1950's the preponderant position it had held at the end of the war. By 1960 the Navy had successfully competed with the Army and the Air Force for a piece of the strategic deterrence mission. When this mission was added to its existing capacity for tactical air war, command of the sea, and amphibious war, it was clear that the U.S. Navy comprised a multifaceted and versatile set of military instruments. American seapower in the early 1960's encompassed a mix of missions and capabilities that seemed to fulfill the Mahanian vision of "driving the enemy's flag from the sea or allow[ing] it to appear only as a fugitive; and which by controlling the great common, closes the highways by which commerce moves to and from the enemy's shores."[1]

The Navy seemed particularly adapted to the demands of a foreign policy that required an American global presence and interventionary capacity to "bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe, to assure the survival and success of liberty . . . [to] do all of this and more."[2] In sum, the U.S. Navy was the embodiment of the expansion of military power in the 20th century and at the same time admirably suited to the posture of flexible response and the "strategy of conflict."

By the 1970's, however, the handful of academic, journalistic, and official theorists of seapower had begun to raise questions concerning the future of seapower. Congressional appropriations seemed to substantiate the reality of a "renaissance of seapower," but questions have persisted. This paper will review the effort to redefine the future of seapower, especially its use short of war. Thus, we will examine in some detail the so-called "presence" mission—as well as outline some of the constraints which impinge on the broader roles of seapower.

Dimensions of Contemporary Naval Theory. Naval force in the abstract has certain virtues over other coercive instruments of diplomacy. For one thing, the traditional legal rules by which naval force operates are by and large, unambiguous, well-known, and widely accepted. Moreover, the high degree of control and thus flexibility inherent in the deployment of naval force is not available to land or air services. As Army Col. Zeb Bradford conceded recently, one of the "lessons" of Vietnam is that:

> . . . ground power can be quite inflexible once committed however much inflexibility it may provide on a tactical level . . . while . . . ships can often reverse course and make a clean break, ground forces rarely can do so once engaged.[3]

In contrast to land operations, naval demonstrations of force can be as explicit or as subtle as desired. Thus, for example, reports in January 1976 that Soviet warships were moving off Angola could be, on the one hand, discounted by the Kremlin when reported in the West, while on the other hand they could still serve as an impressive indication of Soviet concern to Africans on the eve of an important all-African conference which was convened to debate the Angolan Civil War.[4] This kind of demonstration of serious strategic concern can be managed without violating norms of sovereignty. Further, it can be carried out without legal quarrel and without menace or other than verbal opposition.

Moreover, the more precise choreography of force available to navies—interdiction, blockade, warning shots—are, in the abstract at least, plausible options which can be taken in isolation without provoking the escalation of violence that might be predicted if similar exercises were undertaken on land. Thus, "expressive" and "coercive" exercises can take place without civilian casualties, and in fact, without a shot being fired. Indeed, if a government decides in the cool light of morning to minimize the situation, navies are peculiarly adapted to a more considered and calculated interrelationship of force and negotiation: Sufficient time in which to make decisions can usually be obtained by comparatively easy engagement and disengagement, and targets of influence can be chosen so that they are proportional in value to the desired goal of diplomacy. It is with these kinds of observations that a case can be made that, as Laurence Martin has put it, "reliance on naval force . . . is itself a contribution to moderation in international society."[5]

If the U.S. Navy has served at midcentury as among the most flexible of instruments of American foreign and military policy, it is no less susceptible

to some new constraints now affecting those policies. One of these is the cost of high technology weapons systems. Navy planners must be as concerned or even more so than their counterparts in other services about the receptivity of the American people to the rising costs of military technology. A recent analysis of major weapons systems development underway in FY 76 reveals that Navy technology is now far and away the most expensive technology being purchased by the Pentagon, and with the possible exception of the B-1 bomber, will continue to be so for the foreseeable future.[6] Moreover, the apparent growth of skepticism on the part of the American public towards combat intervention of any substantial intensity and for any significant length of time may undercut the willingness of political leadership to exploit that portion of the Navy's force and mission profile devoted to the projection of power ashore.[7] Finally, of course, technological change, e.g., precision-guided munitions and the general growth of Soviet power intersects directly with the course of the U.S. Navy. Indeed, perhaps the most dramatic manifestations of Soviet military expansion have been in terms of their naval capability—a capability which many analysts, going too far, would contend effectively consigns the Mahanian doctrine of "command of the sea" to history.

Constraints and Conceptual Change. The net effect of these closing domestic and foreign constraints on thinking about U.S. naval power has been to force a restatement of U.S. naval missions and within this restatement give much closer consideration to what have been termed the "war-deterring" as opposed to the "war-fighting" missions.[8] Former Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Elmo Zumwalt's redefinition of U.S. Navy missions[9] and his subsequent requests for ship construction, weapons development, and procurement funds, included and emphasized the Navy's war-fighting capability. Nevertheless, the rationale for this "war-fighting" or combat capability is now framed increasingly in the language of war deterrence and the political uses of naval force.

The appointment of Vice Adm. Stansfield Turner as President of the Naval War College in 1972 is perhaps more than mere coincidence.[10] From 1972-1974, Turner revamped the War College curriculum and encouraged research oriented towards the exploration and understanding of the political constraints impinging on the U.S. Navy of the future. In his final report on his 2 years at the War College, Turner took explicit note of what he regarded as the prevalent inadequacy of contemporary seapower theory as well as the professionals responsible for using that power:

> Our final and complete supremacy at sea in World War II, followed by the lack of opposition at sea in Korea and Vietnam, encouraged intellectual complacency and indifference in some fundamental areas of the naval profession. As a result, for example, most of today's influential thinking on strategic deterrence and strategic arms limitations comes from civilians, with only modest input from naval officers.*[11]

However, there does seem to be an emerging school of thought within the U.S. Navy that argues that war-fighting missions and forces of the U.S. Navy (or navies in general) are and will be increasingly constrained; and, therefore, thought must now be given to war-deterring missions and forces. Comdr. (now Capt.) James F. McNulty has summarized this perception:

*There is a small but growing number of naval officers who are reexamining traditional ideas about naval strategy and developing new ones, as attested to by the sources cited in this article and the pages of recent issues of this journal. Ed.

> Military power of demonstrable capability does remain one of the key determinants in the calculus of relative power among states, but in the present environment, military force serves as a make-weight more influential in its unused potential than in its realized capabilities. . . . Naval forces, operating in the presence role, must now be seen as uniquely appropriate to this end. . . .[12]

But, if naval presence seems especially well suited to contemporary international society, surprisingly little systematic thinking has centered on what exactly is the substance of the mission. As Admiral Turner lamented:

> Another example of the lack of rigorous thinking is our approach to naval presence. Despite the Navy's increasingly important role in peacetime deterrence, there is no body of doctrine or writing on how to accomplish this deterrent mission. The lack of serious original thinking in this and other areas, such as our lack of precision in definition of military missions, is costing us dearly in terms of either duplicatory preparations—or lack of preparation.[13]

Ken Booth has gone so far as to assert that the admiral's complaint might be directed not just at the analysis of the presence mission but at the entire literature on naval analysis.[14] These caveats having been stated, let us take brief note of what analysis there does exist with respect to the concept of presence specifically; and, more generally, the role of naval force as a war-deterring instrumentality.

James Cable's work is one of the most extensive treatments of the "presence" function. Presence is equated with the concept of "gunboat diplomacy" and limited naval force:

> Gunboat diplomacy is the use, or threat of limited naval force, otherwise than as an act of war, in order to secure advantage, or to avert loss, either in the furtherance of an international dispute or else against foreign nationals within the territory of the jurisdiction of their own state.[15]

To Cable, one can separate this kind of action from limited war because "limited naval force" is restricted in its execution to obtaining a political goal not extending (necessarily) to punishment. The range of this concept is enormous—covering everything from the Italian Navy's landing at Corfu in 1923, to the injection of Task Force 74 into the Indo-Pakistani crisis, to the voyage of DesDiv 31 through the Makassar Strait to assert the right of innocent passage and even the rescue of the *Mayaguez*. Yet, as Booth notes, Cable's comprehensive definition of gunboat diplomacy and his relatively small number of categories diminishes the analytical strength of his effort.[16]

Notwithstanding these impediments, Cable does usefully point out that the distinguishing feature of contemporary and future gunboat diplomacy is the greater intimacy between a mission of presence and the political intentions which confer upon that mission in its particular content. While the linkage is not new, recognition of the problems one's environment imposes on it may well be new.

The factors affecting a naval presence are remarkable in their diversity and in the numerous combinations these elements can form. Comdr. (now Capt.) Jonathan T. Howe has outlined some of the problems in his description of two events in which the U.S. Navy played a role—the resupply of Quemoy in 1958 and the more nebulous actions of the Sixth Fleet in 1967.[17] Among the considerations which affected the U.S. response in these crises were the estimated intentions of the Soviet Union to intervene, defense estimates of U.S. capability, congressional and public opinion, and the degree of dependence

on British support. Howe traces the effects of each factor (and combinations of two or more) on U.S. response to these crises. His attempt is notable because he treats naval presence as an integral part of U.S. foreign policy.

Howe draws other conclusions that are useful and—in light of recent events—prescient. He notes that crises often blossom suddenly and public opinion does not rise in significance with them. In other words, dissent suffers a lag and gives breathing room for responses. This was certainly the case in the *Mayaguez* affair in which naval power was employed quickly and successfully. This use of naval power was not without its cost (a total of 41 killed, 50 wounded, and the loss of several helicopters). But these costs did not include (at least so far) public outrage. Thus, the *Mayaguez* incident stands in contrast to the Tonkin Gulf incident which was initially also greeted by public and congressional support. Later, however, when gunboat diplomacy and naval presence were revealed to be the initial stages of a broader escalation and intervention, public support was withdrawn.

Almost all analysts of the presence mission point to the flexibility of the naval force in contrast to the use of, for example, ground forces. They are not easily withdrawn once in place and logistics support established. Placing troops on alert or calling global strategic alerts very nearly exhausts the repertoire available to nonnaval forces. In contrast, as Lt. Comdr. Kenneth McGruther notes in a recent review of "naval diplomacy" in the Indo-Pakistani case:

> . . . the key factor which makes a naval force preferable for the presence mission is the great degree of flexibility left to the diplomat even after the introduction of force into a crisis. A naval force is highly maneuverable; its proximity to the coast can itself be taken as a measure of one's intent. . . . Most importantly, a naval force, since it operates in its own milieu, can usually be kept out of hostilities until it chooses to participate, thereby leaving the final decision on commitment both as to time and degree to one's own diplomats.[18]

Similary, Howe concludes that warships can be:

> . . . effective instruments of foreign policy. . . . Warship activity appeared to be an excellent indication of Washington's intentions. In 1967, fleet maneuvers, in keeping with U.S. policy, were deliberately restrained and aggressive only at the time of presumed Soviet threats. Highly publicized augmentation in 1958 demonstrated U.S. determination. In both cases, a Soviet emphasis on naval activity as a true reflection of American intention increased the significance of warship movements.[19]

But the description of the purportedly unique capabilities of naval power does not constitute a theoretical exposition and analysis of the presence mission—a point McGruther made succinctly:

> . . . analysts have thus far not been able to apply the naval presence mission to platform planning or tactics development nor have the relationships between naval strategy and foreign policy integral to this concept been well described. In fact, the presence mission has tended to be asserted rather than analyzed.[20]

McGruther attempts to address the first of these problems—those of platform planning and tactics. The far more nebulous question of naval strategy and foreign policy remains relatively unexplored although Edward N. Luttwak's *The Political Uses of Sea Power* in Robert Osgood's words " . . . makes an important contribution toward closing

the gap between concepts and definitions, on the one hand, and experience, on the other."[21]

Luttwak's analysis, unlike most previous analyses of the presence mission, advances a conceptual framework for understanding the nature of the presence mission in terms of "passive" and "active suasion." It also points towards certain operational and force planning problems. Admiral Turner poses the implication of Luttwak's analysis directly: "Are there different operating policies that would yield a great presence capability?" And with respect to intermission tradeoffs Turner asks: "Is the presence mission becoming sufficiently important to warrant building or designing forces for that purpose?"[22]

The Future of Naval Force Short of War. Thus, naval "theory" seems to be moving towards some sort of accommodation with the broad changes in world politics stemming from the dramatic expansion of technologies of violence during the 20th century and changes in the world balance of naval power. The articulation of "war-deterrence missions" is now underway. The concepts and subsequent policies, missions, and forces directed at nuclear war deterrence were completed almost two decades ago. The current debate and dialogue centers on subnuclear war deterrence through the exploitation of the perceived uniqueness of seapower deployed in short-of-war missions and force configurations. The theoretical and strategic concepts now under discussion borrow heavily from the deterrence theory of the late 1950's and early 1960's. In fact, the idea of "suasion" implemented by means of closely calibrated "Inputs of Naval Suasion"[23] is similar to Herman Kahn's intricate force escalation scenarios. The difficulties of application encountered by the actual attempt to implement a strategy of escalation in Vietnam might tempt one, reasoning by analogy, to dismiss *a priori* the description and analysis of Cable, Luttwak, or McGruther. Such a step strikes us as premature. We will note grounds for some skepticism concerning the future of the political uses of naval power concepts, but these doubts and questions do not center on the conceptual parentage of suasion or naval presence.

In the first place, the nascent theory of naval presence is dealing almost exclusively with the exploitation of military power *short of war*, whereas Schelling, Kahn, et al., sought, in addition, to develop a theory for the controlled manipulation of war and violence itself. The distinction is important. As we have argued elsewhere,[24] the manipulation of violence entails physical and psychological difficulties of a profound sort—difficulties which were overly discounted in the halcyon days of flexible response and force escalation scenarios. The "short-of-war" environment contains many of the same difficulties and dangers encountered in the use of a diplomacy of violence. Nevertheless, in the absence of casualties, without the engagement of honor, and before the onset of "the dialectic of struggle," it would seem plausible to assume that problems of conflict management are somewhat less intense and hence more manageable in the short-of-war environment.

Second, naval theorists probably are correct in emphasizing the apparent uniqueness of naval power. These purported characteristics of naval power are critically important to the political uses of naval power. Luttwak observes:

> The familiar attributes of an oceanic navy—inherent mobility, tactical flexibility, and a wide geographic reach—render it peculiarly useful as an instrument of policy even in the absence of hostilities. Land-based forces, whether ground or air, can also be deployed in a manner calculated to encourage friends and coerce

> enemies, but only within the narrow constraints of insertion feasibility, and with inherently greater risks, since the land nexus can convert any significant deployment into a political commitment, with all the rigidities that this implies.[25]

To the extent this is true, then it is perhaps more reasonable to envision a variable and flexible "peacetime" repertoire of naval suasion than the metaphors of "turning the screw" or gradually easing up or down the volume of violence that dots the pages of the *Pentagon Papers.*

There are problems of course, and presence theorists are aware of them. Thus, we can find McGruther noting:

> There are dangers in the use of naval ships for force presence. Their inherent uncertainty can also have a strongly adverse effect on nations already at war or on the brink of war, thereby actually destabilizing a crisis and possibly precipitating the very war the force was sent to deter. Another disadvantage is that the opposing superpower, misperceiving the intent of a presence force, could commit itself heavily and initiate an escalatory spiral dangerous to both. A third disadvantage is the possibility of expanding expectation on the part of the client state upon the arrival of a strong naval force belonging to its patron. . . . Finally, one cannot dismiss the possibility of an error, mistake, or miscalculation setting off a holocaust when military forces face each other in an already emotional environment. . . .[26]

It should be noted, however, that the kinds of dangers and risks outlined by McGruther are more likely to be attached to what Luttwak could characterize as active suasion:

> The *exercise* of "active" suasion is . . . any deliberate attempt to evoke a specific reaction on the part of others, whether allies, enemies, or neutrals; the reaction actually obtained would constitute the suasion process itself, in this case labeled as active.[27]

Latent suasion, on the other hand, need not involve these kinds of difficulties automatically:

> For it is the perceptions of American power held by other nations, that the dominant makeweight to those perceptions is the credible mobility of U.S. power, and that the most persuasive indicator of such mobility is that manifested by the routine, day-to-day overseas presence activities of the U.S. Navy.[28]

And if McNulty's analysis is correct, it is latent suasion—the display of presence by means of routine activity—that is the most important element in the use of naval power short of war.

Most presence theorists seem to be quite sensitive to the fact that both the advantages and risks that accrue to their approach to the use of naval power hinge on the ambiguities of perceptions of power. Exacerbating this ambiguity, of course, is the fact that one is dealing with the exploitation of force and military power, albeit force short of war. "Goodwill tours," port calls, and the like are "peaceful" to be sure. But the agent is recognized and indeed, must be recognized, as capable of inflicting damage and injury. Therefore, when one discusses naval presence, one must keep in mind that one is dealing primarily with a coercive force and not merely a cultural entity. The role is that of policeman, not diplomat or Nobel laureate. Failure to acknowledge the essentially destructive root of naval power and presence is to risk using it in a manner that will do damage to a nation's credibility and power as a policing force. And finally, overreliance on these

methods detracts from more conventional forms of diplomacy.

On balance, however, many naval presence theorists seem to have successfully taken the difficult and painful step of departing from the Mahanian "command of the sea" paradigm. By their own account, much of the U.S. Navy remains skeptical if for no other reason than that advanced by McNulty that:

> . . . those same new realities which fostered the ascendancy of a conflict avoidance or deterrence national strategy have also set the stage for a basic conflict between the desires of the strategist and the values of the warrior. It is truly difficult for men in uniform, essentially unschooled in the nuances of diplomatic activities, to place much confidence in Naval Presence as an alternative to the possession of superior war-fighting capabilities which have demonstrably kept the peace since 1948. . . . [T]he belief that "to subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill," has seldom found favor in the hearts of those who conceive of themselves as warriors, charged with the military security of the state.[29]

Nevertheless, these developments are an impressive example of what can happen when naval policy is reconceptualized in terms of its relationship with the changing context of world politics. Paradoxically, however, the outcome of the effort might well prove inappropriate to what some students of world politics envision for the future. That is to say, the articulation and refinement of the naval presence mission may be but another example of military planning more suitable to an era that is closing rather than a new era that may soon be upon us. As a theory of presence suited to an age of limited threats and limited war emerges, it finds itself confronted with a new political and technological environment which may confound its meaningful execution. For example, while it used to be true that a task force could steam into an ocean or port unopposed and present the leadership of the militarily inferior state with an obvious excuse of pleading *force majeure*, now a minor state could have the capacity to injure severely very expensive ships with a relatively simple volley of precision-guided weapons. The remainder of this paper will be devoted to a review of some of these problems and their implications for the use of naval force in a presence mode.

An Uncertain Future and the Use of Seapower. Prevention of international conflict—deterrence of war—by means of presence missions would seem possible in a naval environment characterized by at least three factors:

- a plenitude of United States naval assets;
- relative predominance of U.S. naval power understood as the capacity of the United States to maintain and/or project significant naval presence virtually any place on the globe; and
- a relatively benign or, at worst, neutral global order and/or ocean legal regime which provides for and facilitates relatively unencumbered movement and use of one's naval assets.

The most important consequence of such an environment is that it allows for the relatively easy movement of variable levels of naval force in and out of areas in which active presence is or may be called for. At the same time, routine or latent presence is easily maintained, thereby reinforcing the psychological prerequisites of keeping international order—the perception of real or potential military power.

But only as long as the ocean environment remains neutral and/or American power is predominant are the apparently unique attributes of naval

power manifest or can they be exploited short of war. In other words, the unique attractiveness of naval presence as a means for maintaining a "regulated" international environment favorable to American interests is in large measure a function of the structure of world and domestic politics and the world balance of naval power that has obtained for the last 25 years. Recently, however, intimations of a very different environment have emerged, which bring into question the preconditions for presence.

The Constraint of Size. If the capacity to exercise influence via the presence of naval power is in some measure a function of the predominant size of one's naval forces, then the future of American seapower is uncertain. The U.S. Navy has undergone a drastic reduction in total size since the mid-1960's. Obsolescence overtook more than 475 naval vessels by the turn of the decade. By the mid-1970's the Navy had retired virtually all of these ships and had settled on a fleet reconstruction target of 600 ships encompassing a mix of high-capability high-cost and low-capability low-cost ships. Most new construction was seen as coming at the high mix end of the spectrum to include aircraft carriers, attack submarines, a new class of SSBN (the *Trident*), cruisers (including a proposed new class), and the *Spruance*-class frigate/destroyer. Other than the *Knox*-class destroyer, only the patrol frigate would be added to the "low" end of the spectrum and even that ship would run to 3,600 tons and be in the words of a Defense Department spokesman, "the most heavily armed ship of its size in the world."

In early 1976, the Defense Department put forward a five-year shipbuilding program that envisaged the construction of 111 new ships by the mid-1980's at a cost of about $35 billion. But the proposal, launched in the midst of a Presidential campaign, aroused considerable controversy within the Defense Department, and ran into political crosscurrents in Congress. Reports of disagreement between the Secretaries of Defense and the Navy Department on the one hand, and conflict within the Navy between the Chief of Naval Operations and Adm. Hyman Rickover on the other, complicate any accurate projection of the size and composition of the Navy over the next decade. The Navy Department and the Secretary of Defense seemed to disagree as to the ultimate size of the Navy (the Navy reportedly asked for 160 new ships at $55 billion) and how rapidly the country should build to such a size. The disagreement within the Navy centered on Admiral Rickover's long insistence that the Navy of the future should be nuclear. The latter position seemed to have been affirmed by Congress in the Defense Department Appropriations Act of 1975 which stipulated that future major combatants would of necessity be nuclear. By 1976, however, the CNO and the Defense Department saw the costs of such a requirement seriously limiting the ultimate size of the Navy and sought, therefore, some relief from the strict provisions of Title VIII—and also, it would seem, relief from the pressure applied by Admiral Rickover as the CNO issued a stinging public rebuke to Rickover.

The reaction of Congress to this situation has been characteristically fragmented. Within the Sea Power Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee—a traditional bastion of pro-Rickover nuclear Navy sentiment—the Defense Department's shipbuilding budget for FY 77 was increased by more than $1 billion for two strike cruisers, one *Trident* submarine, and start-up costs on a *Nimitz*-class aircraft carrier—all of which were above the Ford administration's request. However, subsequent action by the Senate Armed Services Committee deleted all of these add-ons as well as two ships—an attack

submarine and one strike cruiser—originally requested by the Administration. The Carter administration has not only confirmed these actions, but also has added to the recision list the Navy's fourth large aircraft carrier and several patrol frigates.

These actions suggest that even allowing for the possibility of incremental increases in the inevitable bargaining attendant on the Executive-Legislative and Congressional policy-making process, the Navy's size will approximate that of the FY 77 Five-Year Plan. If this is the case then the ultimate size of the Navy will be closer to 525-550 ships than the 600 ships desired by the Department of the Navy and the CNO. Moreover, considerable skepticism prevails as to the capacity of the American shipbuilding industry to meet even this target within the cost framework proposed by the Defense Department. A history of construction and delivery delays and the most volatile inflationary dynamics of any segment of the defense industry could well result in a size somewhat below that which the Navy reluctantly accepted during the budget battles of late 1975 and early 1976.

The implications for the presence role of a Navy of 500-525 ships is highly problematic. A former Secretary of the Navy has observed recently that such a fleet would require some reduction of American presence at some point on the globe:

> The major difficulty would lie in the lack of sufficient surface combatants and aircraft carriers. In peacetime presence, the principal effect would be that our carrier task groups, deployed amphibious forces and underway replenishment forces would have to be deployed without sufficient carriers and surface combatants to protect them adequately from surprise attack or to enable them to prosecute their missions at the outbreak of war. In our steady state peacetime posture [presumably this means a roughly 500-ship fleet], we would have to reduce our deployments by one carrier task group. This would mean either only one carrier task group in the Mediterranean, or only two task groups to cover the entire ocean areas of the Western Pacific and the Indian Ocean.[30]

In view of the general drawdown of American presence in Asia, the latter deployment seems most likely. In any event, the diminishing size of the Navy constrains its capacity to undertake the basic mission recently ascribed to the 600-ship navy: "... to assure our simultaneous control of all ocean areas adjoining the Eurasian Continent."[31] In view of recent technological changes, however, one suspects that even with a 600-ship fleet, control of these ocean areas would be extremely difficult and the projection of power ashore more so.

Precision-Guided Munitions and Other Limits on Presence Projection and Sea Control. In the introduction of his recent Adelphi Paper, *Precision-Guided Weapons*, James Digby notes:

> Ever since men began shooting things at enemies, most shots have missed or been ineffective. The remarkable thing that has happened over the past few years is that new weapons have been developed which can hit with most of their shots, usually effectively. . . .[32]

Digby cautions that thinking concerning the use, effects and implications of PGM's is only tentative, but there is consensus that the 1972 bombings of North Vietnam and the 1973 Arab-Israeli War demonstrate the potentially revolutionary effects of PGM's on warfare. Though much analysis and speculation on the effect of PGM's have concentrated on land warfare, the potential proliferation of precision-guided

munitions to "lesser" powers does not seem to favor the expressive use of naval power, especially if that power presupposes the classic, vastly asymmetric circumstances of gunboat diplomacy wherein a powerful state attempts to coerce a state with a relatively primitive military establishment. Thus, the International Institute for Strategic Studies recently surveyed changes in naval weapons technologies having to do with armament, fire control, surveillance, ASW, and ship design and concluded:

> . . . the direction of change suggests that the ultimate beneficiaries of the new developments may well be smaller coastal states —both because small navies will be able to acquire an unparalleled capability for detecting, tracking and attacking potential targets and because the existing equipment and doctrine of larger navies may be unsuited to the emerging era of naval warfare.[33]

There is little doubt among most analysts that precision-guided munitions will become more widely developed, accessible and less costly. For instance, India, according to Omi Marvak, a research fellow at the Harvard Program for Science and International Affairs, has already tested an indigenously made remotely piloted vehicle of a type that could readily be converted into a cruise missile. India is also testing inertial guidance and on-board systems and superalloys. The cost of each of these nuclear-capable cruise weapons, Marvak estimates, is only $200,000 to $300,000 apiece.[34]

Assuming therefore the availability and proliferation of PGM's—a process already well underway as the result of aggressive arms sales policies in the West—it is reasonable to infer that the task of naval presence is thereby made immensely complicated. To the extent that PGM's imply increased defensive capacity for a coastal state, projecting power ashore either by means of airstrikes or amphibious assault becomes perhaps exhorbitantly costly. In the absence of a credible threat of projection, how meaningful is presence?

Beyond mere demonstrations, an effective conjoining of surface naval operations with a successful "opposed" landing seems to have become an almost insurmountable obstacle. The critical element of surprise necessary for a successful landing is unlikely. For one thing, the offending state would probably know it had committed an obnoxious act. For another, in an area of cheap and effective defenses, a minor power, if prepared, could inflict major damage to a landing if it were expected. If, on the other hand, the attack was not expected, then an airstrike or amphibious landing would not only represent a failure of diplomatic communication but also the absence of an effective wedding of diplomacy and force.

It is now increasingly likely that many coastal states will be able to afford an adequate minimal coastal defense. The American experience in Vietnam, thus, may be instructive. For few would contend that North Vietnam for instance was a military power of great significance. The Chinese and Russians withheld "state of the art" defensive and offensive weapons. Nevertheless, in Vietnam, fighter bomber aircraft defenses in the presence of pre-PGM's were forced towards the limits of their defensive capability in order to have a reasonable chance of survival. In the future, air support for surface operations may become even less practical.

Not only has air cover become difficult, even with the achievement of "superiority," amphibious advance from the sea has tended to appear practically impossible except at a prohibitive cost. Even the exercise of "vertical envelopment" provides a marginal advance for helicopters which are even more vulnerable to new weaponry than are

fighter bombers. As Brookings analysts Binkin and Record point out:

> Of the 11 helicopters employed in the initial assault on Tang Island [in the *Mayaguez* Crisis] five were quickly destroyed or disabled by small arms and machine gun fire. Moreover, evacuation of the Marines from Tang was delayed as the defenders, estimated at about 150 men, drove off helicopters trying to land on the Island. Withdrawal only became feasible after two U.S. Navy destroyers and two attack aircraft laid a heavy suppressive fire.[35]

Precision-guided munitions may, therefore, severely erode the potential for gunboat diplomacy. Many have speculated that PGM's on land will put a premium on dispersion and concealment. But at sea, dispersion and concealment are the very antithesis of the missions of ships designed to loom awesome and impressive, carriers or CSGN in the case of the United States, and *Kara*-class cruisers in that of the Soviet Union. Moreover, as the advent of PGM's makes unopposed landings less plausible, they also tend to escalate the level of combat activity. The distinction between low and high intensity operations probably has become blurred. The advent of PGM's may, in short, force another rupture in the theoretical and practical attempt to marry force and diplomacy.

PGM's introduce other uncertainties into the projection of influence. First, PGM's may diminish the reliance of allies and clients on "great powers"—especially the United States—against "local" aggression. Thus, alliances may become more explicitly supply arrangements and less territorial guarantees. To this extent, at least, the erosion of the impermeable "hard boundaries" of nation states—one of the more widely touted features of the nation-states' demise—may become less pronounced as nations become more competent in their immediate defense. Supply arrangements will, however, become critical unless middle-range nations acquire the capability to produce their own precision-guided munitions. To an extent, therefore, middle-range powers can further lessen their more apparent reliance on superpowers by gaining the capability to manufacture arms as the Israelis have attempted. On the other hand, since the consumption of stocks in an era of PGM's is said to have increased by a factor of 10, it is probably that no drastic disassociation of lesser states from the major arms suppliers will be feasible in the immediate future.[36]

Second, the rate of consumption and the volume of violence involved in a war involving PGM's may make "projective warfare," i.e., massive bombardment, not only prohibitively expensive but also something only to be considered under the most extreme circumstances. Thus, senior allies, in the future, might attempt even greater constraints on junior partners.

These PGM-induced changes in the military environment might also vitiate another centerpiece of naval strategy—sea control—which is the other side of the coin of naval presence. As Adm. James Holloway III puts it, sea control is "the fundamental function of the U.S. Navy and is a prerequisite of all other naval tasks and most sustained overseas operations by the general purpose forces."[37]

However, cargo ships and their escorts may be vulnerable to PGM's as well as being too slow, perhaps, to affect the battle situation. (The other side of *this* coin is that cargo vessels could be easily and effectively armed with PGM's of their own.) But if surface vessels and escorts prove vulnerable to PGM's, how can effective sea control be maintained and commerce protected? One answer may be to give up some of the "expressive" functions of surface craft in favor of submersible patrol

craft. The potential capture of ships at sea would be inhibited at less risk with other likely effectiveness by using "marshals" riding "shotgun" on relatively simple but fast and lethal submarines. These ships would not, of course, "bristle" for show as the *Kara*-class cruiser does and CSGN will, but knowledge of the presence of the undersea lawmen could be assuring to Western commerce against one of the most probable kinds of sea threats of the future. As Capt. S.W. Roskill, the historian of the Royal Navy, has written:

> . . . the scope for employment of submarines on duties either to be performed by surface ships or aircraft [are] limited only by the cost of submarine production. Indeed, the command of the surface sea whereby a maritime power seeks to secure the uninterrupted passage of mercantile or military cargoes, seem[s] likely to increasingly depend on control of the waters beneath.[38]

And in a similar vein, Vice Adm. George P. Steele wrote in May of 1976:

> Today, and for many years to come the really battle-worthy capital ship is the nuclear powered submarine. It has the unique ability to get close enough to destroy the enemy surface ship, using missiles or torpedoes without great risk, regardless of how much airpower is ranged against it. The only adversary that it really need fear is another and better submarine . . . using the same advantages of mobility and stealth.[39]

Moreover, in Europe, the increasingly common prognostication of a short war being the only one that is likely might make the sea control functions of massive carriers and other surface weapons platforms and the supply functions of a huge "sea control" fleet a bit superfluous. Indeed, the Marine Corps does not even include this kind of massive operation in its planning.[40] One might speculate of course that since the rate of fire of PGM's tends to be very rapid implying high ordnance consumption levels, there might well be an increased need for resupply. Hence, the future importance of surface cargo vessels and thus support ships not only remains but increases. However, the compression of combat time envisaged in much speculation concerning PGM-based warfare may lead to sizable stores of prepositioned ordnance and thereby obviate the need for even the most speedy cargo ships, especially in the absence of port facilities.[41]

With long-range in-flight refueling now available for fighter planes, the need for carriers to supply tactical air cover in either brush-fire wars or other engagements might well diminish. Indeed, concern about the vulnerability of carriers and their cost will most likely increase, thereby intensifying doubts about the future role of carriers and thus much of the rest of the fleet, which is to protect them. It was known that Secretary Schlesinger was less than enthusiastic about maintaining a large supercarrier program through the 1990's, but he was opposed by Secretary Kissinger who is said to be impressed with carriers' "expressive" potential. Of course, the first time a carrier, representing over $5 billion and incalculable appeal to the American psyche, is damaged or sunk, this symbolic function may have to be reevaluated.

The recent IISS survey summarizes the point appropriately:

> While improvements in the range and accuracy of anti-ship weapons suggest that all surface ships will be more vulnerable in the future, it seems that larger ships will be particularly vulnerable. This is not only because larger vessels will be easier to locate and target, but also because FPB-type ["fast patrol boats"] systems will

> possess greater speed, firepower and surveillance capabilities. In future [sic], therefore, it may be more advantageous to have larger numbers of less valuable ships which, in multi-ship operations, could match the firepower of larger units while being less vulnerable.[42]

Secretary Schlesinger, in his last posture statement, seemed to sound this same warning that surface ships may not have a future. The cost of congressionally mandated nuclear surface ships may force the Navy to procure more versatile although admittedly less awe-inspiring surface vessels to perform sea control missions. Yet, even small patrol craft may not be as efficient as submersible patrol boats. As he explained:

> Our shipbuilding program has already suffered severely from the impact of inflation . . . nuclear power . . . become[s] the main source of propulsion for the Navy in the future, we must also consider the versatility of nuclear attack submarines on the ASW mission and against enemy surface ships. Indeed, despite their high cost, we may well want to regard them as competitive with surface escorts. . . .[43]

Schlesinger also expressed "doubts" about the future of amphibious capabilities and a competent sealift scenario in "times of rapid mobilization deployment and attack." He answered these "rhetorical" reservations with what seems to be a rather uninspired response that obtaining a plausible sealift prevents us from putting "our mobility eggs" into the single "basket" of airlift,[44] and moreover, if the Russians were to see our sealift capability reduced, they would be emboldened. This, he stated, was "unthinkable." And although amphibious forces and surface ships are useful, he added the rather telling confession that in regard to those areas defended by sophisticated defense systems, the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps have not "seen anything more demanding than essentially unopposed landings for twenty years" and would have "grave difficulty" in a "high threat environment. . . ." "Nevertheless," he concluded, and not altogether convincingly, "there is a certain salutary value in having reinforced marine battalions aboard their assault ships in sensitive parts of the world."[45] One wonders, of course, how "salutary" these forces are if they are unable to perform their mission at an acceptable cost.

The Soviet Navy. Finally, of course, any assessment of the likelihood that the U.S. Navy can maintain the necessary margin of superiority to exercise effective short-of-war presence or other missions must address the constraints imposed by the major adversary of the United States—the Soviet Union. Debate as to the size, capability, and missions of the Soviet Navy now occupies a major segment of the literature on modern seapower and its use.[46] Opinion concerning the threat posed by Soviet naval forces includes claims that "today, the Soviet Union can boast the world's largest and most modern surface navy; the largest and most modern ocean research and fishing fleets; a potential naval air arm; and one of the most advanced shipbuilding industries in existence."[47] Norman Polmar has concluded that this capability qualifies the Soviet Navy as a "supernavy in every sense of the term; quantity, quality of forces, and operations."

> Thus, a Soviet Navy rebuilt in the 1950's and again in the 1960's, probably with the purpose of fighting the United States and NATO, has provided the U.S.S.R. with a fleet-in-being that can be employed directly in support of political and economic goals without having to fire a shot. The Soviets have learned that a ship

> built to sink another has [many other] uses, while still retaining a potent combat capability.[48]

On the other hand, some observers, most notably perhaps Michael MccGwire and his associates,[49] have suggested that although the Soviet Navy has been required by Soviet political leadership to assume a greater "foreign policy" role, the Navy's capacity to do so while simultaneously carrying out its war-related missions is severely strained. In contrast to Polmar's image of the Soviet Union as the "dominant" seapower today, MccGwire and his group take note of constrained shipyard capacity, limited blue water support ability, marginal air cover, consequent heavy dependence upon politically uncertain overseas basing, and the prospect that significant fleet expansion is quite unlikely in the future.[50] Indeed, Weinland and MccGwire suggest that Admiral Gorshkov's series of articles, "Navies in War and Peace,"[51] rather than heralding a new prominence for Soviet seapower in the Soviet Union's arsenal of politico-military instrumentalities, was in fact an only partially successful plea to defend the limited gains made by Soviet seapower advocates over the course of the 1960's. MccGwire concludes:

> There are no indications that the Navy's relative standing within the political leadership has improved, and if membership of the Central Committee is any guide, Ground Force domination of the military leadership has increased progressively since 1961. Therefore, one suspects that Gorshkov's strictures will fall on deaf ears and that the political leadership will choose to make increasing use of the Soviet Navy as an instrument of foreign policy, but without increasing its relative share of resources.[52]

The latter position would seem to be supported by MccGwire's own analysis and projections concerning ship construction over the next decade, especially with respect to surface combatants. Moreover, recently disclosed Department of Defense comparisons of the U.S. and Soviet Fleets reveal that even during the period of escalating Soviet Fleet size, the United States was outbuilding the Soviets in those classes of ships larger than 3,600 tons, and in view of the Navy's FY 77 Five-Year Shipbuilding Plan, will continue to do so for the foreseeable future.[53] Finally, recent projections concerning Soviet shipyard capacity and construction rates suggest that with the exception of submarines, the Soviets will do well to maintain replacement rates for a navy that now confronts block obsolescence problems as severe as those confronted by the U.S. Navy in the late 1960's and early 1970's.[54]

Official Department of Defense views on the relationship of the two fleets are predictably cautious. However, Secretary Schlesinger, in his last posture statement, took note of the asymmetrical missions of the two fleets, "The Soviet Union, at least for now, stresses defense against United States power projection efforts and interdiction of United States and allied military and economic support shipping on the open oceans."[55] Schlesinger was obviously cognizant of the fundamental differences between the Soviet and American naval force structures.

> . . . once one removes the mission asymmetry and measures the balance, it becomes clear that the naval forces of the Soviet Union and its allies are not generally superior to those of the United States and its allies, and that this should be perceived by well-informed observers.[56]

Nevertheless, Schlesinger was particularly concerned about Soviet antiship capability and the strong Soviet potential for attacks on U.S. and allied shipping. But even here he concluded:

> . . . the United States and its maritime allies could suffer significant

> but not prohibitive shipping losses if the Soviets were to conduct a major antishipping campaign. . . . Although shipping losses might be heavy, the net effect on the U.S. and allied war effort would not be crippling.[57]

The FY 1977 posture statement reaches similar conclusions.[58]

Perhaps the clearest assessment of the capability and missions of the Soviet Navy remains that provided by Barry Blechman of the Brookings Institution:

> Generally, and with the exception of strategic submarines, the Soviet Navy does not appear to be designed to project the Soviet Union's power into distant oceans but to defend the security and interests of the U.S.S.R.—by preventing attacks on its homeland and by limiting the role of the United States and other Western powers in regions close to Soviet shores, notably the Middle East. The Soviet Navy's past building programs, its exercises, its peacetime deployments, and Soviet military doctrine all support the assessment that the primary emphasis in Soviet naval evolution has been and is likely to remain oriented to the accomplishment of these missions.[59]

How this assessment coincides with the maintenance of a viable presence mission is open to question. Still, as former Secretary of Defense Schlesinger summed up in his FY 76 overview:

> . . . [A]s far as peacetime naval presence is concerned, aggregate Soviet activity increased sharply in the late 1960's but now appears to have stabilized somewhat below the overall U.S. level. . . . U.S. forces tend to have a greater surge capability to most theaters of primary interest to the United States and its allies.[60]

Before concluding, however, that on balance the Soviet Navy does not constitute a decisive constraint on the exercise of U.S. naval presence, one should take careful note of the single caveat entered by most observers—that of the Middle East. Blechman has underscored the special position of the Eastern Mediterranean in Soviet and U.S. naval deployments.[61] Moreover, Schlesinger noted in 1975:

> The Soviets could increase their deployments by raising the operating tempo of their forces. During the Middle East war of 1973, in fact, they demonstrated a significant capability to surge and support naval forces to a greater extent than we had anticipated.[62]

Thus, while the more extreme statements of alarm concerning the development and capability of the Soviet Navy are probably overdrawn, the Soviet Union's ability to surge naval forces of considerable size and potency into crisis areas does not augur well for the unfettered exercise of naval suasion. In addition, the apparent severe limitations on Soviet missile reload capacity noted by most observers, including Department of Defense analysts,[63] further confounds the necessarily close calculations associated with the exercise of presence in a competitive environment. The structure and dynamics of naval deterrence in the presence of escalating naval forces are at best complicated. The probability that one of the partners in the relationship is severely limited in its war-fighting options, i.e., to striking first, and—one might surmise with nuclear weapons—imparts a dangerous fragility to the exercise. Nor, for that matter, can one take much comfort from the fact that the Soviet Union has shown a capacity for escalating its naval presence in a part of the world characterized by a large and potent U.S. naval presence, and a surfeit of opportunities for volatile and escalating crises.

Of course, none of this has precluded the exercise of naval presence in the area in the past. But with the advent of

significant Soviet naval capability and will to use it in the region, the mission has become increasingly difficult to fulfill. One suspects that it will be no less so in the future.

The "New International Order" and Constraints on Seapower. Especially important to the future of naval missions are some of the broader changes that seem to be emerging within the structure of the international system. Academic, "official," and journalistic writing is now preoccupied with the problem of defining and understanding a vaguely understood set of "new forces" in world politics. Variously characterizing these forces "interdependence" or "transnationalism," would correspond best with Seyom Brown's judgment that:

> . . . both powerful structures—the cold war coalitions and the nation-state system—are being undermined simultaneously, but at different rates, and uneventfully in various segments of the globe. The weakening of both of these structures gives other bases of political community—ethnicity, religion, social class, economic function, generation—more opportunity to assert themselves and to vie for the loyalty of individuals. A companion thesis is that the resultant incoherence in the world's political structure is likely to be profoundly inadequate to the tasks of global management required to assure the healthy survival of the human species.[64]

One example of this "incoherence" is the omnipresent fact of terrorism as an instrumentality of "the other bases of political community" in the new international system. Nor for that matter must future uses of terrorism be confined to nonnation-state actors.

It is not conceivable, for example, that a small state may use and then deny responsibility for a future *Maine*-kind of incident. Yet small nations could derive considerable benefits from a terroristic accident for which it is almost as hard to attach blame as it is to a natural catastrophe such as fire or flood. If the magnitude of difficulty attendant on employing conventional naval force (and land operations) in the face of PGM's is, as we have suggested, then states may resort more commonly in the future to some kind of quasi-official sponsorship or contractual relationship with terrorist groups for "police actions." (One harbinger of this development could be the use by Syria of the P.L.O. in pursuit of a cease-fire in Lebanon in early 1976.) This would obviously change the rules for the use of purely "expressive" force and might be an incentive for powers great and small to search for unofficial agents.

Of course, the "rules" of confrontation in such a circumstance would be ambiguous and would, necessarily, evolve only through usage as the "rules of deterrence" were "learned" and manipulated throughout the cold war.[65] This does not mean, however, that the "rise of the defense" in international society will necessarily portend an increase in the volume of violence (as it did do in World War I). For if great nations used transnational agents as weaker states do, the tendency may be to dampen the potential for great power conflict. If the United States, for instance, were to sponsor a kind of resuscitated Irgun and if the Soviets were in competition with a forthrightly backed P.L.O., it might well have as a consequence the serendipitous effect of widening the interval between conventional and nuclear war.

However, one future contingency likely to trigger a great power response could be the hijacking of a Western ship or a supertanker. Under a broadened definition of piracy, the new "pirates" of tomorrow might well be transnational terrorists based in one or more littoral states. The likelihood that

terrorism would move to sea "makes historical sense." In the past, one of the purposes of this kind of activity was not mere destruction but bargaining either by holding people or property hostage. There is reason to believe that this may be possible in the future. The logical response is either to:

- focus on the protection of people and property; or
- focus on the retrieval of people or property; or
- wreak havoc on the perpetrators of terrorism on the seas so that they will be deterred from doing it again.

Reprisals have never seemed to have been particularly effective and they can have unintended consequences (as the United States found out in Vietnam and the Israelis may have discovered in the case of their actions on the West Bank and in Lebanon). The second course may not be technologically feasible or, at least, particularly cost effective. Not only could the party which has to take to the offensive lose as much as it saves in retrieving what has been stolen but the political disadvantages would be poignantly burdensome as President Johnson was reminded at the time of the *Pueblo*. If the assault were to be conducted with the aid of surface ships standing offshore, it should be noted, as Gen. Robert E. Cushman, USMC, recently testified, that there is now no American heavy cruiser capable of providing major caliber support to such an operation—even if such a ship could stand far enough distant from enemy shore defenses.[66] Thus, the answer may be, as in the skyjacking phenomena, more in the prevention than in the cure.

Another unpleasant image of the character of new world order has been outlined recently by Robert W. Tucker.[67] There is a potential for lower level and regionally focused conflict to increase as Third World countries possessing oligopolistic control of raw materials essential to the developed world militantly try to exploit whatever advantages they possess. In Tucker's view, the situation is exacerbated because of ambivalence toward the use of force on the part of the developed nations because of the costs attached to such a course, a growing sense of illegitimacy concerning the use of force, as well as the risk of escalation. In sum, "interdependence" may well come to represent a kind of fractious and conflictual international immobility.

> Even if one accepts the view of an ever-rising interdependence occurring at the expense of the state, the prospect of a growing disjunction between power and order is not thereby excluded.[68]

It is conceivable that in such an environment, threatening and posturing —the exploitation of force short of war—will be even more prevalent than now. In such an international system, the presence mission may well prosper inasmuch as the political use of naval power is oriented precisely to the task of short of war influence activity. But other characteristics of this conflictual interdependence severely constrain the presence mission.

Legal Regime of the Ocean. A possible and most important manifestation of this new "equalitarian interdependence" could be a significant transformation of the legal regime of the oceans. As Elizabeth Young has argued recently,[69] we may be moving away from the traditional doctrines of *mare liberum* towards an incrementally established system of *mare clausum* based on 12-mile territorial seas which close important straits and 200-mile Exclusive Economic Zones within which sovereign "territoriality" is enforced. This process of closing Mahan's "great common" may come with decisive suddenness through a U.N. Law of the Seas Conference; or, as seems more likely, more slowly as coastal states gradually develop technological and economic

bases (through association with multinational corporations) for exploiting the oceans and seabed. In any event:

> The great navies will find their traditional roaming of the open seas, "showing the flag" in their interest, constrained, psychologically where not physically, by the multitude of new jurisdictional boundaries. The rights of foreign naval vessels within boundaries of quite unfamiliar texture . . . will need establishing not only by theoretical definition, in terms of international convention, but also by subjection to all the normative pressures of practice and experience.[70]

The openness of the "great common" is of course the basis of the purported uniqueness of naval power—its flexibility being based on its extra-territoriality—which is in turn one of the necessary conditions for conceiving and undertaking the presence mission. If, however, a naval force is no longer "highly maneuverable" or does *not* operate in an international medium and does not need to be very concerned "with violating sovereign territory," have we not removed one of the "key factors" which makes the naval force *most* appropriate to the presence mission? More importantly, have we not also undercut much of the mission itself?

None of this matters, of course, if this new regime exists only on paper. It must be applied to hydrospace or it does not functionally inhibit naval force or the presence mission. Coastal states must be able to enforce their claims; otherwise, very little will have changed. Under present conditions the presence mission would seem, therefore, to maintain its integrity. But the current and future proliferation of military technology (both conventional and nuclear discussed previously) could change decisively this situation and thereby compromise the use of naval force short of war. The future of this question is murky, but the handful of observers who have examined this issue in a preliminary fashion are not entirely sanguine. Lawrence Martin, for example, has recently predicted an increase in military conflict at sea as jurisdictional claims and conflicts proliferate and as coastal states increase their capacity to enforce their claims to this newest dimension of their sovereignty.[71]

Much, perhaps most, of this conflict probably will be regionally contained, directed by coastal states at each other, and confined to the level of conventional military technology. Nevertheless, the major naval powers probably will not be able to escape the implications of this situation, especially the effects of the acquisition of missiles, missile boats, land-based aircraft (and air defense systems), and even small submarines by many coastal states. "During the next decade," the IISS concludes, "when 200 miles of sea is likely to be added to the effective jurisdiction of coastal states, smaller states will be in a position to support their claims to extended sovereignty by the ability to police and defend large areas of ocean from intrusion by outside powers. Outside military intervention would be much more costly."[72]

Lt. Comdr. Linton Wells II has summarized these developments and some of their implications at the recent Conference on Conflict and Order in Ocean Relations:

> . . . the advent of surface-to-surface missiles has given the coastal states the ability to inflict serious damage on destroyer or cruiser-size ships within twenty miles or so of the coast. Moreover, later versions of these weapons, such as Exocet, Harpoon, or Gabriel are essentially prepackaged rounds. Their performance is minimally dependent on the skill of local mechanics and

not much more so on that of local commanders. To be sure, these probably can be countered by an alert crew, but the warning times are so short (less than two minutes is the usual figure), that even a brief lapse in readiness on the part of the target could be fatal. The likely proliferation of laser-designated, electro-optical and other guided aircraft ordnance will provide additional complications for the distant water navy.[73]

The volume of recent exports of late model patrol boats, hovercraft, frigates, fast patrol boats, destroyer escorts, destroyers, aircraft such as the F-14, and surface-to-surface missiles such as Gabriel, Exocet and Sea Killer, surface-to-air and air-to-air missiles (Rapier, Seacat, Hawk, Sidewinder, and Sparrow), and even antisubmarine aircraft to the Persian Gulf, for example, is significant. Since the start of the decade these countries have ordered more than 1,800 aircraft, 15,000 missiles, and 100 ships.[74] Present leadership in most of these countries is now pro-American, but will it be in the future? Moreover, this kind of arms buildup is not likely to go unnoticed among other coastal states of the Gulf or other regions. Furthermore:

> The next effect of these arms exports will be to increase coastal state freedom of action at the expense of the maritime powers. This latitude vanishes, of course, should the latter choose to employ all the means at their disposal, but at lower levels of conflict the new equipment can reduce some of the Western navy advantages. On the other hand, the simple knowledge of their possession may lead to an overrating of the developing country's power and thus dissuade attempts to test it.[75]

This latter point is noteworthy for it strikes at one of the key elements of the presence mission. As described by McGruther and others:

> Most important, a naval force, since it operates in its own milieu, can usually be kept out of hostilities until it chooses to participate, thereby leaving the final decision of commitment both as to tone and degree to one's own diplomats.[76]

Yet, if Wells is correct, the decision to commit will of necessity be of a very different sort than that foreseen by McGruther, Luttwak, et al. In the emerging naval environment one cannot be sure that a presence force can avoid hostilities until it chooses to participate. Finally, if "active suasion" now becomes fraught with peril, even the activities associated with latent suasion must be undertaken with a degree of preparation and care that cannot be counted as "routine."

Michael Klare has argued that much of the current preoccupation on the part of the U.S. Navy and DOD spokesmen with the growth of the Soviet Navy is rooted in the fear that the Soviets will be able to neutralize or circumscribe the political uses of U.S. naval power, especially in the Third World.[77] The present analysis suggests that a combination of developments, but especially the confluence of Third World militancy and the advent of new naval weapons technologies, will tend to complicate immensely the use of naval power by a superpower *even if it possesses clear superiority with respect to the other superpower*. Thus, it seems likely that the naval environment will be characterized by a general increase in the destructive capability of small naval forces, particularly those operating in coastal waters.[78] Thus, "superpower rivalry at sea" may well become a much less important element in calculations concerning sea control and the political uses of naval power.

Conclusion. It may be that these changing circumstances will dictate a

different set of missions for the U.S. Navy. If one sees our future global "interdependence" as a volatile mix of mutual economic need and uneven but relative military (including naval) autonomy and even in some instances, area or regional self-sufficiency, then something approaching Young's "constabulary" missions looms as a distinct possibility:

> The likelihood is that whenever economic interests on or in the seabed or in the superjacent waters are internationally recognized as exclusive to the coastal state, the continued existence of the traditional high seas regime (whatever the hopes or intentions of the maritime powers) will progressively be degraded into mere legal superstition. In all the heavily used seas—and those of the North Atlantic are the most heavily used—there is no foreseeable alternative to the steady erosion of the old freedoms and the substitution of civil (or military) occupation, nationally or regionally organized. As on land, the symbol of such occupation will be the constable on the beat and the presence of legitimately deployed force: a concept totally at variance with that of the freedom of the seas.[79]

Perhaps Young overstates the case. But if hydrospace does become subdivided, the task of national naval forces may well become primarily that of policing regional coastal economic claims either as distinct national units or as contributors to some form of internationalized constabulary.

In any event, even if one rejects the idea of an alternative future for the U.S. Navy based on the constabular mission (a rather different conception of "presence" than that discussed above), the seemingly irreversible proliferation of military technology alone raises questions concerning the profile of missions employed by the U.S. Navy today. Indeed, the volume of arms transfers raises serious questions about the entire regulatory image of world politics within which the current debate over U.S. naval missions is being carried out. Both the regulatory concept and the idea of using naval power short of war imply a purposeful control of the exploitation of force so as to maximize American power and interests, or more abstractly, "international order." If, however, some approximation of the fractured, conflictual, but interdependent world of Robert Tucker comes to pass, we may be compelled to dust off and reexamine new and different notions so as to deal conceptually and pragmatically with other states in the international system.[80] It may well be that the international system will be characterized by stalemate.

BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY

James A. Nathan and James K. Oliver are members of the Political Science faculty at the University of Delaware. In addition to numerous articles, they are co-authors of *United States Foreign Policy and World Order.*

NOTES

1. A.T. Mahan, *The Influence of Sea Power on History* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1890), p. 138.
2. John F. Kennedy, Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the Union, 30 January 1961, *Public Papers of the President*, 1961 (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1962), pp. 23-24.
3. *The Defense Monitor*, January 1976, p. 3.
4. *Washington Post*, 9 January 1976.

5. See Lawrence Martin, "The Role of Force in the Ocean," in *Perspectives on Ocean Policy: Conference on Conflict and Order in Ocean Relations*, NSF Report, Grant No. GI-39643 (Arlie, Va.: 21-24 October 1974).

6. "Guidelines for the New Defense Budget," *The Defense Monitor*, January 1975, p. 8.

7. James A. Nathan and James K. Oliver, "Public Opinion and U.S. Security Policy," *Armed Forces and Society*, Fall 1975, pp. 46-63. See also William Watts and Lloyd Free, "Nationalism, Not Isolationism," *Foreign Policy*, Fall 1976, pp. 3-26.

8. James F. McNulty, "Naval Presence—The Misunderstood Mission," *Naval War College Review*, September-October 1974, pp. 21-31.

9. U.S. Congress, Senate, Hearings Before the Senate Committee on Appropriations, 92d Congress, 2d sess., 1972, p. 67.

10. See "Educational Innovation at the Naval War College 1972-1974: A Case Study," *Naval War College Second Annual Report of the President*, 9 August 1974.

11. *Second Annual Report*, p. 8.

12. McNulty, p. 24.

13. *Second Annual Report*. See also Admiral Turner's comments in "Power at Sea: II. Super-powers and Navies," *Adelphi Papers*, No. 123 (London: 1155, 1976).

14. Ken Booth, "Navies and Foreign Policy," unpublished MS. presented to the International Studies Association, 20-23 March 1976.

15. James Cable, *Gunboat Diplomacy: Political Applications of Limited Naval Force* (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1971), p. 20.

16. Booth, p. 29.

17. Jonathan T. Howe, *Multicrises* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1971).

18. Kenneth McGruther, "The Role of Perception in Naval Diplomacy," *Naval War College Review*, September-October 1974, p. 11.

19. Howe, p. 333.

20. McGruther, p. 3.

21. Edward N. Luttwak, "Foreword" to *The Political Uses of Sea Power* (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974), p. vi.

22. Turner, p. 16.

23. Luttwak, pp. 71-79.

24. James A. Nathan and James K. Oliver, "Diplomacy of Violence," *Society Transaction*, September-October 1974, pp. 32-40.

25. Luttwak, p. 1.

26. McGruther, p. 11.

27. Luttwak, p. 17.

28. McNulty, p. 31.

29. *Ibid.*, p. 29.

30. U.S. Congress, Hearings before the Senate Committee on Armed Services on *S. 920, FY 76 and July-September 1976 Transition Period Authorization for Military Procurement, Research and Development and Active Duty, Selected Reserve and Civilian Personnel Strengths*, Part 2, Authorizations, 94th Congress, 1st sess., 1975, p. 786.

31. *Ibid.*

32. James Digby, "Precision-Guided Weapons," *Adelphi Paper No. 118* (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1975), p. 1.

33. "New Naval Weapons Technologies," in *Strategic Survey 1975* (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1976), pp. 21-22.

34. *The New York Times* Letter to the Editor, 1 March 1976.

35. Martin Binken and Jeffrey Record, *Where Does the Marine Corps Go from Here?* (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1976), p. 12.

36. *The New York Times*, 26 April 1976.

37. James L. Holloway III, "The U.S. Navy: A Bicentennial Appraisal," *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, July 1976, p. 19.

38. *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, v. 21, 1970, p. 343.

39. George P. Steele, "A Fleet to Match our Real Needs," *Outlook, Washington Post*, 16 May 1975.

40. Binken and Record, p. 23.

41. Geoffrey Kemp, "Threats from the Sea: Sources for Asian Maritime Conflicts," *Orbis*, Fall 1975, pp. 1054-1065.

42. *Strategic Survey 1975*, p. 25.

43. Report of Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger to Congress on the *FY 76 and Transitional Budgets FY 77, Authorization Request and FY 76-80 Defense Programs*, 5 February 1975, pp. 111-25-26.

44. *Ibid.*, p. 111-24.

45. *Ibid.*, p. 111-26.

46. For example, Robert W. Herrick's *Soviet Naval Strategy* (Annapolis: U.S. Naval Institute, 1968); David Fairhill, *Russian Sea Power* (Boston: Mass.: Gambit, 1971); Norman Polmar, *Soviet Naval Power: Challenge for the 1970's*, rev. ed. (New York: Crane, Russak, 1974); Michael MccGwire, ed., *Soviet Naval Policy: Objectives and Constraints* (New York: Praeger, 1975); Michael MccGwire, ed., *Soviet Naval Developments: Capability and Complex* (New York: Praeger, 1973); Barry M. Blechman, *The Changing Soviet Navy* (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1973); Barry M. Blechman, *The Control of Naval Armaments: Prospects and Possibilities* (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1975).

47. Polmar, p. 1.

48. *Ibid.*, p. 107.

49. MccGwire, ed., *Soviet Naval Policy, passim.*

50. *Ibid.*, especially MccGwire, "Current Soviet Warship Construction and Naval Weapons Development," pp. 424-451; MccGwire, "The Evolution of Soviet Naval Policy: 1960-1974," pp. 505-541; and Robert Weinland, "Analysis of Americal Gorshkov's 'Navies in War and Peace,'" pp. 547-572.

51. Text published in January through November 1974 issues of the *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*. Also published as *Red Star Rising* (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1974).

52. MccGwire, "The Evolution of Soviet Naval Policy: 1960-1974," p. 540.

53. John W. Finney, "Data Shows Navy Leads in Big Ships," *The New York Times*, 3 May 1976, p. 4 and Les Aspin, *The Trend in the Naval Balance*, mimeo, 1976.

54. Finney, "Aging Fleet Called a Soviet Handicap," *The New York Times*, 20 May 1974, and Finney, "Study Finds a Decline in Shipbuilding for Soviet Navy," *The New York Times*, 4 May 1976, p. 12.

55. U.S. Department of Defense, *Annual Defense Department Report, FY 76 and FY 77* (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1975), p. I-21.

56. *Ibid.*, p. I-22.

57. *Ibid.*, p. I-21-22.

58. U.S. Department of Defense, *Annual Defense Department Report, FY 77* (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1976), pp. 99-100.

59. Blechman, *The Changing Soviet Navy*, p. 36.

60. *Annual Report, FY 76 and FY 77*, p. I-22.

61. Blechman, *The Control of Naval Armaments*, especially pp. 47-63.

62. *Annual Report, FY 76 and FY 77*, p. I-22.

63. *Ibid.*, p. 744.

64. Seyom Brown, *New Force in World Politics* (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1974), p. 3.

65. Alexander George, et al., *Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974), p. 7.

66. *Ibid.*, p. 27.

67. Robert W. Tucker, "A New International Order?" *Commentary*, February 1975, pp. 38-50.

68. *Ibid.*, p. 46.

69. Elizabeth Young, "New Laws for Old Navies: Military Implications of the Law of the Sea," *Survival*, November-December 1974, pp. 262-267. See also the response by J.R. Hill, "Maritime Power and the Law of the Sea," *Survival*, March-April 1975, pp. 69-72.

70. Young, p. 265.

71. Martin, pp. 33-44.

72. *Strategic Survey 1975*, p. 25.

73. Linton Wells, "Comments," in *Perspectives on Ocean Policy*, p. 47.

74. "U.S. Arms to the Persian Gulf: $10 Billion Since 1973," *The Defense Monitor*, May 1975, p. 5.

75. Wells.

76. McGruther, p. 11.

77. Michael Klare, "Superpower Rivalry at Sea," *Foreign Policy*, Winter 1975-1976, p. 167.

78. *Strategic Survey 1975*, p. 25.

79. Young, p. 263.

80. Morton Kaplan, *System and Process in International Politics* (New York: Wiley, 1957).

Ever since the development of nuclear weapons their employment has been a major concern of military planners. Fortunately, we have had no practical experience with their use. However, in the event of war in Western Europe a decision determining the threshold for their employment would be critical if not decisive. Captain Norton discusses four possible thresholds within the context of nuclear and conventional deterrence.

NATO AND METAPHORS:

THE NUCLEAR THRESHOLD

by

Augustus R. Norton

In the wake of the U.S. involvement in Indochina, many tenets of the U.S. foreign policy have been subjected to the severe scrutiny of a Congress renewed in its power and a public noticeably less quiescent concerning American commitments abroad. One cornerstone of American foreign policy has thus far survived relatively intact from this searching and painful period of introspection. That is, of course, the U.S. commitment to the security of Europe.

The declaratory policy of the United States remains clear in its dedication to the defense of Western Europe from external aggression through the policy of flexible response which was adopted by NATO in 1967. The policy of flexible response promises to meet an act of aggression with the requisite level of force necessary to defeat the aggression, including the recourse to strategic or theater nuclear weapons if necessary. Thus, given conventional parity at best,[1] NATO may well depend on nuclear weapons as the final arbiter of conflict and accordingly they are the bedrock for the deterrence of the Warsaw Treaty Organization.

Unfortunately, the mere possession of nuclear weapons, in whatever numbers, may not be adequate to deter a determined adversary. Deterrence is by no means automatic. If it is to be successful, it must be based upon an action policy that is credible to adversary and ally alike. The counteraction credibly promised must so raise the cost of the aggressor's gambit as to make any prospective benefit pall in comparison. In addition, deterrence should not be

I wish to acknowledge my intellectual debt to Morton Kaplan and Albert Wohlstetter whose influence and cerebral stimulation are largely responsible for this article being written. Naturally I alone am responsible for the conclusions reached herein.

based upon postures or policies which *unintentionally* heighten the likelihood or intensity of conflict. Unfortunately it is not at all evident that the current NATO deployment is adequately credible, and more seriously it may well be escalatory and dangerous.

I

With NATO's defensive capacity so clearly and closely intertwined with nuclear weapons, a critical focus must be the circumstances which may justify or even demand a decision to "go nuclear"--i.e., the location of the nuclear threshold.[2] The position of the threshold will influence the effectiveness of nuclear weapons as an element of deterrence and consequently the stability of the balance of forces in Europe. Almost any serious discussion of the military relationship of NATO to the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) starts or ends with reference to the nuclear threshold. If a new weapons system is under consideration (e.g., the cruise missile), we ask: "Will it raise or lower the threshold?" If troop withdrawals are under consideration, the concern is: "What will be the probable effect upon the threshold?" To some a high threshold is sacrosanct, to others it is anathema. Those who are dissatisfied with the nuclear status quo for whatever reason, and desire to adjust, maneuver or propose policies which might affect the threshold, are frequently attacked as dangerous heretics.

Through all this concern with the nuclear threshold, one can perceive certain obvious truths. No one knows where the threshold really is at any given time, although its location is certainly dependent upon the declaratory policies and deployed military capabilities of the respective adversaries. We know that crossing the threshold means that at least one nuclear weapon has been exploded in anger or in error. But *no one* knows if that first shot will lead to yet another and another . . . *ad infinitum*. We know also that the threshold has political and military significance only so long as it does not become so high that nuclear weapons become unalterably irrelevant. We know finally that this amorphous but central concept--the nuclear threshold--can be ignored only at NATO's peril, for it is a critical element in the deterrence of WTO from an attack upon NATO territory.

The defense of Western Europe is inextricably linked to the 7,000 theater nuclear weapons controlled by the United States and deployed within the NATO alliance. Ultimately, the theater nuclear weapons are "coupled" to the strategic nuclear arsenal of the United States by their very presence and the uncertainty which would surround their use. How sure or short that coupling is or should be, has been a matter of fundamental if inpersistent debate. Simply stated, the length of the coupling reflects the degree to which strategic weapons may be isolated from a land war in Europe; while the inviolability of the coupling is a matter for political, rather than objective determination. In short, the Europeans prefer a short, secure coupling, which they perceive as the most effective--and locally least costly--deterrent. The U.S. preference seems quite different.

Conceding the central importance of the nuclear threshold, the purpose of this article will be to develop several conceptual models of the threshold; to discuss the model which best seems to describe existing circumstances; and to illuminate the model which would best satisfy NATO objectives at acceptable levels of risk. The vehicle for the discussion will be a set of four models which are proposed to depict the condition(s) of the threshold at its four logical extremities. Before discussing the models individually, it is important that the following definitions and assumptions be made explicit:

• While the link between conventional defense and the employment of nuclear weapons may be obvious, its upper limit or threshold may be and often is ambiguous.

• Hence, the threshold may exist with varying degrees of clarity. Extreme clarity, i.e., lack of ambiguity, is said to exist when a given action is known to be a sufficient (and frequently a necessary) condition for crossing the threshold. On the other hand, disclarity—"fuzziness" —indicates that the exact level of violence which will result in crossing of the threshold is ambiguous (the sufficient condition is not precisely made known). Each condition of clarity has inherent advantages and disadvantages.

• A high threshold does not necessarily predict a lesser likelihood of nuclear weapons employment, since the speed with which the threshold will be approached is a function of conventional capabilities on both sides. That is to say that a reluctance to use nuclear weapons may be quickly overcome if the conventional defense proves inadequate at early stages of combat. In the case of a low threshold, a conventional defense sustainable over time is less important, since the low threshold describes by definition an early resort to nuclear weapons.

• The first use of nuclear weapons by the Soviet Union is a possibility which should not be, but often is neglected. There is a tendency for choosing preferred worst cases.[3] Many commentaries on potential conflict in Europe tend to assume a *massive conventional* attack by WTO forces. This predilection ignores the very real advantages to be gained by WTO by the first use of nuclear weapons. Thus, when considering the positioning of the threshold from the Western perspective it is well to remember that such positioning may affect the adversary's use of both conventional and nuclear forces, just as the options from the opposite direction may be similarly affected.

• For the purpose of this examination, nuclear weapons are held to be qualitatively distinct from nonnuclear weapons. While the "firebreak" between nuclear and nonnuclear weapons may only be psychological, it is nonetheless significant.[4] However, it should not be inferred that this assumption implies incontrovertible escalation once the threshold is crossed, although conjecture to the contrary is singularly unconvincing.[5]

• There is no universally correct or appropriate model. Each is affected by the logic and facts of its environment and is accordingly situational.

II

Condition one—High and Fuzzy. In this condition the nuclear threshold is discernibly high, but it is not clear how high. Such a posture would be built on a declaratory policy which stresses the grave consequences of nuclear conflict while not specifying the precise level of aggression or attack that would trigger the use of nuclear weapons. As with condition two (below), such a threshold must not be so high as to indicate that nuclear weapons would never be used in connection with conflict in Europe. To do so would remove the "nuclear option," and render nuclear weapons irrelevant to conflict in the European theater.

High thresholds are associated with an expressed basic reluctance to use nuclear weapons. The prudent and reluctant power in this context would allow itself adequate options at the conventional level, combined with the pursuit of nuclear arms control or reduction. The imprudent actor would depend on the *ultima ratio* (his nuclear arsenal), while avoiding arms control processes which would eliminate the nuclear force upon which he so dearly depends. The imprudent actor would find himself in an inherently unstable situation and would tend to overcome

his reluctance and thus to move to condition three or four (see below) or would find himself faced with the prospect of *faits accomplis.*[6]

There is a degree of risk with this posture, although the risk is not as great as with other postures. The potential adversary, perceiving a high and fuzzy threshold, could elect to conduct low-intensity or even midintensity military operations with relatively modest objectives. The attacker would tend to allow himself a margin of safety to account for his perceptual shortfall in order not to engage inadvertently the nuclear arsenal of his victims or their sponsors. Were the attacker to misperceive grossly the threshold, there would be a grave risk of a nuclear exchange. To enhance the latter risk (and thus deterrence), it would be desirable to build on the existing ambiguity concerning threshold clarity with yet further ambiguity.

A condition one threshold would be most desirable when a broad spectrum of conventional capabilities exists on the part of the defender. Since higher levels of violence will enter the zone of ambiguity, any choices for defense posturing would be wisely directed to credible conventional capabilities to enhance deterrence. Should conventional-level deterrence fail to dissuade low and midlevel military actions, there must be an alternative to nuclear weapons employment.

Condition two—High and Clear. This is a readily discernible, precisely specified threshold. This posture is of the genre of the Hollywood scene in which the cowboy draws a line in Main Street of Laramie and declares to the outlaw: "Cross this line and we'll meet at thirty paces with six-guns." In the cinema the line has been frequently crossed; in the nuclear arena one hopes otherwise. This is truly the post of a rich and extravagant state-actor (at least in the context of the U.S.-Soviet military balance), for if it is to be both credible as a deterrent and effective in practice (which will largely determine credibility anyway), it necessitates plenary conventional capabilities.

This condition has the advantage of clearly delineating the precise point at which there will be a resort to nuclear weapons. It is likely to be internally credible since it will take a major act of war to cross the threshold. Unfortunately, it does nothing to deter lower levels of aggression and it compounds the failure by defining by omission just what a lower level of aggression would be. This posture would be most appropriate in two conditions: First, where a preponderance of conventional force rests with the defender and second, where the adversary has neither the conventional force nor the desire to seek even modest military objectives. Obviously, neither the first nor the second condition has existed, nor is likely to exist for NATO forces in Central Europe.

Without a conventional capability adequate to deny the adversary gains at the nonnuclear (i.e., below the threshold) levels, this condition would be incredible for deterring Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) attack in Central Europe. While such a threshold condition is not the most dangerous, it raises the risk of serious miscalculation especially with regard to tardy reappraisals by the defender. Specifically, the declaratory policy may be recognized as inadequate too late, and thus the action policy may be early resort to nuclear weapons. This could readily occur because of friendly miscalculations of their own or enemy conventional strengths. Condition two would tend to be highly unstable and would likely evolve to condition one, or less frequently conditions three or four. Condition two would have several serious side effects, in addition to its inherent instability.

- It may encourage further nuclear proliferation among allies to reduce the

clarity and/or height of the threshold. The French *force de frappe* may be correctly viewed as an early such response.

- It may lead to reduced expenditures, and resultant reductions in conventional capabilities unless the need for a broad spectrum of conventional capabilities is recognized and accepted. Accordingly, it may actually increase the prospect of a nuclear exchange in the event of conflict.
- It may erode allied faith in NATO and create a sublimation effect (e.g., "Finlandization"). This may occur for two very different reasons: First, the perception by the Europeans of nonnuclear capabilities as inadequate to the threat; or, second, the specter of a replay of World War II connoted by the emphasis on conventional defense. Either interpretation could make less belligerent or even submissive stances vis-à-vis the Soviet Union more appealing.

Condition three—Low and Fuzzy. This condition can be very effective for limited periods and yet it is extremely dangerous. It espouses the effectiveness of nuclear weapons to signal resolve, or to defeat and hence deter a conventional transgression. Thus, it promises an early answer to the question of the degree to which theater nuclear weapons are coupled to strategic nuclear weapons. This posture promises an early resort to nuclear weapons while not being very clear exactly how early.

More than with any other condition, except the fourth, this posture raises major questions of credibility. This condition may only be credible if the Soviet Union continues to believe that nuclear conflict is a unity.[7] That is, in order to be consciously implemented, NATO would have to assert publicly that restraint in nuclear conflict is attainable, while counting on the Soviet Union not to reach the same conclusion.[8] For the United States to do otherwise would be to subscribe to a doctrine for the employment of theater nuclear weapons which would be tantamount to firing the first shot in a nuclear exchange. The political costs of such positioning would be quite high, since it would fly in the face of the European aversion to any strategy which implies an extended (and grossly destructive) land war on the continent. This posture would be, however, one mode for allowing a parsimonious nation to reduce overseas deployments, but only at great potential political costs.

Not only would condition three enhance the danger inherent in East-West crisis, but it would substantively challenge the Atlantic alliance. For these reasons, this posture would tend to be transitional. The domestic and international political controversy it would engender would be a pressure for redefinition—tending at least to movement to condition four and perhaps condition one (which would be dangerous in itself if the move to condition three had been accompanied by reductions in nonnuclear deployments). More fundamentally, condition three would lose its disclarity and naturally evolve through requisite declarations and historical experience. As time progressed, it would become clearer through planned and inadvertent adversary testing.

Condition four—Low and Clear. Aggressive actions at a specified level of violence trigger the use of nuclear weapons. The defender would have little reluctance to resort to nuclear weapons, although he would be discriminating in the choice of targets. As with condition three, this posture is associated with theater nuclear war-fighting capabilities and would be built upon the belief that a credible nuclear war-fighting capability would be the best deterrent. To espouse a condition four (or even condition three) threshold, there would have to be wide ranging theater nuclear

capabilities to complement a doctrine which must specify nuclear exchanges containable to the region. Thus, more limited stratagems to signal resolve, such as the nuclear shot across the bow, would be inconsistent with the containability notion to the degree that they imply linkage to strategic nuclear forces. Such a tact obviously raises the credibility ogre.

Credibility problems are obvious, since there will always be doubts concerning any nation's preference for early resort to nuclear weapons when faced with the prospects for retaliation in kind and escalation. Credibility would be enahanced by the pursuit of a declaratory policy which stresses the possibility of first use and the responsiveness of nuclear weapons systems. Secure, dispersed weapons systems would enhance this posture, as would improvements in the accuracy of nuclear delivery systems.

Some testing would be possible, although adversary inhibitions are likely to preclude a testing of the defender's resolve by crossing the line delineated. A credible condition four threshold would require modest and reasonable conventional capabilities in order to prevent the "designing around" of deterrence at subthreshold levels. More importantly however, consistent with the war-fighting capability would be substantial maneuver forces to fight a theater nuclear war. Not to have the number of forces deemed necessary for battlefield use would call into question the commitment to go to war and would naturally infer short coupling.

To the degree that the low and clear posture stressed a battlefield nuclear war-fighting capability and the containment of theater nuclear war, it would challenge the cohesiveness of the alliance. It would seem beneficial to reinforce European and Soviet perceptions of the escalatory process by stressing the link between "tactical" and "strategic" nuclear weapons yet to do so in too vocal a fashion would stress a posture which purports to initiate general war and would thus be incredible. This is certainly a posture demanding a delicate choice of rhetoric.

A low and clear posture would suffer from arms limitation and agreements unless such agreements reduce conventional forces in WTO in trade for theater nuclear forces in NATO. This is precisely the type of *quid pro quo* which WTO has been unwilling to accept to date however.

III

While theater nuclear weapons are certainly omnipresent in any calculus performed within NATO or WTO, they are not being bandied about by either Eastern or Western spokesmen. The days when President Eisenhower considered nuclear weapons just another weapon during the "New Look" and "Massive Retaliation" epoch are long past. Similarly, it has now been two decades since the Soviets overtly threatened Great Britain with a rain of "modern destructive weapons" as a result of British participation in the Suez crisis.

Under the flexible response rubric U.S. spokesmen have been persistent in portraying theater nuclear weapons (TNW) as a supplement to conventional forces, rather than a substitute. Essentially the U.S. position has delineated two roles for TNW. First, the deterrence of Soviet first use through the ability to reply in kind. Second, as insurance against the failure of NATO deployments in the face of an overwhelming attack of massive, but subnuclear dimensions. Accordingly, the option of a first use of theater nuclear weapons by NATO is quite plainly left open. A clear and typical statement of the U.S. position has been provided by Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld in the *Annual Defense Department Report*, FY 1977:

> If deterrence failed, and the Pact used nuclear weapons or NATO's conventional forces could not contain Pact Forces, we could consider the use of theatre nuclear forces. *The NATO objective in either of these situations—war termination on terms acceptable to the Alliance—would be sought by executing the appropriate options.* [Emphasis added][9]

While the relevance of the theater nuclear weaponry deployed by the United States in Europe is stalwartly stressed, it is quite clear that the expressed position recognizes the great danger inherent in the use of such weapons. Excepting Soviet first use (which must always be considered a possibility),[10] there is an evident reluctance to resort to nuclear weapons which belies a high threshold aspiration. The ability of the NATO powers to sustain a high threshold obviously requires the capability to deal with levels of violence below the threshold. This caveat is oft recognized. Reference to this fact can be found, for example, in a very important report presented to Congress in 1975 by then Secretary of Defense Schlesinger, wherein it is noted:

> [Theatre Nuclear Weapons] have a unique role to play in the spectrum of deterrence, and we should continue to maintain and improve them. But they should not be viewed as a crutch that can replace a strong conventional leg of the deterrent Triad [Triad in this context refers to conventional, theater nuclear and strategic forces]. . . .[11]

> It should also be noted that conventional forces cannot substitute for an adequate theatre nuclear force.[12]

Thus, TNW are deemed essential for a NATO defense sufficiently buttressed with conventional capability to support a high threshold. As was noted earlier, a high threshold—ambiguous or not—if not supported by adequate nonnuclear capabilities will tend to be quickly approached and perhaps crossed (with surrender being the alternative). In the section which follows, the aspiration will be measured against the reality, and a judgment will be made as to whether NATO capabilities seem to meet the requisites for the condition one threshold.

IV

It is a fundamental premise of this article that the declared U.S. policy for the use of TNW should be complementary to the realities of the European balance of forces. Using the position presented in the preceding section as our benchmark, it is quite clear that several capabilities should be present in NATO:

- NATO should be capable of defeating a significant range of offensive operations that may be mounted from the East.
- The NATO TNW posture should be sufficiently stable so as to remove significant temptations for a preemptive disarming attack by WTO.
- In the event that the use of TNW's is authorized by the West, the outcome of a TNW exchange must not be disadvantageous to NATO.

NATO Conventional Capabilities. Is the evident aspiration for a condition one threshold reasonably linked to the reality one finds when examining the balance of forces in Europe? We have seen already that an expressed reluctance to resort to nuclear weapons may be quickly overcome in the face of failure at the nonnuclear levels. Is such a failure likely? Over the past decade or so, there has been considerable controversy within the community of defense specialists over the relative capability of NATO versus WTO conventional forces. As might be expected, there

is a surfeit of contentious arguments.[13]

Several bases for comparison do however suggest themselves as logical stopping points for examination along the familiar path which is being explored. The first of such points must be the numerical balance of forces. While recognizing that advantages of technology, disposition and resolve may be equally important, there can be little doubt that numbers count. Adjudging the quantitative comparison, it is plain that the balance is weighed heavily to the advantage of WTO in several significant respects. According to a recent study by the Library of Congress, the numerical balance leaves NATO outmanned and outgunned in Northern and Central Europe as follows: Committed divisions 27:57; reinforcement divisions 17:51; reserve divisions 9:2; total divisions 53:152; tanks 7,000:19,000; tactical aircraft 2,500:2,900; medium and intermediate range ballistic missiles 0:583.[14] The figures are sufficiently disparaging so as to raise questions concerning the level of relative NATO capabilities in the defense.

Even some of those who argue that NATO is not outnumbered in terms of committed forces, do concede a rapid mobilization advantage of WTO. One noted authority, Steven L. Canby, states:

> The major Soviet advantage is the Warsaw bloc's rapid mobilization and reinforcement system. Whereas NATO could reinforce its division count by two to five divisions in the first thirty days, the comparable WTO figure is twenty-five to fifty divisions.[15]

There are several factors which mitigate the numerical balance discussed above. Certainly differences in force structure must be considered. For example, the manpower of U.S. armored and mechanized divisions is 17,500 and 16,000 respectively, as opposed to comparable Soviet divisions which are being increased in strength to 12,500 men in the case of motorized rifle divisions and 10,000 in the case of tank divisions.[16] Yet the Soviets are structured for a short violent war which emphasizes shock power as opposed to the staying power stressed in the NATO long-war deployment.[17] Thus, the "division slice"—the division, itself plus a proportional share of nondivisional troops and administrative overheads—is 17,000 for Soviet mechanized divisions vis-à-vis 48,000 or more for a comparable U.S. division.[18] Effectively then, WTO does have a numerical advantage which is yet further accentuated by its emphasis on "up front" strength.

As a mode for encouragement, classic attack ratios are frequently cited as an indication that WTO does not possess the requisite power to launch an attack confidently. It is commonly asserted that a superiority ratio on the order of 3:1 is necessary for an attack to be launched with reasonable confidence and prospects for success. What such assertions ignore however is that the 3:1 "rule" refers to local superiority as opposed to theater superiority. By paying heed to the principles of *mass* and *economy of force*, an attacking force may achieve the 3:1 force ratio locally while even suffering an imbalance in general. Thus, simplistic efforts to sum all forces available on either side, and then declare NATO is not outnumbered three to one and is therefore quite capable of a credible conventional defense, are patently absurd. A widely read study by the Brookings Institution makes just such an assertion,[19] while adding the telling caveat that "*only* in tanks does the Pact have an overwhelming superiority."[20]

Recent research, including this Brookings study, asserts that NATO can defend itself if it is restructured to meet the short-war threat.[21] By maximizing immediately available combat power, NATO would enhance the credibility of its deployment to counter the most

likely threat, rather than the current posture of short-war vulnerability which tends to validate Soviet doctrine. As Steven Canby observes:

> Essentially, the Soviets have no alternative to their plan for a blitzkrieg war, so this is the kind of attack NATO must be postured to repulse, NATO does not have the required force today.[22]

Canby's observation is well borne out by Andrew Goodpaster, former Supreme Allied Commander Europe, who notes:

> NATO conventional forces alone do not give full assurance of preventing the overrunning of Western Europe, a fact that is well-known, both to NATO and to the Warsaw Pact.[23]

The weight of such assessments and the proposals that flow from them has begun to be felt within the U.S. military establishment where there is a very recent emphasis on winning the first battle of the next war. Much of the impetus for the new focus may be found in the development of precision guidance technologies which promise to offset force imbalances, especially in armored vehicles, and perhaps most significantly complement a high nuclear threshold by destroying targets previously planned for TNW's.[24] While precision-guided munitions (PGM's) hold great promise for NATO, the technology is not at all one-sided. The Western emphasis on quality high-cost weapons systems raises the specter of important vulnerabilities to PGM's deployed within WTO. Furthermore, while PGM's are said to favor the defense,[25] it is important to remind ourselves that the defense being referred to is the tactical (i.e., local) as opposed to the strategic. Thus, a WTO attack of limited scale could result in the seizure of territory that could be regained only at a great price through a NATO attack which would have to overcome a PGM-armed defender. In summary then, PGM's and other emerging technology can bolster NATO capabilities, but they are not a panacea, for as Kenneth Hunt observes,

> . . . in the long run technology is rarely dominant. . . . Countermeasures are always produced; an advantage is rarely enjoyed for long. At the moment, NATO is reaping some advantage from superior technology, but it can reap more by strengthening the defense and raising the price of aggression. Deterrence would thus be improved and the new weapons could be said to have provided some stability. However, the balance between offense and defense is likely to be changed temporarily, and perhaps only tactically, at that. Technology must certainly be pressed into service, but it must not be asked too much. Numbers count as well. Men are still important.[26]

NATO TNW Stability: Temptations and Vulnerability. Theater nuclear weapons systems which are vulnerable to preemptive destruction could well lead to the very outcome—nuclear exchange in Europe—that should be avoided. Inadequately protected systems may tempt the adversary to pursue their destruction at the very earliest stages of conflict. The higher the first strike bonus, the more keen will be the preemption incentive. Furthermore, NATO recognition of such vulnerability could well form the impetus for an otherwise unnecessary first use by NATO in lieu of the destruction of the systems on the ground. Unfortunately such instability clearly exists. In fact, acknowledgment by important U.S. spokesmen of this undesirable state of affairs may be found on the public record.

In his fiscal year 1976 report to the Congress, then Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger stressed that,[72]

"Vulnerability of these [TNW] forces to surprise nuclear attack should be reduced, and the more exposed dual-capable systems should have the capability to disperse quickly so as to match a surprise dispersal by the Warsaw Pact."[27] Obviously for there to be a characteristic to be affected (i.e., vulnerability), it must first exist . . . and it does. The evident concern of DOD with the problem of TNW vulnerability is clear in numerous statements that have been made on the open record. Others, with less cause for circumspection, have been far more explicit in treating the problem. Specific areas of vulnerability have been identified for example, by S.T. Cohen and W.C. Lyons, as follows:

> (1) NATO's tactical air forces are concentrated at airfields (on the order of one hundred). Nearly all of which are within reach of Soviet tactical missiles.
>
> (2) NATO's mobile tactical nuclear missiles and self-propelled 155 MM and 203 MM artillery weapon systems are usually parked in a limited number of large casernes (as are most of NATO's armored vehicles), thereby enhancing their targetability to Soviet tactical missiles.
>
> (3) NATO's (U.S.-controlled) tactical nuclear warheads are kept, during peacetime, in a limited number of well-guarded storage areas at large military installations to thwart terrorist "bomb-nappers" and Pact saboteurs (in time of East-West crisis) and are only dispersed under extreme crisis conditions.[28]

A partial response to these vulnerabilities may be found in the fiscal year 1977 report to the Congress by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Brown, who stated:

> . . . the inherent mobility and dispersal capability of these weapons enhance [sic] their survivability and reduce [sic] the temptation to attempt their destruction by preemptive strikes. A potential adversary is confronted with possible nuclear capability in every artillery position across the entire front. This spread of common delivery means presents the enemy with a most difficult targeting problem.[29]

Notwithstanding the emphasis so obviously (if implicitly) placed upon strategic warning in order to take advantage of "inherent mobility and dispersal capability," this statement is noteworthy for several reasons. First, while it is made in the context of a discussion of TNW in general, the vulnerability problem only seems to have been solved in the case of the most numerous and least useful delivery system—tube artillery. Totally ignored in this official statement, and many others for that matter, is the potential vulnerability of aircraft, surface-to-surface missiles and rockets, and atomic demolition munitions (ADM's). Ironically, the least important (with the unimportant exception of ADM's) system may be the most survivable, and then only with adequate warning. The range of cannon artillery is limited to the confines of the battle area, and the yields of its warheads range from as low as .1 KT to only several KT.[30] Accordingly, artillery-launched nuclear munitions are least appropriate to the concept for the use of TNW that has been declared:

> First use should be clearly limited and defensive in nature, so as to reduce the risks of escalation. However, the attack should be delivered with sufficient shock and decisiveness to forcibly change the perceptions of WP leaders and create a situation conducive to negotiations.[31]

Clearly the elements of "shock and decisiveness" require more than artillery can deliver in order to prevent mis-

perception or misconstruction of intent. Thus, such systems as the Lance and the Pershing, as well as tactical air systems, must loom large as the preferable vehicles for delivery. Unfortunately, they also loom large by any measure of vulnerability. One specialist, Colin S. Gray, has summed up the situation as follows:

> The current NATO posture is excessive in scale for any of the stated political or military purposes for which it is maintained. However, the scale and almost *ad hoc* character of the posture is perhaps justifiable, given, its vulnerability to nuclear and conventional PGM and (in many instances) to being overrun rapidly. Nuclear ammunition sites invite pre-emptive attack; similarly, most of the TNW delivery vehicles offer a very large first-strike bonus to the attacker. Save for Lance (which is in very short supply), NATO's SSM's are movable rather than mobile, and the QRA [Quick Reaction Alert] (and many other) aircraft should not be expected to survive a dedicated assault upon airfields. Given NATO's determination to delay TNW use for as long as possible, major elements of the TNW posture must survive the first day of war intact. Under present conditions, they cannot be expected to.[32]

The preceding statement is reinforced in its seriousness by a comment from Malcolm Currie's recent Research and Development report to Congress:

> The advent of Soviet capabilities to carry out deep-strike missions against NATO targets is of particular concern, especially in view of the developing asymmetry in tactical air defenses. . . . Comparatively, the new Soviet tactical aircraft facing NATO's thin and aging air defense environment are well-suited to attacking NATO targets and are being produced in numbers.[33]

Such vulnerabilities as have been alluded to above prompted James Schlesinger to announce in his report to Congress on TNW posture, that:

> Past DOD theatre nuclear force modernization programs were not fully keyed to specific threats to their survivability. To reduce these uncertainties and improve our modernization programs, theatre nuclear force "security" R&D program has been initiated with the following objectives:
>
> > To assess the survivability of these elements under conventional and nuclear attack, identify deficiencies and develop improvements.
> >
> > To develop technology to counter possible future threats to the survivability of these theatre nuclear elements. . . .
>
> Studies are in progress to find ways of improving survivability under nuclear attack.[34]

To date there have been scant public statements on the outcome of these studies.[35] We do know that efforts are currently underway to improve survivability of TNW's through improvements in mobility, hardening of aircraft shelters, camouflage of fixed systems, and active defense and increased communications security.[36] However, whether the vulnerability problem can be reduced to acceptable and stable limits must be a matter for conjecture at this point. Optimism would dictate that the problem being recognized will now be aggressively attacked and solved. But, as many previous Supreme Allied Commanders would probably agree, optimism may be misplaced.

(Dis)Advantages of the Current "Doctrine." If there is one unifying

sentiment which draws together the disparate commentary on TNW in Europe, it is the recognition that the doctrine for use of TNW is nonexistent, or at best inadequate.[37] Notwithstanding the undesirability of a nuclear exchange in general, there are several very critical deficiencies in the deployment.

The decision to escalate beyond theater-based weapons would indeed be excruciating and a challenge to the continued existence of U.S. and Soviet society. Yet, realities tend to indicate that in the event of war in Europe the decision would have to be made sooner, rather than later, as a direct result of opposing capabilities. On balance the coupling seems to be short indeed. This conclusion is complicated by several factors which tend to bring to question the very logic of NATO dependence upon TNW.

Considerable analysis supports the conclusion that a nuclear war in Europe may actually require more men rather than less. As previously recognized by James Schlesinger, TNW do not substitute for conventional forces. Thus, even a limited early use of TNW may further place NATO forces at a disadvantage. The side with the most forces does perhaps have the most to lose, but it also stands to have the most survive. As noted by a German authority, Wolfgang Heisenberg, an adequate manpower supply is not obviated by TNW.

> The original hope that the introduction of TNW might compensate for the Eastern superiority in *manpower* has largely been disproved by the American, British and German war games and studies . . . , which demonstrated that at least for the geographical conditions of Central Europe, the greater depth of the battle zone and the higher ratio of casualties would probably make the Western Forces more rather than less dependent on a sufficient supply of manpower. [Emphasis in original][38]

Compounding these shortcomings is the lack of symmetry in the TNW arsenals of the opposing alliances. While U.S. supplied weapons are of relatively low yields, this characteristic is not shared by the U.S.S.R. which according to most estimates has opted for larger yield weapons with poorer delivery accuracy.[39] Thus, in the event of a first use by NATO, restraint in targeting and levels of destruction is unlikely to be reciprocated by the Soviets. Unless the West is willing to accept a heavier tit for its tat, the likelihood of further escalation must be deemed high. Having the ability to strike with discriminate yield and accuracy loses its value as a demonstration of intent, when the adversary is technically incapable of acting within such tacit parameters of restraint. Unless a first TNW use by NATO is adequate to demonstrate resolve decisively, thus causing WTO to desist in its attack, the propensity for further escalation can only be high.

Another disadvantage for NATO TNW use is the delay in real time that is likely to result from two factors: first, the obvious reluctance to cross the threshold and second, the sheer political mechanics of approving the use of nuclear weapons. On the latter point, it is interesting to note that a very recent U.S. Army Field Manual uses 25 hours as the illustrative delay between request and delivery.[40] When such delays are combined with the formidable daily rate of advance objectives (up to 100 kilometers per day) sought by the Soviets, it may well be that TNW's alone may be too much, too late.

V

The current U.S. position on theater nuclear weapons stresses ambiguity to the point that not only is the threshold obscured, but the very concept for use is chimerical. The aspiration is clearly

for a high and fuzzy threshold, yet reality seems to point elsewhere. The very vulnerability of the TNW delivery systems invites a resort to TNW by the adversary, and hence provides the impetus for an early use by NATO. Conventional shortcomings in NATO add yet further incentive for a first and early use. Once the sacred threshold[41] is crossed, NATO is ill-equipped numerically and in terms of material (e.g., NATO tanks are not as well equipped for a nuclear environment as their WTO counterparts) to fight a theater nuclear war. Thus, nuclear weapons may only be an opiate for an alliance unwilling to provide the nonnuclear wherewithal for a satisfactory defensive deployment.

Cogent objections are raised against efforts to dissipate the fog shrouding TNW doctrine. Precise definition of the doctrine may have deleterious effects upon alliance cohesion and may add precision to the adversary's planning which is undesirable. However, some balance must be found between total clarity and complete ambiguity (or should one read: "confusion"?). While the heuristic condition one threshold is appropriate to the situational requirements faced in NATO's environment, the requisites of ambiguity must not be excuses to ignore reality or to deny clarity where it is useful. To the extent that clarity can be safely achieved, conventional necessities will be highlighted, and this is desirable. Nuclear weapons are desirable insofar as they deter the use of nuclear weapons by the adversary, but they cannot offset conventional shortcomings. Perhaps the best way to gain recognition for nonnuclear force requirements will be to attain reasonable specification of the point at which a first use by NATO will be countenanced. While precise public definition is unwise, careful (if somewhat imprecise) public specification should be viewed as a means for building support for stalwart nonnuclear capabilities. To deny the Soviet Union the capability of seizing West European territories by nonnuclear means is to put the onus of first use upon the Soviets. This desirable goal reverses current asymmetries.

Furthermore, careful definition of the threshold provides a rationale for the elimination of instable TNW systems and the improved protection of those that remain. The ability to defend Europe without nuclear weapons may, in a supreme irony, render NATO more capable of fighting a theater nuclear war. This is especially so since modern targeting technologies may demand deployments not unlike those envisaged for nuclear warfare. Thus, the rationalization of the NATO TNW posture may still satisfy European sensitivities while paying heed to martial realities.

The intentional use of nuclear weapons in Europe would be one of the trying acts in the history of civilization. That act should not be consummated out of ignorance or error.

BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY



A graduate of the University of Miami, Capt. Augustus R. Norton has served with the 82nd Airborne Division and the Vietnamese Airborne Division. He is now Adjunct Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of Illinois, Chicago Circle Campus and a Ph.D. candidate at the University of Chicago.

NOTES

1. The conventional capability of NATO forces vis-à-vis the forces of the Warsaw Pact will be surveyed in some detail in Section IV of this article.

2. According to a recent study by the Library of Congress, the threshold is defined as: "An intangible and adjustable line between levels and types of conflict, such as the separation between nuclear and non-nuclear warfare. The greater the reluctance to use nuclear weapons, the higher the threshold." See *United States/Soviet Military Balance* (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1976), p. 68.

3. Bernard Brodie noted this tendency in his classic work, *Strategy in the Missile Age* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959), p. 347. Brodie stated: "... we hear repeated expression of the idea that *if* the enemy starts the war, he will do it in the one way that enables us to annihilate him. This is only one of the many instances where we have let our fantasies dwell exclusively on 'American-preferred Soviet strategies.'" [Emphasis in original.] Samuel T. Cohen makes a similar comment more relevant to the instant examination:

> Apart from predictions of future Soviet intentions, the Warsaw Pact's capability for initiating a tactical nuclear campaign against NATO can no more be disregarded than its capability to launch a large-scale conventional attack. Obviously a nuclear attack would be far more successful militarily; the Soviets would have the great advantage of a nuclear first strike and NATO's forces, which are not structured for tactical nuclear war, would be highly vulnerable. Yet the U.S. emphasis continues to be based on conventional attack, which somehow is assumed to be far more probable and credible. Ironically, emphasizing a NATO conventional capability to defend against a Pact conventional attack appears only to increase the likelihood that any attack will be nuclear at the onset, why would the Soviets opt for a mode of warfare that had a lesser chance for victory?

"Tactical Nuclear Weapons and U.S. Military Strategy," *Orbis*, Spring 1971, p. 182. Naturally Cohen's comments ignore the very real element of risk which the Soviets would have to contemplate if first use were being considered.

4. A most important development of this argument may be found in Thomas Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1960), pp. 257-266.

5. For an example of such conjecture see James H. Polk, "The Realities of Tactical Nuclear Warfare," *Orbis*, Summer 1973.

6. This possibility is widely asserted, e.g., Andrew Goodpaster, "NATO Strategy and Requirements," *Survival*, September/October 1975, p. 210; and Statement by Gen. Fred C. Weyand, Chief of Staff, before the Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, *The Posture of the Army* (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 3 February 1976), p. 15. Apprehension concerning *faits accomplis* seizures of territory is not a recent development as commonly assumed, e.g., Bernard Brodie, *War and Politics* (New York: Macmillan, 1973). See p. 398 particularly, where Brodie cites the "Hamburg grab" which was a popular scenario during the Kennedy and Johnson administrations.

7. According to Martin J. Miller in a May-June 1970 article in *Ordnance* magazine, "there has been little indication in recent Soviet military literature to suggest that they have seriously considered concepts such as controlled nuclear response. The Soviets still adhere to the strict 'nuclear firebreak' theory that any use of nuclear weapons will trigger a general nuclear war." The Miller article is reprinted in a most valuable volume of hearings: U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee of the Committee on Foreign Relations, *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy* (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1974), pp. 213-217.

8. The Soviet "conclusion" may indeed be changing. In contrast to this writer's pessimism regarding the viability of a condition three threshold, under conditions of Soviet dismissal of the unity notion, one might consult the hearings cited above, e.g., James Schlesinger asserted that the Soviets would be deterred regardless of their view. He stated:

> The point that one has to emphasize here is that either way, if the Soviets believe that any initiation of the use of tactical nuclear weapons would be unconstrained or would result in an unconstrained situation, ..., that would improve deterrence. If they believe it can be constrained then they have in effect endorsed our strategy. I might add that there has been an evolution in that direction in Soviet strategic doctrine in recent years," *Ibid.*, p. 160.

9. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, *Annual Defense Department Report, FY 1977* (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1976), p. 99.

10. See note 8 and Rumsfeld statement, *ibid.*, p. 101, where he states:

> Doctrine and exercises indicate that the Warsaw Pact places high value on tactical surprise with nuclear weapons. Their doctrine states that if the Warsaw Pact believes NATO is about to launch a major nuclear attack, it will seek to preempt with nuclear strikes on

military targets. Moreover, there are clear indications that the Pact fully appreciates the initial advantage to be gained by a first use of theater nuclear forces in the absence of NATO indications to use nuclear weapons.

11. Report to Congress, "The Theatre Nuclear Force Posture in Europe," (required by the Congress in Public Law 93-365, popularly known as the "Nunn Amendment"), excerpted in *Survival*, September/October 1975, pp. 235-241. Quoted material at p. 241.

12. *Ibid.*, p. 237.

13. The interested reader might refer to the following two sources, the first of which asserts that the conventional balance is not necessarily disadvantageous and the second presents the opposite position: A. Enthoven and K.W. Smith, *How Much Is Enough?* (New York: Harper & Row, 1971); Morton Kaplan, ed., *NATO and Dissuasion* (Chicago: University of Chicago, Center for Policy Study, 1974), especially chapters by Kaplan.

14. Library of Congress, *United States/Soviet Military Balance: A Frame of Reference for Congress* (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., January 1976), p. 7. The figures provided exclude France which has two mechanized divisions (with 325 tanks) in Germany. It should be noted that the figures provided in the referenced study conflict in some cases with those provided by other sources, e.g., The International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance 1975-1976* (London: 1975), states on p. 97 that the total divisions available to NATO total 65. Despite the discrepancy in figures, they are illustrative of the position under discussion.

15. Steven L. Canby, "Damping Nuclear Counterforce Incentives: Correcting NATO's Inferiority in Conventional Military Strength," *Orbis*, Spring 1975, p. 49.

16. Drew Middleton, "Haig Says NATO Must Deal with Soviet Expansion," *The New York Times*, 6 March 1976, p. 2:3.

17. For an excellent discussion of Soviet doctrine for Europe, see Trevor Cliffe, *Military Technology and the European Balance* (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, Adelphi Paper #89, August 1972), pp. 29-35. A more recent treatment may be found in *The Soviet Theater Nuclear Offensive* (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1976).

18. Steven L. Canby, *The Alliance and Europe: Part IV: Military Doctrine and Technology* (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, Adelphi Paper #109, Winter 1974/5), p. 3.

19. Richard D. Lawrence and Jeffrey Record, *U.S. Force Structure in NATO: An Alternative* (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1974), p. 45.

20. *Ibid.*

21. See especially Canby, *Alliance and Europe;* and Canby, "Damping Nuclear Counterforce."

22. Canby, "Damping Nuclear Counterforce," p. 64.

23. Andrew Goodpaster, "U.S. Military Strategy for the Eighties," *The National Security Affairs Forum*, Spring/Summer 1976, p. 6.

24. See for example Albert Wohlstetter, "Threats and Promises of Peace: Europe and America in the New Era," *Orbis*, Winter 1974, especially p. 1124. For an excellent treatment of PGM's see James Digby, *Precision-Guided Weapons* (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, Adelphi Paper #118, Summer 1975).

25. See e.g., Canby, *Alliance and Europe*, p. 29.

26. Kenneth Hunt, "New Technology and the European Theater," in *The Other Arms Race*, ed. by Geoffrey Kemp, Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., and Uri Ra'anan (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1975), p. 122.

27. Report of Secretary of Defense (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1975), p. III-3.

28. S.T. Cohen and W.C. Lyons, "A Comparison of U.S.-Allied and Soviet Tactical Nuclear Force Capabilities and Policies," *Orbis*, Spring 1975, p. 37.

29. Report of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1976), p. 70.

30. Jeffrey Record, *U.S. Nuclear Weapons in Europe: Issues and Alternatives* (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1974), p. 20.

31. Schlesinger, "Nuclear Force Posture," p. 237.

32. Colin S. Gray, "Theatre Nuclear Weapons: Doctrines and Postures," *World Politics*, January 1976, p. 307.

33. *Director of Department of Defense Research and Development Report to the Congress FY77* (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1976), pp. 11-12.

34. Schlesinger, p. 239.

35. A rare, if oblique reference may be found in Rumsfeld, p. 106, where it is indicated that many land-based and carrier-based aircraft have been relieved of interdiction missions with nuclear weapons, as a result of targeting changes.

36. *Ibid.*, p. 103.

37. In the unclassified literature, the closest thing to a doctrine is U.S. Army Field Manual 100-30 (Test), *Tactical Nuclear Operations* (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1971). This scant manual (about 32 printed pages) speaks of a conflict of "30 to 60 days and possibly as long as 120 days," (p. 2-2) which seems absolutely incredible especially in light of the naive belief in restraint which is evident. Casualties of from 10 to 50 percent are predicted in the forward divisions. Interestingly, the acknowledged need for redundancy in command and control, and support seems to militate against the current emphasis on "cutting the fat" and improving the "tooth to tail ratio."

38. Wolfgang Heisenberg, *The Alliance and Europe: Part I: Crisis Stability in Europe and Tactical Nuclear Weapons* (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, Adelphi Paper #96, Summer 1973), p. 9. See also Record, pp. 11-13; and Canby, "Damping Nuclear Counterforce," p. 49.

39. On this point see for e.g., Miller; Richard Rosencrance, *Strategic Deterrence Reconsidered* (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, Adelphi Paper #116, Spring 1975), especially pp. 22-23. For a dissenting view to the effect that Soviet mode of TNW employment may call for more discriminate types of weapons than are commonly ascribed by Western authorities, see S.T. Cohen and W.R. Van Cleave, "Western European Collateral Damage from Tactical Nuclear Weapons," *RUSI Journal*, June 1976, pp. 32-38.

40. U.S. Army Field Manual 100-5, *Operations* (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1976), p. 10-9.

41. Indeed, as Herman Kahn teaches us, there are thresholds beyond that under discussion, but avoiding the nuclear escalation ladder seems a laudable objective. See Kahn's, *On Escalation: Metaphors and Scenarios* (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1968).

There are many similarities in the strategic position of Germany before 1914 and the Soviet Union today. Analogy is no substitute for analysis, but insight into past events can educate our minds—and those of our potential enemies as well--so that we are better able to gain wise and valid insights into current and future situations. The strategic concepts of Adm. Franz Hipper of the Imperial German Navy deserve examination, even though history can only illustrate, never prove a point.

REFLECTIONS ON THE STRATEGY OF A CONTINENTAL COMMANDER: ADMIRAL FRANZ HIPPER ON NAVAL WARFARE

by

Tobias R. Philbin III

In the course of the 20th century, the United States has supplanted the British Empire as the world's premier island-based seapower and the Soviet Union has taken Germany's position as the first-rank naval power of the Eurasian landmass. For this reason an appreciation of the position of a continental-based naval commander is as important today as it was at the turn of the century. There is widespread belief that the present age with its nuclear weaponry, ease of communication and sophisticated technology is unique. Yet two factors—geography and national outlook—are as critical now as they were when Germany and England contested mastery of the oceans.

The strategic problems facing the present Soviet admiral commanding the Northern Fleet and those Adm. Franz Hipper faced two generations ago are similar: a mission of sea denial; natural obstacles in achieving the open sea; national priorities assigning the premier position to land forces; and a desire for seapower to ensure world-power status. In addition, it is worthwhile to examine Hipper's thoughts on naval warfare in World War I because they cast fresh light on the origins of German naval strategy in World War II.

Franz Hipper served in the Kaiser's navy from 1889 to 1918. He is largely remembered for his brilliant performance at Jutland. What he is not remembered for and what may be far more significant historically is his plan for commerce warfare or a "war of sea denial," in today's vernacular. In fact, a case can be made that if Hipper's plan had been followed and his overall

strategy adopted, World War I could have ended in late 1915 with a German victory.

Hipper and the Planning of Commerce Warfare. Hipper's approach to commerce warfare was delineated in an operations plan[1] submitted to the High Seas Fleet Commander, Adm. Friedrich von Ingenohl, in November 1914. There was much uncertainty in the German Navy concerning the type of naval strategy to be followed,[2] especially from the beginning of World War I in August 1914 to the commencement of the first U-boat campaign in 1915. Some operations were undertaken with the fleet, cruiser warfare was carried on by a few ships overseas; and there were individual U-boat victories. However, in the main theater the Germans did not readily divine the implications of the British strategy of distant blockade and initially they interpreted the British operations as deliberate evasion of action.[3] This situation gave rise to a debate among German naval commanders over two basic strategies: *Kleinkrieg* and *Grosskrieg.* The first called for a *guerre de course* or raiding of commerce and included U-boat warfare; the second for an attack by the German battle fleet upon the British Grand Fleet. Use of the battle fleet applied to the second strategy even if commerce raiding were the mission assigned.

Hipper's Strategy. Hipper's approach lay between these two strategic concepts and involved use of part of the High Seas Fleet for a war on commerce. Acting on an idea proposed by one of his battle-cruiser commanders, Hipper wrote an operations plan advocating the use of Germany's entire battle-cruiser force in the Atlantic. Hipper's plan was to take his five capital ships (*Derfflinger, Moltke, Seydlitz, von der Tann* and *Blücher)* north around the Shetlands, past Iceland, then southwest, raiding Canadian ports and proceeding south along the U.S. coast to sink British cruisers and shipping off U.S. ports and finally to link up with Adm. Count von Spee's cruiser squadron in the West Indies. There Hipper would be athwart the main British sealanes in the Atlantic: The Americas, and to a lesser extent, all traffic rounding either Cape Horn or the Cape of Good Hope would be in his area of operations. Hipper thus envisioned the destruction of England's lines of trade and commerce with much of the British Empire and the principal neutral, the United States. Hipper said in his operations proposal that "... carrying out of cruiser war with the battle cruisers in the Atlantic remains the one way in which our High Seas fighting ships can damage the enemy and thereby justify their existence."

His plan was based on four assumptions, which in the light of hindsight, appear both valid and cogent. They were, first, that British sea communications could be damaged in such a manner as to precipitate a favorable negotiated settlement of the war for Germany; second, that the German High Command would have to abandon any plan of invading the British Isles; third, Hipper's battle-cruiser force (which was both the main scouting arm of the High Seas Fleet and about 20 percent of the German strategic deterrent) would be unavailable in home waters for the duration; and lastly, that he, Hipper, would have to fight a battle in distant waters against a force of British capital ships, probably without the support of the main fleet.

There is considerable evidence to indicate the validity of Hipper's assumption that British sea communications could be damaged by a powerful overseas cruiser squadron.[4] Outside of home waters the only protection available to British commerce was a dozen or so obsolete armored cruisers and these would have been no match for Hipper's

ships which were fast battleships albeit designated large cruisers. The British maintained an additional small force of light cruisers off U.S. ports to prevent German shipping from escaping and Hipper could have disposed of them on his way to the West Indies. Further, the degree of destruction of British or Allied commerce would have been controlled by three factors: the time Hipper's squadron operated without a major battle, the logistics, and the intelligence available to the German squadron.

Because Hipper's intent to operate in American waters could well have affected his success, it is relevant to speculate on possible American reaction to his proposed venture. Adms. George Dewey and Alfred Thayer Mahan would have been surprised at a German operation in the Caribbean as they both believed the main arena of battle-fleet conflict was to be the North Sea.[5] But the U.S. Navy's General Board would have been confirmed in its prediction of a Caribbean base of operations for a German attack in the Western Hemisphere.[6]

The operation itself if carried out in late November or early December 1914 might have struck a responsive chord in the American public. The U.S. Department of State at that time was making representations to the British government, warning of a serious deterioration in relations unless England ceased her heavyhanded enforcement of belligerency rights, a practice which had almost wiped out U.S. trade with continental Europe.[7] As Capt. Stephen Roskill says, in his analysis of the period of Anglo-American antagonisms:

> . . . But the detention of American ships had provoked strong protests from that country, and had the German unrestricted submarine campaign and such *gaucheries* as the notorious Zimmerman telegram not produced still stronger reactions, the dispute over Belligerent Rights might well have resulted in a disastrous deterioration in Anglo-American relations.

Roskill further notes that British "visit and search" policy was the chief cause of the War of 1812 and Americans remembered this.[8]

The second and third assumptions in Hipper's proposed operation, i.e., Germany would have to abandon any intention of invading the British Isles and the German battle-cruiser force would be unavailable for use in home waters for the duration of the war, are relatively simple to confirm. Germany's High Seas Fleet had the primary mission of holding the North Sea front, something which could be done without the help of a battle-cruiser force because of developments in mine warfare. That Germany lacked the ability to invade the United Kingdom in 1914 would seem evident because of the heavy casualties suffered in the first battle of the Marne and the German General Staff's assignment of a coastal defense mission to the High Seas Fleet. Even in the event of a fleet action in the North Sea, with Hipper gone the requirement for a German battle-cruiser force would not have been acute; most of the British battle cruisers would have been pursuing Hipper, if British action in the Falklands is indicative of a probable British response.

The fourth assumption—that he, Hipper, would have to fight a battle in distant waters against a force of British capital ships and probably without the support of the High Seas Fleet—is the most complex to analyze. It must be asked if Hipper's battle cruisers could reach their projected operating area, and several factors determine the likelihood of Hipper's achieving a breakout into the open Atlantic: the validity and timeliness of British intelligence, the weather, British command and control ability, and the location of Hipper's proposed commerce warfare operation, the West Indies.

The record of British naval intelligence in providing rapid and accurate information on German fleet movements, especially in the early days of World War I, is legend.[9] On the other hand, problems in British communications afloat, especially the winter of 1914-15 and later at Jutland, constitute a principal lesson of that conflict.[10] The weather in the North Sea and Atlantic in November and December 1914 was that of long dark nights, poor visibility and fog.[11] Thus the combination of bad weather and poor British command and control would seem to negate good British intelligence and make the breakout feasible. After the breakout, the logistics would be Hipper's most serious problem in reaching the West Indies. To begin with, the roundabout route proposed (north of the British Isles, west, north of Iceland, and thence south via Newfoundland) would have consumed 50 percent of Hipper's fuel before his arrival in potential operations areas.[12] In a letter to von Ingenohl, Hipper proposed a multifaceted solution to this situation:

> Perhaps it would be practicable to proceed after coaling in one of the U-boat anchorages in the Northwest coast of Iceland—and a further coaling in Canada, simultaneously attacking the coast—thence along the American coast to the West Indies. Everything indicates to me that coaling in U-boat anchorages in Icelandic waters would not remain undiscovered very long; nonetheless the detailing of coaling steamers to such areas should not be overlooked.[13]

The German Admiralty Staff had, in fact, made arrangements worldwide for such operations before war broke out. These included advance purchase and storage basing of coal supplies, charts and such other logistical requirements as were thought prudent. But because Hipper was uncertain of the wartime utility of these arrangements he proposed adding an outboard coal bunker to each of his battle cruisers to extend range and endurance.[14]

Was Hipper too bold in assuming he could place his colliers at the Icelandic U-boat anchorages and would this have given the operation away? He readily admits the possibility. But the probability of success then appeared good because the British were entirely unaware of the U-boat arrangements in Iceland.[15] A need for coaling by force of arms at Canadian ports would arise if, for example, Hipper had engaged in any action, such as engaging a large convoy, which would involve heavy fuel expenditure. Hipper's prospects of success were also enhanced by the lack of Canadian coastal defense.[16] Most important, everything depended on how long Hipper's battle-cruiser force could remain undetected by the Royal Navy. Hence he tailored his tactics in anticipation of possible detection as any major combat would doubtless reveal his location and weaken his resources for an engagement with British capital ships far from home.

Should he come upon a convoy, Hipper planned to disable the escort first to cut off enemy communications in order to deny the British a clear picture of his strength, disposition or movements.[17] He would then attack the convoy, leaving one battle cruiser to sink the crippled escort. Another rationale for this tactic was his lack of secure bases in his operating area; and he needed to husband his resources for the "inevitable battle with enemy heavy forces."

No doubt Hipper's arrival in the shipping lanes off North America would have disclosed his position. But the British deployment of a large force of capital ships, presumably 2:1 or at least 10 dreadnoughts, to destroy Hipper would have altered the balance of power in the North Sea.[18] At the very least it would have created some opportunities

for offensive action by the High Seas Fleet. Hipper would have been at least 5 days ahead of his pursuers unless delayed by action off the Canadian coast. Millions of tons of German shipping tied up in U.S. ports because of British blockade could have been freed and the blockade cruisers, mostly small light craft, would fall to Hipper one by one. Nonetheless, such operations off the U.S. east coast would have been particularly dangerous (a risk he was willing to take) because Hipper's presence was likely to be revealed and reported to the British more rapidly than if he were to operate in the West Indies or in the South Atlantic. He intended to rendezvous with Count von Spee's colonial squadron[19] even though the resulting increase in fighting strength would have entailed further logistics complications. Logistics aside, such a combination of Hipper and Spee would have been a strategic nightmare for the Royal Navy. The most significant flaw in these proposed arrangements was the lack of German overseas bases and provision for ammunition resupply.

The importance to the course of the war of Hipper's planned operation would not have been in the ships he sunk or if he himself were sunk. Rather, his deployment would have divided the British Grand Fleet, thus giving the German High Seas Fleet at least numerical parity, if not superiority. The level of training, materiel readiness and operational competence in the High Seas Fleet was at its height in December 1914, and that of the British less so. Prospects for German victory were good and had they won a battle in the North Sea the returning British force, whether recalled before or after sinking Hipper,[20] would have found its lines of communications cut and, outnumbered, would probably have been defeated. At that point the British would have lost the war.

But it was not to be. Admiral von Ingenohl, Fleet Commander in Chief, disapproved Hipper's plan because Ingenohl thought it would be better to let the U-boat have its day before the main fleet or any part of it went out to fight.[21] He sent Hipper's operations proposal and his own comments forward on 14 November 1914 to Adm. Hugo von Pohl, Chief of the Admiralty Staff, and Admiral von Tirpitz, State Secretary of the Imperial Naval Office. The positions of both men on naval strategy in this period are well documented. Admiral von Pohl adhered to the basic premise of a "fleet-in-being" or *Kleinkrieg* strategy and preferred the U-boat warfare recommended by Ingenohl. In fact, his last act as Chief of the Admiralty Staff in February 1915 was to authorize its unlimited prosecution.[22] This Pohl-Ingenohl agreement on U-boat warfare foredoomed Hipper's operations proposal to the file cabinet. As for Tirpitz, he favored a direct attack by the High Seas Fleet on the Grand Fleet, regardless of German numerical inferiority. Only after the battle of Dogger Bank on 24 January 1915 did Tirpitz advocate commerce warfare.[23]

Hipper's Plan: Historical Continuity. Some 25 years later, Erich Raeder, Hipper's chief of staff in World War I, resurrected Hipper's 1914 proposal as the basis of the master plan for the reconstruction of the German Navy. Raeder presented his "Z-Plan" for a naval strategy based on commerce warfare to Adolf Hitler in January 1939, noting that "To operate against this lifeline of commerce, in case war came, should be the primary objective of the German Fleet."[24]

This rationale may be compared with Hipper's position as stated in the first paragraph of his commerce warfare operations proposal: ". . . nonetheless, carrying out of cruiser war with the battle cruisers in the Atlantic remains the one way in which our High Seas fighting ships can damage the enemy and thereby justify their existence."

Raeder continued: "Because of Germany's lack of naval bases and her unfavorable position, hemmed in as she was by the barrier of the British Isles, these ships must have great cruising range, plus speed to prevent their being caught by stronger enemy forces."[25]

This may be compared with Hipper's position as stated in the second and fifth paragraphs of his proposal:

> . . . If the deployment is decided upon, I would unquestionably assign the four newest battle cruisers if their coal bunkerage could be raised in some manner. . . . The possibilities of the voyage could be greatly increased by giving the ships blisters for the required coal on the first part of the voyage.

Raeder's "Z-Plan" naval strategy included attacking British overseas trade by groups of "battle and light cruisers as well as U-boats and auxiliary raiders."[26] British naval intelligence speculated on the possible connection between German cruiser warfare in World War I and in World War II and noted that the German official history criticized the High Seas Fleet commander for not undertaking operations which would support the cruiser squadron under Count von Spee fighting its way home from the Far East.[27] The author of the official German history on overseas cruiser warfare in World War I was Erich Raeder.[28]

There are significant parallels between Hipper and his strategic grandson, the Soviet Northern Fleet commander. The Soviets today have feasible solutions to the traditional dilemma of logistics and geography faced by continental-based naval commanders. Today they have naval bases in Cuba and Somalia as well as at least potential bases in former Portuguese colonies in Africa. They have circumvented the problem of geography by advanced deployment of a significant number of combatants. They also have a large merchant marine and fishing fleet which could provide an excellent logistics base afloat.

Commenting on Admiral Gorshkov's view of the history of World War I, Adm. Robert B. Carney noted:

> Having sorted out what he believes to be the enduring principles, we may be sure that he applies them to his thinking concerning modern fleet composition and employment . . . It is to be hoped that later reviewers (of *Red Star Rising at Sea*, [U.S. Naval Institute, Annapolis, 1974]) would give these matters careful attention for Admiral Gorshkov's writings undoubtedly furnish some valid clues to current Russian maritime thinking.[29]

Gorshkov's emphasis on history in this book amounts to about 90 percent of the text. In his latest work, *The Sea Power of the State*, some 30 percent of the text is dedicated to "Pages from the History of Navies," including World War I.[30] In short, it would be foolish of the West to assume the Soviets are not profiting from naval historical studies. Perhaps the Soviets have learned something from Hipper since his view of fleet employment is markedly similar to their own. If the evidence of their ship construction programs is to be credited, the mission of sea denial still forms a very large part of the Soviet Navy's overall task. They are building multimission ships as a national force to forward the political aims of the Soviet Union, a strategy Hipper advocated for Germany in 1915.

Hipper and the Strategy of Sea Denial. Hipper recognized naval policy was to be dictated by national political requirements and by his civil and military superiors. He pressed for seapower as a solution to the stalemate on the Western Front by achieving a dominant position athwart the sealanes of the world. This meant bases were needed

outside the continental landmass and ironically, Germany nearly had them by negotiation before hostilities commenced. The Wilhelmstrasse and Whitehall had agreed in principle to the transfer of Angola, San Thomé and Principe, and northern Mozambique to Germany in May 1913 but disagreements over the publication of the treaty delayed final sanction until the end of July 1914. However, because of the imminence of war, the treaty was never signed.[31] Hipper advocated ship types which would have performed best in an overseas context. His thinking on capital ships was welded to strategic position and bases. On 7 July 1915 he wrote:

> Our present war strategy against England is due to its very nature stamped strategically defensive. This is because of England's geographical position combined with our lack of German Atlantic bases, i.e., the German Bight is cut off from the Atlantic and further, there is the relative strength of the British and German fleets. Due to the above circumstances a truly effective offensive on the high seas to sever British Atlantic communications and defeat England, which should be our aim, has not been possible.[32]

It should be noted that Admiral von Pohl, the German fleet commander, claimed in his private correspondence that his admirals and captains were less in favor of offensive action than was he in March 1915.[33] Nevertheless, Hipper's analysis was echoed by the German official history published in 1922 and by Arthur Marder's 1965 *magnum opus*.[34]

In unpublished position papers, Hipper criticized German warship design philosophy for emphasizing cost effectiveness rather than gun and speed superiority over the enemy. Nevertheless, he was aware of the political considerations inherent in any building program as is evident from his response to his commander's inquiry concerning the type of capital ships to be built in the future. Writing on 7 July 1915, Hipper said: "In order to answer this properly, I should have to know what was the situation, what were the government's political objectives, and what role the armed forces of the country were to have in attaining those objectives."[35] Hipper wrote further that he believed large capital ships would be required to conduct overseas warfare in any future war, especially "if we desire to bring the war into the Atlantic." He said the threat of the U-boat could be countered by greater underwater defensive measures and higher speed in large capital ships.

Hipper felt Germany should refrain from further battleship construction until it was clear what the enemy was going to do; meanwhile, battle cruisers should be built. These, he said, should have heavy calibre guns carried in 4 turrets on the centerline with the greatest possible range and a secondary battery of 12 5.9-inch guns, conforming to German practice of the time.[36] Hipper also believed there should be at least 50 percent reserve gun tubes in shops at bases for each heavy gun mounted in the fleet.[37] As for armor, he was in favor of increasing the protection against plunging fire by adding armor to the decks and weapons systems, both turrets and magazine-handling areas. This could be accomplished by reducing the side armor. He also suggested a second armored deck to protect the rudder machinery and was in favor of increased freeboard aft and of complete watertight integrity of fore-and-aft spaces for the full length of the ship and to the upper deck. He also wanted a more spacious command tower especially for the flagship, with a good view aft.

In addition to better protection for future battle cruisers, Hipper wanted greater speed in any new construction as

well as greater reliability and endurance. He felt the maximum speed of new German capital ships should be over 30 knots, some 6 knots faster than the *Derfflinger* class, the latest battle cruisers in service in 1915.

Hipper wanted a greater radius of action than the German battle cruiser of 1915 possessed (some 2,000 to 2,500 miles), for operations overseas. If German bases or supply ships were available, then Hipper wanted oil-fired ships. If technology would permit, he wanted diesel engines because he said they provided a higher radius of action, contributed to ship stability, and advanced the ideal of a passage not heralded by great clouds of smoke.

The question may be asked if any ships resembling Hipper's prototype ever got onto the German drawing board, after von Pohl had passed the recommendations on to Tirpitz. Several ships did get on the drawing board,[38] a few were launched, but none saw service in World War I or under the Versailles Treaty. It is interesting to note such warships were designed for Raeder's navy, which had as its primary mission a war on sea communications. Norman Polmar, among others, asserts a similar mission exists for the Soviet Navy.[39]

It was not only surface ships which were to figure in the Imperial German Navy's strategy; indeed history records something entirely different. The role of the U-boat in German naval strategy is central to the history of the Imperial Navy in World War I. And lest Hipper be adjudged as a reactionary "battleship admiral" it is well to note that Hipper's personal journal contains numerous references to U-boat warfare which indicate he favored it as an effective weapon for Germany.[40] However, Hipper's official views on the tactical and strategical use of the U-boat indicate he did not feel it was a panacea, unlike most of his contemporaries.[41]

These unpublished observations are contained in his analysis of ship-type questions tendered in response to von Pohl's fleet-wide request for commanders' opinions. On 7 July 1915 Hipper submitted an extensive letter in response to von Pohl's 20 February request; the letter included Hipper's definition of the missions and limitations applicable to the U-boat. He wrote:

> Apart from offensive actions against enemy warships a range of activities previously performed only by surface craft falls to the U-boats in the future—strategic scouting, clearing and securing designated areas, guarding specific parts of the fleet at anchor, commerce warfare in the traffic lanes of enemy ports, and minelaying, especially off enemy coasts.
>
> Escorting and scouting by U-boats are only practicable by day; the escorting of fleet units underway is limited by insufficient (U-boat) speed. Also, their ability to scout tactically is gravely impaired by their insufficient surface speed and the impossibility of diving with their wireless rigged. . . .
>
> The U-boats are of tremendous value as minelayers. They can lay a complete minefield in secrecy and this is the best way to do it. The type of minelayer U-boats which carry their own mines to the entrances of enemy harbors appear especially suitable, effective and practical and constitute a method of employment for torpedo-armed U-boats should they find only difficult targets for their weapons in the event the enemy are driven from the high seas.[42]

Hipper also cautioned that improved defenses and antisubmarine weapons could be expected and noted that in cases where the element of surprise was missing, the measure of U-boat success was very small. The two latter observations drew a marginal exclamation from

von Pohl who wrote, "This man always against the U-boat!"[43] This was, of course, untrue.

As a continental-based naval commander, Hipper's appreciation of the capabilities and limitations of naval aircraft constitutes the penultimate element of his understanding of modern maritime warfare. He presented his opinions to von Pohl in the July 1915 letter. Hipper said airships, without regard to attack functions, were suitable for strategical scouting; the tactical scouting prior to a battle; the security service, securing a sealane, and for guarding a fleet, "especially a fleet underway."

Hipper envisioned radio-equipped aircraft used by his surface ships to expand significantly their scouting ability, and he recognized they would be limited by weather conditions and darkness. More importantly, he foresaw aircraft and airships assuming an antisubmarine mission in combination with surface forces. By August 1918 such forces existed in the German inventory as they did in that of the Allies. He said that "the simultaneous use of light surface forces, airships and aircraft could be of great impact if systematically developed. . . . Should we make as great an effort in air weapons as in the underwater weapons it would give us absolute superiority over all other nations in the world."[44]

Conclusions. Hipper's theoretical contributions to the art of naval warfare were produced primarily between November 1914 and July 1915. During this period many of the traditional constraints on a continental-based naval commander came sharply into focus. Geography (the barrier of the British Isles), national priorities (the two-front land war), national outlook (the innate conservatism and ignorance of the national command in adhering to a fleet-in-being strategy) all conspired to keep victory beyond the grasp of the operational commander. Moreover, war came too early for the Imperial German Navy: The desired date in terms of capital ship strength was closer to 1921 when some 60 dreadnoughts would have been operational as would overseas bases. By way of contrast, the Soviet inheritors of continental-based naval command now have ports available in the Caribbean and in Africa and they are carefully pursuing their building programs which are meshed with a diplomacy forwarding their overriding political aims. In retrospect, Hipper's operational approach to commerce warfare was fraught with difficulties and dangers, most of which required audacity and initiative. On paper and in action as a commander at Jutland, Hipper showed himself possessed of these qualities. But institutionally speaking, such were not the hallmarks of the Imperial German Navy. Nor for that matter did Hitler's navy under Raeder convince its own national leadership that *it* was worthy of being so credited. The other elements of Hipper's approach to his naval strategy of sea denial, notably the integration of airpower, underwater weapons and surface forces, accurately presaged both technology and strategy. Most of Hipper's elements of naval strategy are to be found in Soviet naval strategy albeit metamorphosed. For example, it would be well to remember that Hipper did not advocate an aircraft carrier per se;

BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY

Professor Philbin earned his Ph.D. from Kings College, University of London. A Naval Reserve officer, he served as Gunnery Officer in U.S.S. *Harwood* (DD-861). He is currently a member of the faculty of the Virginia Military Institute.

he saw the aircraft as an antisubmarine and support weapon. The *Kiev* is the embodiment of just such a concept.[45]

Though there are similarities between the views of Hipper and his strategic descendants, they are not the same: Hipper lived and operated in an era destroyed by World War I. And while the vicissitudes of time, ideology and nationality limit the validity of historical analogy, there is sufficient value in the data itself to warrant comparison. To paraphrase Admiral Carney, the enduring principles need to be sorted out.

NOTES

1. Bundesarchiv/Militärachiv, Freiburg im Breisgau (hereinafter BA/MA) F149/PG74106 *"Kreuzerkrieg mit Grosser Kreuzer,"* November 1914 (Commerce War with Battle Cruisers), Franz Hipper to Friedrich von Ingenohl, 12 November 1914.

2. See Holger H. Herwig, *The German Naval Officer Corps* (London: Oxford University Press, 1973), pp. 174ff; see also Karl Axel Gemzell, *Organization, Conflict and Innovation: A Study of German Naval Strategic Planning 1888-1941* (Lund, Esselte Studium, 1973), pp. 176ff; see also Edward Wegener in *Marine and Marinepolitik im Kaiserlichen Deutschland 1871-1914* (Düsseldorf: Droste Verlag, 1972), pp. 236-262.

3. Reinhard Scheer, *Germany's High Sea Fleet in the World War* (London: Cassell, 1920), pp. 37-41. See also BA/MA N162/1 *Nachlass Hipper* (Hipper's personal war diary) entries for 6 and 14 August 1914.

4. The best analysis of the probable impact of cruiser warfare may be found in "Review of German Cruiser Warfare," by Lockhard Leith, *Naval Staff Study* (Ministry of Defence, Naval Intelligence Division, official unpublished 1940), pp. 5ff. Erich Raeder also asserts the efficacy of this policy in his work *Der Kreuzerkrieg in den auslandischen Gewassern*, 2 vols. (Berlin: Mittler, 1927) and in Raeder, *My Life* (Annapolis: U.S. Naval Institute, 1960), pp. 152ff. Arthur Marder's analysis of German commerce warfare may be found in *From Dreadnought to Scapa Flow, vol. 2, The War Years: To the Eve of Jutland 1914-1916* (London: Oxford University Press, 1960-1971), p. 127. See also Gemzell, p. 140.

5. Robert Seager and Doris Maguire, eds., *The Letters and Papers of Alfred Thayer Mahan* (Annapolis: U.S. Naval Institute, 1975), vol. 3, pp. 699-700. See also Ronald Spector, *Admiral of the New Empire: The Life and Career of George Dewey* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana University Press, 1974), p. 196.

6. Holger H. Herwig, *Politics of Frustration: The United States in German Naval Planning 1887-1941* (New York: Little, Brown, 1976), pp. 106-108.

7. U.S. Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1914 Supplement* (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1928), pp. 375ff.

8. Stephen Roskill, *Naval Policy Between the Wars, vol. 1, The Period of Anglo-American Antagonism 1919-1929* (London: Collins, 1968), p. 21.

9. David Kahn, *The Codebreakers, The Story of Secret Writing* (New York: Macmillan, 1972), pp. 206-297; Scheer, p. 73; see also Viscount Jellicoe, *The Grand Fleet: Its Creation Development and Work* (London: Cassell, 1919), pp. 56-57; see also Herbert O. Yardley, *The American Black Chamber* (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1931), pp. 210-220; H.C. Hoy, *40 O.B. or How the War Was Won* (London: Mayflower Press, 1932), pp. 19-25.

10. Public Record Office, Chancery Lane, London (hereinafter P.R.O./ADM) Admiralty 137/342, "Grand Fleet Wireless Telegraphy Memoranda 1914-1918." See also A.J. Marder, vol. 3, *Jutland and After;* see also vol. 2, pp. 137ff. and 167ff. See also G. Frothingham, *The Naval History of the World War (1915-1917)*, vol. 1 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1926), pp. 200ff; see also E.B. Potter and C.W. Nimitz, *Sea Power A Naval History* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1960), p. 451.

11. U.S. National Archives (hereinafter Nat Arch) File T-1022/PG 62369-62382/Reels 141, 142, 207, von Ingenohl, *Kriegstagebuch des Kommandos der Hochseestreitkräfte* (War Diary of the High Sea Fleet Command) 30 July 1914 to 27 January 1915. See entries made for weather on a daily basis for this period.

12. BA/MA F50-66/16/17/18, Reichsmarineamt, *Deutsche Kriegsflotte, vol. 3, Grosser Kreuzer 1908-1914* (Imperial Navy Office, German Fleet, vol. 3, Battle Cruisers), Ships Characteristics' Manuals. See entries for fuel and endurance for S.M.S. *Derfflinger, Moltke, Seydlitz, von der Tann,* and *Blücher,* pp. 26-27 each manual.

13. BA/MA F149/PG 74106, Hipper to Ingenohl, p. 2.

14. *Ibid.*, p. 3.

15. P.R.O./ADM 1/5691-8770. This file contains the Admiralty index of intelligence on Germany. It was searched carefully for reference to Iceland being used for U-boat operations with no reference found; P.R.O./ADM 137/1988, *Grand Fleet Intelligence Office Files 1914-1918* was also negative; Ministry of Defence Naval Library, Earls Court, CB 1182, *German Navy,* Naval Intelligence Division, Admiralty War Staff. This unpublished official intelligence compendium on the Imperial German Navy 1914-1918 contains no reference to such bases.

16. Sir Julian S. Corbett and Sir Henry Newbolt, *Naval Operations History of the Great War,* 5 vols. (London: Longmans, 1920-1934), vol. 1, pp. 5, 15. See also *Jane's Fighting Ships* (London: Sampson Low, 1914), p. 29. Only Bermuda is listed as fortified.

17. BA/MA F 149/PG 74106, Hipper to Ingenohl, p. 2.

18. In November 1914 there were no less than seven British dreadnoughts in dock with condenser troubles and two were on trials and not yet combat-ready. Two battle cruisers were detached to hunt von Spee in the South Atlantic. Three battle cruisers were in the Mediterranean. This left 14 dreadnought battleships and 4 battle cruisers available to the English at least 10 of which would have had to hunt Hipper. By 30 November the Germans had 16 dreadnoughts available besides those under Hipper. See Marder, vol. 2, pp. 43ff. and BA/MA F368-376/PG 76545-76572, *Dislocation Der Seestreitkräfte* (Disposition of Naval Forces), August 1914-November 1918. See weekly entries for High Sea Fleet Nov/Dec 1914.

19. Hipper to Ingenohl, p. 2. See also Ingenohl to Hugo von Pohl, Chief of Admiralty Staff, 14 November 1914.

20. This is assuming the British home forces would have been defeated by the High Seas Fleet without Hipper.

21. BA/MA F149/PG 74906, Ingenohl to Pohl, 14 November 1914. For further discussion see von Pohl, *Aus Aufzeichnungen und Briefen Während der Kriegezeit* (Berlin: Karl Siegismund, 1920), p. 5. See also von Tirpitz, *Deutsche Ohnmachtspolitik im Weltkriege: Politische Dokumente,* vol. 2 (Hamburg & Berlin: Hanseatische Verlagsanstalt, 1926), pp. 108ff.

22. Gemzell, p. 184, n. 42; see also BA/MA N158, *Nachlass von Muller 1871-1926* (Georg von Müller's personal war diary). Muller was Chief of the Kaiser's Naval Cabinet. See entry for 4/343.

23. Gemzell. See also Pohl, pp. 39ff, 77ff; and Tirpitz, *Dokumente,* pp. 104ff, 11, 116-117, 119, 200.

24. Raeder, *My Life,* p. 272.

25. *Ibid.*

26. Raeder, p. 273.

27. Leith, p. 5.

28. Raeder.

29. Sergei G. Gorshkov, *Red Star Rising at Sea* (Annapolis: U.S. Naval Institute, 1974), trans. by Theodore A. Neely, Jr., Herbert Preston, ed., commentary by R.B. Carney, p. 50.

30. Gorshkov, *The Sea Power of the State* (Moscow: Military Publishing House, 1976). See pp. 103-253, out of 436 pages total.

31. Sir A.W. Ward and G.P. Gooch, eds., *Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy* (New York: Macmillan, 1923), vol. 3, pp. 477-478. See also Fritz Fischer, *Germany's Aims in the First World War* (New York: Norton, 1967), pp. 38-39; Gemzell, p. 160.

32. Nat Arch, T-1022/PG 77733d/Reel 1659, *Kriegserfahrungen der Hochseestreitkräfte* 1 April-30 June 1915 (War Experiences of the Forces Afloat), Hipper to Hugo von Pohl, 7 July 1915, pp. 4-6.

33. Pohl, *Aus Aufzeichnungen und Briefen,* p. 117.

34. Marder, *From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow,* vol. 2, p. 3. See also Otto Gross, *Der Krieg zur See, Nordsee,* vol. 1 (Berlin: Mittler, 1922), p. 41.

35. Nat Arch, T-1022/PG 77733d/Reel 1659, Hipper to Pohl, p. 3.

36. German policy on dreadnought battle-cruiser construction provided 5.9-inch secondary batteries in all ships. This was in contrast to British policy which refrained from a secondary armament until the *Iron Duke*-class battleships (6th class of dreadnought type built) and the *Tiger* (4th type of battle cruiser built). The German Imperial Navy Office Design Bureau had already produced an advanced battle-cruiser design that could be repeated several times so as to free design teams for work on advanced battleships. See Nat Arch, T 1022/PG 66088/Reel 1501, *Protokoll uber die Sitzung am 24. September 1910* (Memorandum for Record), Battle Cruiser Design Conference *Derfflinger* Class.

37. This detail must appear somewhat pedantic. However, logistics constituted a serious problem for the German Fleet as the war dragged on. This was because Admiral Tirpitz had put all his money into ship construction and had shorted the fleet on consumables and spare parts.

See, e.g., Nat Arch, T 1022/PG 76531/Reel 984, *Admiralstab Befehle an andere Behörden* (Admiralty Staff Orders and Correspondence with Other Commands), 6 April 1915. See correspondence between Admiralty Staff and Imperial Navy Office; BA/MA N162, *Nachlass Hipper*, 6/14, 15-21 November 1915.

38. These ships are covered in a study by F. Forstmeier and S. Breyer, *Deutsche Grosskampfschiffe 1915-1918* (Munich: J.F. Lehmann Verlag, 1970), see especially table, pp. 18-19.

39. Norman Polmar, *Soviet Naval Power—Challenge for the 1970s* (New York: Crane Russak, 1974), p. 24. For German connection, pp. 42ff. See Gorshkov, *Sea Power of the State*, p. 2. See also John E. Moore, *The Soviet Navy Today* (New York: Stern & Day, 1976), pp. 7-8.

40. BA/MA N162 *Nachlass Hipper*, 1/10, 6 August 1914; 1/29, 23 September 1914; 2/22, 20 March 1915; 3/5, 1 May 1915; 3/6-7, 9 May 1915; 3/10, 27 May 1915; 4/3, 1-8 September 1915.

41. Gerhard Ritter, *The Sword and the Sceptre: The Problem of Militarism in Germany, vol. 3, The Tragedy of Statesmanship—Bethmann Hollweg as War Chancellor (1914-1917)* (Coral Gables: Miami University Press, 1972), pp. 119-120.

42. Nat Arch, T 1022/PG 77733d/Reel 1659, *Kriegserfahrungen*, 7 July 1915, pp. 10-12. This was written in the context of the first U-boat offensive and the *Lusitania* sinking.

43. *Ibid.*, marginal note, p. 7.

44. *Ibid.*, pp. 12-13.

45. William R. Hynes, "The Role of *Kiev* in Soviet Naval Operations," *Naval War College Review*, Fall 1976, pp. 41-42.

Many studies of combat experiences and their effects on the participants can be made by direct and relatively close observation either at the time or shortly thereafter. However, reasonably close contact with prisoners of war can only be had after their release. In the case of the Americans held by the North Vietnamese this contact in many cases came only after they had been held for several years in unspeakable conditions and had endured extraordinary hardships. Thus, even the best studies of these events can only be based on vicarious observation. We present here one such study, followed by a commentary by a former prisoner of war.

THE FACELESS POW

by

William K. Carr

Being captured and imprisoned by a foreign military force is a shocking and demoralizing experience. For most persons who become prisoners of war (POW's), the experience is their introduction to a complete loss of freedom. It may also be the prisoner's first intimate contact with a foreign population whose language and behavior are unintelligible to him. The degree of difference between the cultures of the captor and captive is a predictable measure of the difficulties confronting a prisoner from the moment of captivity to the moment of release or escape. Some residual effects of captivity may also be due to the culturally determined behavior of captor towards his prisoners.

Internment as a POW by an alien captor requires that the prisoner adjust to a lifestyle for which he normally has no preparation and no desire. Creature comforts of his precaptivity life are now disallowed and new ones substituted. A POW's clothing, food, living quarters, daily routine and privacy are not only no longer matters for his choice, they are almost inevitably to his disliking.

Less apparent, but just as real, is the necessity for accommodating to the captor's demands and expectations of POW behavior. Although it is customary for camp rules to be made explicit to prisoners, these rules cover only the more obvious aspects of prison life. Formal policies for controlling POW behavior, announced with great clarity by the captor, deal primarily with camp security and so anticipate situations that the captor is aware could develop. What are not made explicit are the culturally determined rules for behavior to which the captor unconsciously conforms and to which he expects his foreign prisoners also to conform.

Adapting to the diet, sanitation facilities and security regulations

imposed by the captor may be distasteful but at least these conditions of captivity are generally unambiguous, and they may even be negotiable with the captor. Adapting to the captor's unspoken cultural rules for "correct" behavior is, however, largely a process of trial and error. Rarely does a POW receive any tutoring from his captor. For those areas of human conduct performed unconsciously, it is much easier to recognize "incorrect" behavior after the fact than it is to admonish in advance. Captors, therefore, punish prisoners for their mistakes without first telling them all the rules, and, because of the proven threat of unpredictable penalties for inadvertently offending the captor, prisoners are reluctant to explore possibilities for widening their range of behavior beyond what they know to be safe.

A POW held by people whose cultural habits are unknown to him is as surely confined by this ignorance as he is by barbed wire and armed guards. The more exotic the captor's culture the more difficult it is for the prisoner to learn its rules as a means of survival.

The collective experience of U.S. military personnel subjected to POW internment in Vietnam during the 1960's illustrates the tragic consequences that can come from unintentional and unconscious mutual misunderstandings between captor and captive. Equally important, for future survival training and for clearer interpretations of the Code of Conduct, the POW experience in Vietnam also demonstrates how dramatically prisoners' chances of survival are improved when the captor's Code of Conduct is understood.

Although most U.S. military personnel captured by hostile forces in Vietnam received some unnecessarily rough treatment while being transported from their place of capture to a permanent holding site, the brutalizing of prisoners that caused international condemnation typically occurred during formal interrogation sessions in established POW camps or prisons. It was at this point that the essential worth of the interrogator and the POW were tested—or so the captives thought.

Once the POW had identified himself with "name, rank, serial number and date of birth," he refused to answer further questions, in the best tradition of the American fighting man. Because of a common interpretation of the Code of Conduct, U.S. military personnel generally feel that any response to direct interrogation by an enemy captor, beyond self-identification, is likely to be judged traitorous or at least cowardly. Also, because the American popular conception of POW interrogations is based on Gestapo-style portrayals, we assume the universal purpose of such interrogations is the extraction of military intelligence. If a prisoner answers the interrogator's first, seemingly innocuous questions, he will only encourage further and more incriminating questions that cannot remain unanswered with impunity.

For these reasons, and as a matter of principle and personal integrity, American POW's do not willingly give their captors information. It was this refusal to respond to Vietnamese interrogators that caused much of the physical suffering among the prisoners. Attempts to justify their silence as compliance with the American military Code of Conduct or with the terms of the Geneva Convention only infuriated the captor and provoked scorn and punishment.

The Vietnamese did not respect the prisoners' silence as evidence of their being good soldiers, loyal to their country. On the contrary, the Americans' natural self-confidence was interpreted as arrogance and their refusal to answer interrogators' questions was seen as blatant insincerity. It seems not to have occurred to the captor that their POW's were responding to captivity as

normal Americans rather than as defective Vietnamese.

The prisoners soon learned to minimize their "arrogance" because that odious quality in their behavior was frequently pointed out to them and persuasively discouraged by immediate and harsh retribution. One repatriated former POW reported being struck in the head by a guard, for example, while seated across a table from his interrogator. The prisoner had crossed his legs without permission, much to the interrogator's annoyance. This self-indulgent act was called disrespectful and arrogant.

Ironically, the prisoner's leg crossing may well have indicated he was moving in the direction wanted by the interrogator. It suggests the prisoner was beginning to accept the interrogation as something other than an entirely nonnegotiable situation. In any case, the American was learning what Vietnamese consider arrogant behavior. An understanding of what constituted insincerity was, however, much longer in coming.

Vietnamese definitions of insincerity and sincerity do not of course coincide with American, and they were not explained to the POW's in such graphic and unambiguous terms as arrogance. In fact, the captor's definition of sincerity seemed to the prisoners to have nothing to do with the concept. The explanations sounded like only euphemisms for "You prisoners must answer all the interrogator's questions." Eventually the POW's did understand what their captors meant by "sincerity," but only after a great deal of mistreatment bordering on torture.

"Sincerity," to Americans, means conducting oneself according to one's true feelings. Sincerity is consistency between what one thinks and what one does. A sincere person is strong enough to resist bending unwillingly to mere circumstances. Sincerity is courage, while insincerity is a form of lying. Deceitful behavior may, at times, be expedient, but it usually contradicts one's self-respect.

The East Asian concept of sincerity, shared by the Vietnamese, teaches the individual to separate his feelings from his behavior.[1] The ideal, well-integrated Vietnamese personality is one that is flexible and adept at accommodating to situations for which there are distinct rules to guide behavior. Since it is assumed everyone knows how to behave correctly, a sincere person is expected to suppress any feelings that conflict with the reality of existing conditions and to conduct himself in accordance with the dictates of the moment. Anyone of normal intelligence who flaunts the rules for correct behavior is considered selfish and insincere.

Vietnamese selfishness and insincerity are regarded as attempts to take unfair advantage of those who are complying with the practices of proper social conduct. The insincere person is guilty of refusing to sacrifice his own psychological comfort for the benefit of others. Insincerity is not taken lightly among Vietnamese because the price of sincerity is high.

To avoid being accused of insincerity, the Vietnamese follow an elaborate protocol of interpersonal ritual designed to demonstrate clearly one's compliance with the demand that personal feelings be of secondary importance. Good form takes precedence over individual preference. Regardless of one's attitude about another person, for example, there are occasions in which one must do what is expected in the relationship. The penalty for ignoring the rules can be severe, even between people of long and close acquaintance.

It is not surprising, then, that the American POW's had some difficulty in comprehending their jailers' definition of sincerity. The command for sincerity must have seemed frivolous except for the insistent and threatening manner in which it was made. In refusing interrogators' questions the Americans were

already being perfectly sincere. Their feelings were exactly congruent with their behavior. Until they learned otherwise, the POW's saw interrogations as a tug of war between the captor who wanted hard intelligence and themselves who had no intention of giving such information.

Gradually, over many months and several years, the prisoners developed a communal wisdom about how to handle interrogations in a way calculated to deny the enemy meaningful information while reducing his use of apparently senseless and arbitrary brutality. The key to this wisdom was the cessation of categorical refusals to respond to questions. Until the key was found, the typical POW response to interrogators' probings was an announcement about restrictions on information beyond "name, rank, serial number and date of birth" as imposed by the Code of Conduct. Somehow, this rigid response, which in effect refuted the interrogators' belief in their right to interrogate, changed into an equivocal response. The POW's learned to stop saying "no" and to say "maybe" instead.

Former prisoners of the Vietnamese have described how interrogations became "conversations" by various kinds of displays of "sincerity" in which feigned difficulties in understanding the questions, asserted ignorance on one subject but professed knowledge on another, and the rephrasing of questions before responding, were substituted for the earlier practice of maintaining a stoic silence. The new technique was generally successful in lowering the degree of physical violence inflicted during interrogations. It also reduced both the number of questions asked and the length of the sessions. To the POWs' delight, interrogators usually accepted what they were told and, contrary to previous expectations, interrogators did not persist in requiring the revelation of critical military information.

The history of American POW internment in North Vietnam shows changes in official policy in the treatment of prisoners between the mid-1960's and the early 1970's that are not connected to changes in the prisoners' behavior, however. Exploitation of POW's for propaganda, and mistreatment of prisoners as retaliation for U.S. bombings of Hanoi, for example, ignored any improvement in relations between camp personnel and prisoners. The attitude of interrogators towards those they interrogated, on the other hand, was as much personal as official. If a prisoner responded acceptably to interrogation, subsequent abuse was unnecessary. Instructions from higher authority for harassing prisoners as a group was, however, a different matter. The POW's did not solve all their problems by merely simulating sincerity.

The method for dealing with interrogations developed by captive U.S. military personnel, through which they were able to satisfy their captors while adhering to their own principles of integrity, was a masterpiece of ingenuity, but it did not result in the prisons being converted into rest camps. Food, hygiene and medical care remained substandard. Punishment for the infraction of prison rules continued in force. Propaganda statements coerced from prisoners were periodically broadcast. The method did, however, make manageable the one predictable, inescapable phase of captivity that could last as long as the captor chose it to and that probably resulted in more bodily harm to prisoners than any other single aspect of internment.

The technique of responding to interrogations by appearing to give substantive answers but actually saying nothing of consequence was not a glib joke on the Vietnamese captors, nor did it resemble the comic doubletalk of "Hogan's Heroes." It was a technique, discovered by chance, that was effective because of certain cultural charac-

teristics peculiar to East Asian interpersonal behavior codes. If the POWs' technique had not coincided with those codes, their responses to interrogators' questions might well have been seen for what they were, viz, attempts to evade answering; or worse, as attempts to mock the interrogators.

To the American prisoners, their behavior in circumventing interrogations was a consciously insincere bit of role-playing. It was contrived and therefore deceitful, and, for the POW's, a survival technique to be discarded when no longer needed. To the Vietnamese captors, however, the prisoners' behavior was sincere, not because the captors were fooled, but because the prisoners' behavior took on a form that means sincerity to Vietnamese. The captor was not interested in American-style sincerity which requires the individual to act the way he feels. Vietnamese sincerity entails behaving according to the dictates of circumstances.

It is unlikely the American prisoners fully understood why their "deceitfulness" softened their captors' treatment of them. It was sufficient that it did. The POW's accommodation to the captor's expectations is explicable, nonetheless, and the following analysis of those expectations argues for the inclusion of cultural information in captivity survival training courses for U.S. military personnel.

When the American prisoners were refusing to give more than "name, rank, serial number and date of birth" to their Vietnamese interrogators during the early years of the war, they were insulting their captors in an unforgivable way. This was not a problem of frustrating the interrogator's effort to extract usable military intelligence, but a question of denying the very existence of the interrogator's person. That is, American POW's were denying the interrogators "face."

"Face" is the essence of one's being. To have no "face" is to be a nonperson. Although "face" is not a quality of one's personality, it is a personal asset, the possession of which is necessary for one's social identity.[2] An individual has "face" only in interpersonal relationships that are created, structured and sustained according to precise regulations carried out by well-defined rituals. A man among strangers, for example, has no "face" and since he is therefore not a person, he is due none of the amenities accorded to and expected from humans who are persons.

"Face" is created when two individuals enter into a relationship for the utilitarian purpose of providing each other goods and services. Such relationships place each participant in a ranked position relative to the other and these positions are called "face." A person has "face" when he holds that position, but he does not carry "face" away from the relationship. "Face" is specific to individuals.

The person holding the higher "face" uses the power assigned that position to define the nature and terms of the relationship. Although these relationships are intended for mutual benefit, it is a privilege of the superior person to designate at the beginning what each participant may expect from the other.

Except for kinship ties and friendships, "face" relationships are the only kind in which an individual may reasonably predict he will find honesty and reliability. Strangers cannot be trusted because they have no "face." "Face," however, guarantees dependability.

Stories of captured U.S. military personnel being physically and verbally abused by the civilian population of Vietnam while being transported through villages are familiar to the American public. This abuse was not entirely due to the prisoners being enemies, however. The Vietnamese can be hostile to any stranger, including other Vietnamese. A nonperson is a nonperson, regardless of his origin. What the American POW's did not at first

realize was that once they had arrived at a permanent internment site and were seated opposite an interrogator, the rules for their treatment and the expectations of their behavior radically changed.

Confronted now by a known or knowable individual, the prisoner was about to be transformed from a nonperson to a person. No longer a stranger among strangers, no one was going to throw stones at the prisoner and he, too, was expected to adapt his behavior to the change in circumstances. The captors assumed their prisoner would be more than pleased at the opportunity to acquire "face" by entering into a relationship of mutual benefit with the interrogator who already had considerable "face" with other prison officials.[3]

But of course it did not turn out that way, at least not at first. Americans do not have "face" and the POW's certainly were not interested in it, even if the interrogator had explained it to them. "Face" to the Vietnamese is an unquestioned condition of life that is not intellectualized for purposes of explanation. So the foreign prisoners remained uninformed of what was expected of them.

The interrogators nevertheless persisted in their attempts to make persons out of their "faceless" prisoners who, for unfathomable and mysterious Occidental reasons, insisted on being nobodies. Naturally, the captor was not motivated out of concern for the well-being of the POW's. The interrogators had a job to do that depended on the prisoners accepting a particular role in what was obviously a task of common advantage; a fact which unfortunately escaped the prisoners' notice.

There was no doubt in any interrogator's mind that he outranked the prisoner in their relationship, and, as the superior, it was the interrogator's right to define the nature of that relationship, as it was the subordinate prisoner's obligation to accept the definition. Under normal conditions, either party to a potential "face" agreement can refuse it and the whole thing is forgotten. American POW's were not given that choice.

The prisoners' failure to display any recognition of the fact that they had no choice confused and angered the captor. The prisoners' refusals also to evince interest in a relationship with interrogators meant, to the captor, that the prisoners put no value on the interrogators' "face." The prisoners were treating their captors as strangers, as nonexistent persons.

We know from debriefing reports of repatriated POW's that the prisoner-interrogator standoff lasted a long while. The interrogators could not back down and the POW's could not retreat because for a time they did not know how without dishonor.

There was, however, a way to break the deadlock which the POW's finally saw. It is a way provided in the Vietnamese system of personal behavior that permits the individual to respond "correctly" to demands made on him without emotional or intellectual commitment to the acts. Behavior is judged more by its form than by its content. In the case of the POW's it was enough that they should respond to the interrogators' questions. It was not necessary they "answer" the questions.[4]

Devious, evasive and equivocal replies to interrogators' questions were not "answers" in the American sense of the word. The replies were only "responses"; but that was what the captor wanted.

By responding to questions, the prisoners acknowledged the interrogators' right to ask questions. That is, the prisoners conceded the interrogators' privilege to define the nature of the relationship, thereby giving "face" to all concerned. The form of the relationship was now correct and details of its content were secondary, as they always are in matters of "face."

Vietnamese ethics forbid the exploitation of "face" contracts, for that is what these relationships are in effect. They are contracts conceived in perpetuity as vehicles for mutual support in a variety of areas of the contractors' lives.[5] "Face" is not friendship, however, and it need not be accompanied by feelings of camaraderie. Also, the contract does not pertain to the general welfare of the principals; only designated obligations are accountable.

An excellent example of the bilateral, reciprocal quality, as well as the technical limitations, of "face" was described by one returned POW who had been held in Hanoi for several years. Having long since learned to refrain from outright refutation of his prison interrogator, this POW had reached a phase of his captivity in which he was not singled out for arbitrary abuse. If the prison commandant chose to punish all the inmates, then of course everyone suffered, but at least the protagonist of this story was on nonviolent terms with the interrogator.

It was in these circumstances that the subject prisoner was one day taken from his cell to the interrogator's office for questioning about a communications code discovered in the prisoners' toilet area by the guards. The code was obviously of the prisoners making and secret communications among prisoners was punishable by any means the captor saw fit.

The prisoner denied any knowledge of the code with the quite plausible and true argument that he had been separated from the other prisoners. Although he persisted in his claim of ignorance and was finally returned to his cell unharmed, it was clear the interrogator thought he was lying.

A day or two after this scene, the interrogator left for a brief holiday and his leaving was made known to all. Shortly thereafter, two interrogators whom the prisoner had never seen arrived to question him further. After a somewhat perfunctory, but brutalizing attempt to force a confession from the prisoner, the interrogators left the prison. Suddenly, the original interrogator returned from his "holiday" and was "outraged" at hearing of this intrusion by outsiders.

This rather transparent charade makes sense if one keeps in mind that the prisoner did not refuse the regular interrogator's questions. In fact, he responded volubly, saying more than the interrogator wanted to hear, but not on the subject in question. The prisoner's response was acceptable to the interrogator because there was the matter of "face" to consider. If the interrogator had used or threatened violence himself, he would have lost "face"—a more serious loss than the information he was seeking, which, in any case, might be attainable elsewhere.

In not accusing the prisoner of lying, and by pretending to know nothing of the two outside interrogators, the principal interrogator did nothing to destroy his relationship with the prisoner. The prisoner, in turn, by also pretending not to know who had really sent the two visitors, permitted his interrogator to save "face." For each party, preserving the form of the relationship was more valuable than unmasking its content.

Of the many lessons to be learned from the experience of U.S. POW's during the Vietnam War, surely a fundamental one is that a captor's culture is just as much a part of the physical reality of captivity as the filthy latrines and the monotonous diet.

BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY

A graduate of George Washington and Columbia Universities, William K. Carr is a research anthropologist. He holds the rank of Commander, U.S. Naval Reserve.

NOTES

1. Lucian W. Pye, *The Spirit of Chinese Politics: A Psychocultural Study of the Authority Crisis in Political Development.* 1968; The M.I.T. Press; pp. 149 and 187.

2. William K. Carr, "The 'Face' of Mao Tse-tung." *World Affairs,* vol. 131, no. 3, 1968, pp. 146-152.

3. Marilyn W. Hoskins, "Building Rapport With the Vietnamese," unbound typescript, copyright dated 1971; based on "social anthropological research in Viet Nam."

4. Carl C. Peck, *Homecoming Medical Care for Repatriated Prisoners of War: A Manual for Physicians and Dentists,* January 1973; Center for Prisoner of War Studies, Navy Medical Neuropsychiatric Research Unit, San Diego, California 92152. (Official Use Only)

5. Takie Sugiyama Lebra, "Reciprocity-Based Moral Sanctions and Messianic Salvation," *American Anthropologist,* vol. 74, no. 3, 1972, pp. 391-407.

Comment

by

Lieutenant Colonel Jon A. Reynolds, U.S. Air Force

As William K. Carr has correctly pointed out, most American POW's captured in North Vietnam anticipated incarceration to include multiple physical deprivations. Although dog meat and rotten fish were distasteful at first, even the most finicky adjusted, resigned themselves to the fact that they were being discriminated against, and soon looked forward to the two meals as the highlight of the day. What the POW's did not anticipate were the inherent cultural differences between American and Vietnamese society and the captors' demand that captives adapt to and abide by the captors' unspoken cultural rules for "correct behavior." As examples of cultural differences the author examines American and Vietnamese concepts of "sincerity" and "face." He suggests that had the POW been aware of Vietnamese perceptions of these concepts, he might have employed this knowledge to improve his relationship with his captors and thus have reduced the severity of his protracted incarceration.

The major issue after reading Carr, and an issue which he doesn't seem to consider, is that even if a POW had been aware of the cultural differences in behavior patterns and values between Americans and Vietnamese, how might he have employed this information? Did he indeed *want* to improve his relationship with his captors? Carr is correct that as a matter of principle and personal integrity American POW's did not willingly give their captors information. Indeed, refusal to respond to Vietnamese interrogators and their efforts to exploit POW's for propaganda purposes did cause much of the physical suffering among the prisoners. That the Vietnamese did not respect the prisoners' silence as evidence of their being good Americans and dedicated to the ideological principles for which they were fighting was really of no concern to the Americans.

The East Asian concept of sincerity is in the category of "nice to know" information, and might conceivably have been used at certain times to minimize maltreatment. Subsequent abuse may have been unnecessary. Most POW's, however, preferred to have the Vietnamese think of them as being "diehards," as being unwilling to "role play," to feign sincerity, or to compromise their standards—regardless of the consequences.

Although insulting captors was not

conducive to good health, it at least provided one great source of self-satisfaction in an environment in which gratifications were few and far between. Hence the old POW adage, "if it hurts, you know you are doing the right thing." And while it may have been painful at the time, most POW's still continue to identify the times of crises as their greatest moments. Days spent in irons or cuffs, or in holes in the ground, or in solitary—all of these represented a degree of status among POW's. A psychologist or cultural anthropologist might not be able to figure this out from books he has read, but the most respected POW's were the defiant ones, who stated their cases politely, looked their captors square in the eye, and stood proud. Such action demanded courage. They often suffered severe consequences for their behavior. But this was the approach that the real leaders such as Risner and Stockdale employed.

The POW with moral courage and genuine substance to his character would have found it difficult to "role play" for any extended period of time. He preferred to tell it as it is and let the captor know precisely where he stood.

Theoretically, Carr's thesis makes sense. In practice, not. The magnitude of differences in culture is perhaps relevant to predicting the degree of difficulty which a POW might expect. Indeed, one of the many lessons of the Vietnamese experience is that a captor's culture is as much a part of the physical reality of captivity as the filthy latrines and monotonous diet. Perhaps we should include cultural information as part of captivity survival training courses for U.S. military personnel. But, in doing so, we should instill more deeply our own moral, ethical, and ideological codes. Rather than teach the potential captive to play the part of the enemy, we should have him adhere more closely to the conduct of a good American. Rather than conform to the enemy's culture pattern, have him conform to ours. Ultimately, one's performance as a POW will be measured by fellow Americans, not by the enemy.

[Colonel Reynolds was a prisoner of war from 28 November 1965 to 12 February 1973.]

SET AND DRIFT

THE MILITARY BALANCE IN EAST AFRICA: A KENYAN VIEW

by

Major J.R. Kibwana, Kenya Navy

The past 5 years have seen a dramatic increase in the level of military buildup in the East African states of Somalia, Ethiopia, Sudan, Uganda, Tanzania and Kenya—a development that has, in certain cases, led to an extravagant diversion of very scarce human and financial resources. To understand this shift from that postulated by a great many African statesmen during those palmy days in the early independence period, when any military expenditure was viewed with great abhorrence, a brief overview of the history of the relevant armed forces is appropriate.

With the exception of the Tanzania military forces, which were rebuilt completely from scratch after the 1964 mutiny, and the Ethiopian forces, the rest of the East African Armed Forces were a legacy of the colonial regimes. They were essentially police instruments geared to internal security roles and frontier defense, external security having been the responsibility of the colonial power. As could be expected, therefore, the size, composition and doctrine of these forces were unimpressive, to say the least. Ill-formed and incipient, they had scant capacity to project military power effectively to their own borders, let alone sustain operations beyond them.

This, then, was the situation with regard to the military forces of the newly independent states of Somalia, Sudan, Uganda, Tanzania and Kenya in the early 1960's. Lacking an industrial base with which to support themselves and hampered by financial and technological constraints, these institutions depended almost entirely on the former metropoles for military equipment, logistics, training and certain specialized supporting services. The overall effect of this continued dependence on the ex-colonial power was stultifying in most cases, since any planned expansion or modernization of these forces was subtly tempered by the former metropoles' own perception of the military requirements of that particular country vis-a-vis their own political, economic or overall global strategic interests.

Little or no opposition over this overt limitation of arms supplies to their countries was voiced by the respective political leaderships. This was hardly surprising, considering that at this time civil-military relations were not particularly happy. An authoritarian military regime was in power in the Sudan; short-lived abortive military coups d'etat had erupted in December 1960 in Ethiopia in December 1961 in Somalia, and there had been the Tanzanian,

Ugandan and Kenyan mutinies of January 1964.

Against this background, the notion of any military expansion was viewed with great hostility and in certain extreme cases even the abolition of the armed forces was advocated.[1] Several other factors were also contributory to this continuing relationship with the former metropoles:

- A general ignorance, albeit excusable, among African politicans (who had successfully followed the advice to seek first the political kingdom) not only of the function of the armed forces, but even in the vaguest terms, of their equipment, organization and capabilities.
- The external threat to national independence was viewed not so much in military terms as in politicoeconomic terms—the neoimperialist threat.
- The benefits of standardization accruing from a single source of supply of military hardware in terms of costs in maintenance and training.

Up to the beginning of the 1970's, the external political relations within East Africa were more or less stable. There had been general public acceptance of the three principles of coexistence. That no consideration—historical, geographical or ethnic, could permit any African State to claim sovereignty over another, or part of its territory; that colonial boundaries were fixed, and that self-determination was the only criterion for any change. This doctrine had been embodied in the Charter of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) enjoining all signatories to respect "the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each member state and for its inalienable right to independent existence."[2]

However, the early 1970's heralded in almost all these countries difficulties of varying severity in the political, administrative and economic spheres, some of which were influenced by external forces and others arose from pressures of rapid development on weak economies.

The facade of African unity and coexistence began, therefore, to show signs of cracks as each country began to reexamine its national interests vis-a-vis regional considerations. Differences stemming from dormant ideological convictions or unsatisfactorily defined borders now manifested themselves by giving rise to growing hostilities between individual countries. These difficulties sometimes culminated in the sort of border skirmishes that occurred between Ethiopia and Somalia.

The situation was further exacerbated by internal upheavals and subversion by political, ethnic or occasionally religious minorities, often supported from outside. In this regard, Kenya had to contend with the "Shiftra"[3] insurgents supported by Somalia, while Ethiopia had the problem of the Eritrean separatist movement and the Sudan experienced a major rebellion by the Christian minority in the south. All these problems brought into sharp focus the need for military self-sufficiency at the national level in these affected countries.

Other factors that led to a great deal of attention being paid to the military establishment were:

- The painful realization of the African countries of their inability to participate effectively in major strategic military questions affecting the continent and more specifically the liberation of Southern Africa. This was particularly true of Tanzania, which had to face harassment and intrusion at her southern border by Portuguese forces in Mozambique.
- Pressure from the military elite, as in the case of Sudan, Somalia and Uganda, which had military governments. It is a peculiar phenomenon of the military governments to expand their armed forces independently of external threats. A study of military expenditures of these countries over the

period immediately preceding a *coup d'état* bears this fact out.[4] With these regimes, the flourish of jet aircraft, the rumble of heavy tanks, artillery, etc., were sure symbols of power and authority.

With the initial goodwill of coexistence now eroded and the restraining influence of the ex-metropoles severed, all of these neighboring countries sought to improve their military capabilities according to their own perception of national security issues. More often than not, however, the relative sizes of their armed forces and their defense budgets indicated the importance placed by individual governments on the role of military power in their relationships with neighbors.

It should be noted here that even prior to this situation, the then level of military expenditures was a burden that these countries could ill-afford. Indeed, the subsequent military expansion would not have been possible without the assistance of foreign powers in the provision of military hardware as grant aid or on easy credit terms. Such arms transactions were, in most cases, out of all proportion to the defense needs of the recipient states and, in fact, tended to perpetuate the vicious circle of an arms "walk" in the region.

For instance, the U.S. aid to Ethiopia during the 1960's and early 1970's had a perceptible influence on Somalia's acceptance of military assistance from the Soviet Union (amounting to about U.S. $32 million) and the subsequent Soviet military presence in that area.[5] On the other hand, this sharp increase in Somalia's military strength was itself viewed by Kenya as a real threat to her national security, necessitating a reassessment of her own defense forces.

Kenya's Armed Forces policy in the first decade of independence was directed towards fashioning a cohesive and balanced military force commensurate with the perceived needs and priorities of the new nation. It was, according to the government's defense policy, "not considered necessary to build up massive and unnecessarily large armed forces which would be an extravagant and wasteful drain on the country's scarce economic resources."[6]

In pursuance of this policy, the armed forces were kept at a low level, consisting of a 7,500-man army, an 800-man air force and a small 350-man navy.[7] In comparison with her neighbors, this was modest, both in terms of numerical strength and in terms of military expenditure which remained in the area of 1-2 percent of the Gross National Product.

However, as could be expected, Kenya could not remain unresponsive in the light of an escalation of arms by her neighbors, made possible by assistance on a lavish scale from the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China. A brief overview of the military situation in these countries is given to illustrate Kenya's security problem at this time relative to the countries with which she shares her lengthy and permeable borders:

Somalia. Since its formation in 1960, the Somali National Army has expanded from 5,000 to a formidable well-armed force of 23,000 men in 1975.[8] For a country with a population of only 3,150,000, the size of the force is quite out of proportion to its defensive needs. This situation is viewed with extreme suspicion by Kenya, in view of Somalia's irredentist claim to the North Eastern province of Kenya, and one can only assume that the level of Somalia military preparedness is linked to its continued policy of settling the border issues in one way or another.

Ethiopia. Although the Ethiopian Armed Forces are relatively large (a total figure of 44,800 in 1975,[9]) they are not considered excessively large for a population of 27,430,000, with potential enemies at almost every point

around her circumference. Indeed, it was Ethiopia's vulnerability to concerted action by the Eritrean Liberation Front and the Somali dissidents in the east, not to mention the hostile regime in the Sudan, that led to an extensive modernization of the armed forces with assistance in the form of equipment, financial credits, grants and training from the Western countries, principally the United States. Furthermore, the governments of Ethiopia and Kenya signed a mutual defense agreement in July 1963 as a result of this common threat.

Nevertheless, the relations (from Kenya's point of view) with the present turbulent military regime are uncertain, and the treaty may not be much of an assurance to Kenya in the future.

Sudan. Although the Sudanese Armed Forces are formidable at 48,600 men for a population of 17,870,000[10] relations between Kenya and Sudan are amicable to the point where Kenya administers roughly 30,000 square miles of Sudanese territory under mutual agreement. The length of the common border is under 100 miles and the chances of conflict between these two countries are remote.

Uganda. With the assumption of power by the military regime of General Idi Amin in 1971, the Ugandan Forces underwent a rapid expansion from 6,000 to the present level of 21,000 men.[11] The continuing instability in Uganda under the flamboyant leadership, often predisposed to military adventurism and bullyism,[12] has emerged as one of the more serious threats to Kenya's security. With the current relative imbalance in the arms level between these two countries, one could well visualize a situation where a limited armed conflict could ensue, perhaps as a result of an effort by the military regime to provide distraction from some severe internal crisis.

Tanzania. The Tanzanian Armed Forces were completely rebuilt from scratch following the 1964 mutiny and have grown steadily through the years to the present level of 14,600, a modest size for a country of a population of 15,110,000.[13] Relations with Tanzania, once one of Kenya's closest associates, at the moment are cool, largely owing to diametrically opposed ideological philosophies, especially in the economic field. However, political and diplomatic agreements appear to be the future means of resolving conflicts between these two countries.

It is against this background of superior forces of her neighbors in a period of strained relations, that Kenya must examine her capabilities to offer credible deterrence. Even using the yardstick of effectiveness and numbers rather than the old yardstick of size and numbers of units as a measurement, Kenya's security appears to be wanting. It appears, for instance, that Somalia is the strongest naval power in East Africa, with Ethiopia second, Tanzania third and Kenya fourth. It seems prudent at this time for Kenya to pursue a modest expansion program of its armed forces and to acquire more advanced equipment to redress this imbalance. Indeed, it is desirable that this situation be addressed now rather than permitting it to develop to a point where the outcome of a possible conflict would be a humiliating and costly defeat.

The pattern of military development in East Africa to date indicates that the arms buildup will increase. Against this background must be viewed the increasing tendency to resort to force in civil conflicts, the emergence of violent military regimes and the impotence of the OAU in solving disputes. One other factor likely to assume a new dimension in the future is the commitment by OAU member states to a policy of confrontation in the liberation of South Africa.[14] The policy of the 1960's of not to "build up Armed Forces which

are extravagant and a drain on the country's scarce resources"[15] becomes redundant. Rather, it should be accepted that the goals of economic development and social justice can only be expected where an atmosphere of security and stability exists. No price is too high for us where the preservation of the independence, liberty and freedom of the Kenyan people is concerned.

NOTES

1. Dr. Julius K. Nyerere, *Observer*, 30 August 1964.
2. Article III, Paragraph 3 of the Charter of the Organization of African Unity.
3. Shiftra- a term meaning bandit, used to describe the dissident of Somali ethnic region who sought to break away from Kenya and join Somalia in the 1960's.
4. U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, *World Military Expenditures* (Washington, D.C.: 1971), vp.
5. M.J.V. Bell, *Military Assistance to Independent African States*, The Adelphi Papers, No. 15 (London: Institute for Strategic Studies, 1964), p. 14.
6. Kenya, Ministry of Defense. *Ministry of Defence, Annual Report 1970-71*, p. 2.
7. Irving Kaplan, et al., eds., *Area Handbook for Kenya*, 2nd ed. (Washington: American University. Foreign Area Studies, 1976), p. 399.
8. *The Military Balance, 1975-1976* (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1975), p. 43.
9. *Ibid.*, p. 41.
10. *Ibid.*, p. 37.
11. *Ibid.*, p. 44.
12. John Worrall, "Mounting Dangers for Latest U.S. 'Ally' in Africa," *U.S. News & World Report*, 2 August 1976, p. 49.
13. *Ibid.*, p. 44.
14. OAU Doc. CM/Res. 271(XIX), July 1967.
15. *Ministry of Defence Annual Report 1970-71.*

EAST GERMAN DEFENSE POLICY IN THE SEVENTIES

by

Stephen R. Bowers

Socialist national defense, as explained by Lt. Gen. Fritz Streletz, Secretary of the German Democratic Republic's National Defense Council, involves both externally and internally organized armed protection of the Socialist State and requires the efforts of the National People's Army (NVA), the border troops, the militia, internal security agencies, and civil defense. But, even more importantly, it demands that every citizen recognize "his place and his duty in the military defense of the Republic."[1]

The policy of the German Democratic Republic reflects a unique conception of national defense. Its foundation is the Leninist defense doctrine and its guiding forces are the Socialist Unit Party (SED) and the political-moral unity of the people and the army, that reliable symbol of German tradition. A study of GDR defense policy is important not only because of the GDR's formal role in the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO), but for what it tells us about the implementation of Leninist principles of defense, elements which supposedly provide guidance for all Communist Party states, and what it may reveal about the Soviet policy which the SED cites as its model.

Although there are numerous facets of defense policy in general, this paper concentrates on those features which contribute most to the unique character of the GDR's "Socialist national defense."

Military Integration.

Ich schwore
An der Seite der Sowjetarmee
und der Armeen
der mit uns verbundeten
sozialistischen Lander
als Soldat der Nationalen Volksarmee
jederzeit bereit zu sein,
den Sozialismus gegen alle Feinde
zu verteidigen
und mein Leben zur Erringung
des Sieges einzusetzen.[2]

(I swear that I am ready at all times to do my duty as a soldier of the National Peoples' Army on the side of the Soviet armies and the armies of the socialist lands united with us, to defend socialism against all enemies and to be ready to give my life for the attainment of victory.)

With these words from the loyalty oath of the NVA, the recruit expresses the official East German conception of his nation's military place in Europe. Each soldier commits himself to the alliance with the Soviet Army and the other military forces of the WTO in order to protect socialism against its enemies. The policy of the SED is founded on the proposition that the German Democratic Republic is "inconceivable" without its close alliance with the Soviet Union and the other WTO states. A corollary of this belief is that the military integration of the NVA with the Soviet forces is a "decisive factor" in contributing to the GDR's increasing military capacity.[3] Military and political leaders alike pay tribute to the role of the U.S.S.R. and the WTO in building an East German military with a "combat value superior to that of the NATO armed forces" and possessing "qualitatively superior weapons." The SED and the GDR government always treat security and military policy as matters requiring collective decisions so that the NVA will function as a component of a united armed force.[4] The same is true of the GDR People's Navy which Vice Admiral Ehm, deputy head of the navy, has described as a firm link of the Socialist navies of the Baltic. Ehm credits the U.S.S.R. with having made the People's Navy a modern fighting force through its contributions of missile speedboats, torpedo boats, coast guard ships, and submarine hunters. In addition, East German naval officers study at Soviet military schools, thus strengthening ties between the two military establishments.[5]

Although the fact of integration of East German with Soviet forces is familiar, the nature and extent of that process are less well documented. One feature of the process is the considerable emphasis on military collaboration. By 1973, numerous calls were being issued for East German combat training to be patterned after the Soviet model on a scale greater than ever before. This enterprise is not only politically and ideologically desirable, but is, in view of the GDR's use of Soviet weapons, it might be argued, a practical necessity.

In February 1973, *Volksarmee,* the main NVA organ for all services, boasted that cooperation between the NVA and the Soviet Army had reached the company level. Such concentrated cooperation, now carried out every 2 or 3 weeks instead of annually as in the past, is an impressive accomplishment rarely matched by Western forces. The result of this, according to *Volksarmee,* has been the development of uniform norms and provisions for combat training. "We cannot learn enough about intensive training from the Soviet comrades," Defense Minister Heinz Hoffmann declared.[6] Military integration

even affects the premilitary training for the Pioneer Organization, the GDR youth group for children aged 6 to 14 years. During the "Brothers in Class–Brothers in Arms" maneuvers in Ronneburg in 1974, Soviet personnel served as the advisors. A major stated objective of the maneuver was to give the Pioneers, who were organized into groups representing the WTO armies, a greater appreciation for the military role of the Soviet Union.[7]

Joint combat training is coupled with appeals by the NVA Political Main Administration for increased pressure on officers to learn Russian. Although the GDR military press translates many Soviet military studies, NVA authorities argue that officers at all command levels would benefit by being able to read Soviet journals in the original Russian. This would further satisfy the requirements of military integration while simultaneously giving East German officers the benefit of Soviet military science.[8]

The pressures for wider military integration and the study of the Russian language may be more than simply an effort to develop a unique defense system. An additional concern might be to mute the "nationalist tendencies" that journals such as *Militärwesen* have noted among the NVA officer corps, particularly the officer cadets. Precise manifestations of these tendencies are not made explicit in East German literature, but indications exist in the presentations of some authorities regarding military integration. For example, in evaluating joint GDR-Soviet training, Maj. Gen. Joachim Goldbach exhorted all commanders to "recognize the value of this training [and] not regard it as useless but as valuable help for stabilizing training results."[9] Another reflection of nationalism was provided by a *Volksarmee* discussion of the "common German mother tongue." Responding to the apparent traditional nationalist feeling that the German language is a basis for German unity, *Volksarmee* insisted that people are united not by common expressions for formulating thoughts and feelings but by a common class affiliation.[10] The former obviously draws the East Germans toward the Federal Republic thus impeding GDR-Soviet military integration while the latter serves to unite them with the U.S.S.R. Western reports about a continuing East German distrust of the Russian soldiers stationed in the GDR support the view that both political and military considerations provide impetus for the military integration of the GDR and the Soviet Union.[11]

The GDR's Sense of Threat. East German defense policy is based on the premise that the nation faces both internal and external threats. A guide for the 1973-74 political training program of NVA officers and NCO's reflects this in its call for special attention to conveying and strengthening a "real image of the enemy." The objective of the year's training was to enable members of the armed forces to "counter enemy arguments" that the West is peaceable and to overcome "illusions concerning . . . the danger of imperialism" and "hostile theories" about any common East-West German interests.[12] Numerous publications raised the possibility that the very détente to which the GDR was committed might endanger the NVA's "foe image."

The GDR presents its internal danger in terms of a sharpening ideological class conflict requiring that no cuts be made in vigilance against "hostile intrigues." The People's Police works to counter this "threat" by increased and more vigorous political-ideological training at duty stations and, perhaps betraying a fear that more than ideology is at issue, further restricting access to explosives, firearms, and poisons. Under 1974 regulations justified as a response to the "class struggle situation," only "aware" citizens have access to these materials

when "social requirements" and private interests permit.[13]

The GDR's external threat is presented as both military and nonmilitary. Discussions of the nonmilitary threat generally refer to "psychological warfare" against the GDR through Western television and radio broadcasts. *Volksarmee* measures the magnitude of this "aggression" in terms of the number of FRG radio and television transmitters in the 50-kilometer-wide strip along the GDR-FRG border. Their programs, the journal charges, are directed against the authority of the SED and the GDR military forces.[14] East German publications see NATO defense spending as quantitative evidence of Western malevolence. These expenditures are said to have reached "astronomical proportions" and exceed "anything the reactionary forces have ever been able to marshall against socialism."[15] Imperialism and its military might, they insist, is both real and menacing. Even though spokesmen boast of Western reverses, they continue to warn that "imperialism" is so bold as to contemplate a nuclear first strike against the WTO forces.[16] The West German Bundeswehr emerges as a major villain in all discussions of the "aggressive" and "desperate" moves of the Western military forces.

The conclusion that GDR military leaders reach after presentation of their grim litany is that, first, military strength and combat readiness are an absolute requirement for restraint of the "imperialist camp." There is no such thing as Western "goodwill."[17] Second, they argue, "hatred for enemies of socialism" must be instilled in GDR citizens, especially youth. One demonstrates his love of socialism, it is said, by a display of hatred for its enemies.[18]

The GDR's Military Philosophy. East Germany's military philosophy is a response to the sense of threat exhibited by the nation's leadership. Traditional military virtues compose a major element of the NVA philosophy and much attention is devoted to subjects such as discipline and combat readiness of troops. *Märkische Volksstimme* expressed the motive of this philosophy with its exhortation that the GDR military

> Must always be better prepared for a confrontation than the armed forces of the aggressor. . . . The further détente progresses, the more combat ready must our armed forces be, the more pronounced must be the readiness and ability of all citizens of the GDR for defending socialism and peace.[19]

NVA leaders hypothesize that there is a link between the discipline that a person learns in the military and his ability to meet the requirements of citizenship. The army, they posit, is both a school of military mastery and a training institution of class-related education. Furthermore, this "patriotic military service," as they see it, is not the same as militarism so they can denounce service in the Western military and praise participation in their own without contradicting themselves in theory.

Immediate military requirements are characterized by an insistence upon "iron discipline and absolute military obedience" in order to maintain a high level of combat readiness. The "hardness of the class struggle," in their view, dictates such an approach[20] and the increasing technological sophistication of their weaponry demands an even higher quality of combat training. Physical, psychological, and intellectual standards are therefore increased in an effort to keep pace with new responsibilities and requirements. The rising standards for military physical fitness tests are an indication of this endeavor. The regular military multiple event matches offer the leadership an opportunity to measure its success in working for better physical performances by the

200,000 young people who participate each year.[21] A major objective of all training of this type is the development of militarily necessary skills of movement. The Society for Sport and Technology (GST) has responsibility for encouraging the most intensive participation in these activities and its success can be seen by the fact that over 90 percent of all 16-18 year old East German males participate in GST pre-military basic training.[22]

The intensity with which the military authorities approach these military tasks is not only a function of what they regard as an increasingly bitter ideological confrontation in Europe, but also a response to serious shortcomings evident during numerous inspections in recent years. In June 1973, Deputy Minister for National Defense Heinz Kessler referred to unspecified "deficiencies and inadequacies" noted during NVA inspections. Other officers provided specific details of failures by their references to unsatisfactory results in combat training, poor discipline and order, lack of a militant competitive atmosphere, dishonesty in military competitions, problems with NCO's, failures of infantrymen in mastering the formula for determining distances, antitank riflemen who have difficulty with the target formula, and failure to utilize squad leaders.[23] In addition to these stipulations, criticism was heaped on the SED-organized worker's militia for "soft training which does not resemble combat," militia leaders who inconsistently implement orders, and failure to enforce the SED's leading role in small units.[24]

Discussions in military and party journals since 1973 reflect general satisfaction with the response to the call for an improvement in the military effort. The upgrading of the worker's militia is the most dramatic instance of the GDR's success in implementing its military philosophy. This was made possible by a more rigid regular accounting by militia commanders to party leaders, stricter and more effective training of commanders, platoon leaders, and squad leaders by officers of the People's Police, more assistance by the GST for projects such as introducing realism into antiaircraft defense training, and closer coordination of training with the NVA and the Soviet forces.[25] By spending more money on the militia and rejuvenating its ranks by bringing in younger personnel, the SED created a 400,000-man force, armed with mortars, antitank guns, and heavy machine-guns, which will not be affected by East-West force reduction agreements since it is classified as a militia. Nationwide militia maneuvers in the fall of 1976, the largest ones ever, completed the ambitious 1973-76 training program and demonstrated the integration of the militia with the regular GDR military forces. By assigning this vastly improved force the responsibility for helping safeguard the GDR's western frontier, the SED has improved its defense capability while showing its faith in the once ridiculed factory militia.

The SED's views regarding the use of force were expressed by Heinz Hoffmann on the 20th anniversary of the NVA. Even though a nuclear war would bring "great suffering to all peoples, especially in the capitalist countries," such a war would, Hoffmann argued, be a "just war" because it would mean the end of capitalism. He continued by insisting that the GDR does not

> . . . share the view which is held even by progressive people in the peace movement that no just war is possible in the nuclear age and that war with nuclear missiles is no longer a continuation of the politics of the warring classes, but would hence amount only to a nuclear inferno, to the end of the world.[26]

Associating this view with Maoism, Hoffmann explained that even total war would be simply politics in another form. The GDR Defense Minister added

that the employment of armed forces merely to threaten the enemy and "offer backing for negotiations" is also a continuation of politics by other means.

East German policy on the use of force is augmented by official emphasis on development of civil defense. Most discussions center on blast shelter systems rather than on evacuation procedures employed by the Soviet Union and military publications speak of the requirement that the population itself do much of the work, especially in preparation of respiratory and body protection equipment. In November 1973, *Militärwesen* boasted of an expanded civil defense effort, not passive in character, and designed to raise the defense readiness of the nation. This was supported by a directive from the State Secretariat for Vocational Training that more emphasis be placed on civil defense as part of the required education of all apprentices. Every instructor is now obligated to master civil defense techniques and incorporate training of civil defense into other educational topics. The success of this campaign can be measured by pronouncements of officials such as Werner Eidner, civil defense chief of Potsdam Bezirk, who recently described the "high level of readiness" achieved through implementation of new procedures involving wider public participation.[27] The inclusion of civil defense techniques into courses in health education is common today and the general population as well as civil defense personnel are required to have some special knowledge of the subject. Preparation of equipment and facilities is also included in the instruction. East German civil defense has been broadened to cover the execution of measures for protection and preservation of the operation of the economy.[28]

East German Military Technology. The credibility of the GDR's military philosophy is enhanced by the implementation of modern technology in the nation's forces. Although in its first years the East German military was denied the benefits of technology, recent years have witnessed the equipment of the NVA with modern arms and the employment of sophisticated combat techniques increasing its effectiveness and combat readiness.[29] The application of technology creates no serious philosophical problems for the SED theorists who see it as a method whereby the soldier can multiply "the natural forces belonging to his corporeality." *Militärtechnik* explains that

> As the working man increases his productive force by employing increasingly more perfect and effective means of work, so does the soldier achieve the necessary combat force by employing the powerful combat means created today. He uses the mechanical, physical, chemical properties of weapons and devices so as to let them work as a means of power on the weapons, order of battle, and other objects of the enemy.[30]

The above reference to "chemical properties of weapons" raises questions about the extent to which the GDR seeks to exploit available technology. The recently disclosed case of Professor Adolf Henning Frucht, formerly of the GDR Institute for Labor Physiology, revealed some of the activities of the GDR in the development of a new type of biological weapon. Frucht, who feared production of the weapon he discovered by accident, sent a warning to the West so an antidote could be prepared in case the weapon was used. Following a highly secret trial in 1968, the East German scientist was given a life sentence.[31] Meanwhile, GDR military publications describe the activities of special "antichemical warfare companies" in the NVA and efforts of the WTO forces to prepare for the use of chemical-biological weapons.[32]

Other East German technical advances can be seen in more accepted research endeavors. A few will illustrate the high technological level of the GDR forces: the perfection of active-reactive artillery shells in 1972, the use of electronic computers for photo interpretation in 1973, and the application of modern computer and information technology to the troop command process in 1974.[33] These and numerous other innovations attest to the claim that the GDR has indeed thoroughly modernized its military forces.

Political Demands on the East German Military. GDR military philosophers do not believe that quality and quantity of weapons, technical equipment, or numerical strength alone can be decisive for victory in modern warfare. Rather, they speak of the necessity for an indissoluble dialectic unity and reciprocity of man and material achieved only through an understanding of the fact that the employment of force must always have a political purpose. This understanding is seen as the result of the soldier's political awareness and moral force, qualities that must be instilled by the party workers within the military.[34] This reasoning provides justification for the party's well-documented control over the military and the military's development into a pillar of the political establishment.

However, political control over the GDR military has apparently been shaken by the impact of technology. In the first years of the NVA, when the level of technology was low, the intellectual requirements of officers and NCO's were correspondingly low. As a result, political reliability was relatively easily achieved since there were few other considerations. The high incidence of SED membership among the officers, 99.2 percent were members, reflected this. By 1972, after 20 years of gradually increasing technological demands, the frequency of party members dropped to 80 percent.[35] The official response to the rise of technology and its resultant diminution of political work was an effort to reassert political domination. In 1973 there were numerous criticisms of the political behavior of SED members in the NVA and the current troop indoctrination programs. A major complaint was the lack of command support for political work,[36] an apparent indication that some officers considered purely military training as more important than ideological efforts. The commander of the Thalmann Officer's School demonstrated the determination of the SED to fight this tendency. Of the qualifications for an officer, Maj. Gen. Leopold Gotthilf said,

> Good grades in civics, history, mathematics, physics, or German are not enough. Just as important is active participation in the Free German Youth, in the GST, in political life. In short, theory and practice have to harmonize.[37]

At the same time, *Volksarmee* announced that a unit's rating would be based not only on its ability in military training subjects but also on its political attitude.[38]

The objective of the SED's political work in the military is to develop a unity of political creed and high military performance and a mental state characterized by an understanding of military tasks as political assignments. This creates a unique situation requiring the armed forces to fulfill not only military responsibilities but also always to be conscious of its class mission. Emphasis on the class mission makes it possible for the SED to pursue an ambitious program for militarization of the country while simultaneously condemning militarism. That which serves the interest of the masses cannot, by their definition, be militaristic. Thus, the relationship between the masses, the SED, and the military supports a positive attitude toward service in the armed forces.

NOTES

1. *Berliner Zeitung,* 12 January 1976, p. 3.
2. *Handbuch Militärisches Grundwissen* (Berlin; GDR; Militärverlag der DDR, 1972), p. 25.
3. *Einheit,* 4/5, 1975, p. 461.
4. *Ibid.,* pp. 461-462.
5. *National Zeitung,* 23 November 1975, p. 4 (supplement).
6. *Volksarmee,* No. 7, 1973, p. 3.
7. *Volkswacht,* 6 March 1974, p. 6.
8. *Volksarmee,* No. 6, 1973, p. 5.
9. *Ibid.,* No. 19, 1973, p. 1.
10. *Ibid.,* No. 47, 1974, p. 7.
11. *Frankfurter Allgemeine,* supplement, 15 February 1975, p. 3.
12. Quoted in *IWE Tagesdienst,* 1 October 1973, pp. 1-2.
13. *Ibid.,* 13 April 1974, p. 1.
14. *Volksarmee,* No. 17, 1974, p. 6.
15. *Märkische Volksstimme,* 15 May 1976, p. 6.
16. *Einheit,* No. 8, 1976, pp. 839-840.
17. *Militärtechnik,* No. 11, 1975, pp. 481-483.
18. *Armeerundschau,* No. 1, 1974, p. 3.
19. *Märkische Volksstimme,* 15 May 1976, p. 6.
20. *Volksarmee,* No. 27, 1975, p. 3.
21. Discussions of East German physical training can be found in *Truppenpraxis* (Bonn), No. 8, 1976, and *Presse Informationen* (Berlin; GDR, 9 January 1976).
22. *Neues Deutschland,* 14/15 February, 1976, p. 15.
23. *Volksarmee,* No. 23, 1973, p. 5; No. 29, 1973, pp. 4-5; and No. 12, 1973, p. 1.
24. *Der Kämpfer,* May 1973, p. 2, and August 1973, p. 1.
25. *Ibid.,* June 1976, p. 4.
26. *Einheit,* No. 3, 1976, p. 356.
27. *IWE Tagesdienst,* 21 January 1976, p. 2.
28. *Militärmedizin,* May 1973, pp. 163-173.
29. *Berliner Zeitung,* 12 January 1976, p. 3.
30. *Militärtechnik,* No. 7, 1976, pp. 289-290.
31. *Die Welt,* 21 August 1976, p. 3.
32. *Armeerundschau,* No. 4, 1973, pp. 6-9; No. 10, 1973, pp. 76-77; and No. 10, 1975, p. 76.
33. *Volksarmee,* No. 45, 1972, p. 8; No. 2, 1973, p. 8; and *Militärtechnik,* No. 10, 1974, pp. 439-440.
34. *Militärtechnik,* No. 7, 1976, pp. 289-291.
35. *IWE Tagesdienst,* 5 July 1974, p. 1.
36. *Volksarmee,* No. 2, 1973, pp. 4-5.
37. *Berliner Zeitung,* 28 March 1973, p. 3.
38. *Volksarmee,* No. 5, 1973, pp. 4-5.



PROFESSIONAL READING

REVIEW ARTICLE

INDIVIDUALS, IDEAS, AND INSTITUTIONS

Recent Writings on American Foreign Policy

by

Thomas H. Etzold

Some years ago, when after decades of parsimony the Congress at last was appropriating monies to construct or purchase modern embassies and consulates, one of the old hands in the Foreign Service remarked of the goings-on that the Department of State seemed to be suffering from an edifice complex. Reading an assortment of books on American foreign affairs makes readily apparent the fact that historians and political scientists have developed a similar neurosis, for their writings abound with references to "architects," "building blocks" and "pillars," and more "structures," "frameworks," and "foundations" than one could count in a dozen issues of *Scientific American* or *Popular Mechanics*. These terms refer, of course, to the enduring trinity of topics in foreign affairs analysis, namely; individuals, ideas, and institutions, three categories that permit rough grouping of the books treated here.

Individuals. It is one of the ironies of history that great men are fated to be misunderstood at best, and very likely vilified, at least for a time. Greatness earns hostility from competitors and carping critics alike. Great deeds and forceful personalities also generate a more legitimate sort of controversy. For in statecraft, traditionally as well as today, important elements of the problems remain susceptible only to intuitive treatment, so that one cannot command consensus by the appearance of "scientific" decisionmaking in the manner, say, of Herbert Hoover.

In the history of American foreign affairs, the result of this irony has been that, as of 1977, every Secretary of State since World War II, with the possible exception of George Marshall, appears in the literature either as a nonentity (Edward Stettinius, William Rogers), or predominantly as a villain (James Byrnes, Dean Acheson, John Foster Dulles, Dean Rusk, Henry Kissinger).

Since the Second World War, two of those men have impressed their world views on American foreign affairs to an extent scarcely approached by any of their colleagues and contemporaries: Dean G. Acheson, and Henry A. Kissinger. Acheson has become known as the "architect" of containment and the cold war, and Kissinger as the individual who closed the door on Acheson's edifice and then, with Richard M. Nixon collaborating, set

about fashioning a new "structure of peace."[1] Because of their preeminent influence on postwar international order and America's role therein, Acheson and Kissinger have received a more-than-average share of attention, and, one suspects, of criticism, a fact which makes favorable assessments of either both rare and valuable as counterweights to the natural correlation between attention and criticism.

It has been almost 25 years since Acheson turned over the Department of State to John Foster Dulles. Sometimes inside, sometimes outside, but never far from high government circles from 1945 to 1949, Acheson presided at the State Department from 1949 to 1953. He was indeed "present at the creation" of the postwar international order, as he claimed in the title of his most significant volume of memoirs.[2] During the years between his departure from office and his death in October 1971, Acheson wrote, lectured, and served as a senior statesman-advisor to Presidents Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon (Acheson was too critical, and too much involved in Democratic Party politics, to be called on in the Eisenhower years). Even Kissinger is said to have respected Acheson's opinions.

Alive, Acheson continually stimulated controversy by his style, personality, and politics; in death such controversies have continued without abatement. While Secretary of State Acheson drew the fire of rightwing anti-Communists for failing to demonstrate eagerness to rid the State Department of all "205 card-carrying Communists" discovered there by Senator Joe McCarthy; for "losing" China; for advocating the pusillanimous policy of containment; and for limiting aims in Korea. (In one of the most alliterative phrases of the era, critics complained about Acheson's College of Cowardly Containment.) In subsequent years Acheson became the target of leftist or liberal ideologues, who indicted him as the master builder of the cold war, the developer of containment into a global ideological struggle and a "militarized" foreign policy. Only since his death has there emerged a clear line of favorable assessment to countervail the long-standing, if somewhat contradictory, negative appraisals of his contributions to postwar American foreign affairs.

The most recent book on Acheson, by political scientist David S. McLellan, is likely to stand as a milestone in the evaluation of that public servant, and not only because it is generally favorable in tone.* In treating Acheson's times and policies, McLellan has successfully presented an overview first of the challenges for U.S. policymakers inherent in postwar circumstances, and second of the extent to which American foreign policy represented a coherent and effectual response. In doing so, he has demonstrated the integrity of Acheson's views and actions in this context.

For Acheson the great question of the postwar period was "whether the West could achieve the unity and discipline needed to preserve itself in an age of revolution and totalitarianism."[3] The inability of the United Nations to diminish great power conflicts after World War II, and its corresponding inutility in controlling atomic energy and weapons, made the division of Europe, and indeed of the world, a virtual certainty after about 1947. Thereafter Acheson's policies were intended to strengthen and unite the West while denying significant accretions of power to the Soviet Union. Thus he emphasized the American connection with Western Europe and the need to integrate a rehabilitated Germany into Western economy and defense.

McLellan confirms Acheson's claim to have had a large role in shaping the

*David S. McLellan, *Dean Acheson: The State Department Years* (New York: Dodd, Mead, 1976), 466pp. index. illustrations, $17.50.

postwar world, and attributes both his influence in office and his controversial bent out of office to a combination of outspokenness, logic, and integrity. He numbers among Acheson's failures his errors in the Far East, especially regarding the People's Republic of China during the Korean War; his inability to bring about the rearmament of Germany; and an approach to worldwide communism that proved piecemeal, and therefore less than effective. His successes, which in McLellan's view clearly outweighed his failures, came in the "establishment of a strategic basis for dealing with the Soviet Union";[4] in bringing about sufficient European unity to permit the formation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization; in good relations with the United Nations, the American public, and the Congress; and in successful management of the bureaucracy. McLellan emphasizes that Acheson and Truman were concerned principally with power, and not ideology; and he makes a strong case for the idea that they acted defensively rather than aggressively.

What Acheson built, Kissinger razed; at least so it would seem from Administration rhetoric in the Nixon-Kissinger-Ford years. Cold war gave way to détente; the United States moved from meaningless strategic superiority toward parity and sufficiency vis-à-vis the Soviet Union; and American foreign policy worldwide turned away from the defense of dominance via military means and toward acceptance of the "realities of interdependence."

The result, in favorable assessment: "The world is a safer place today because of [Kissinger's] courage and vision. It may even be a little better."[5] In negative assessment:

> Suppose that Kissinger is, in the common parlance, "some kind of nut or something." . . . Before Kissinger and his detente, the Free World nations had a Cold War, but hard currencies. They had some inflation, but only in the controllable degree which accompanies increases in Gross National Product. Subsequent to Kissinger and SALT, every great Western nation slid into double-digit inflation, the disappearance of governmental stability, and a loss of confidence in national security. The only beneficiaries, other than the oil-rich Arabs, are the Soviets themselves. . . . Everything Dr. Kissinger touches turns out very much like his great wheat deal.[6]

Although Kissinger has so recently left office that one can scarcely arrive at a measured assessment of his legacy, there are already more books written about him than there have been about Acheson in the last 25 years. The two books quoted and cited here, one quite recent and the other now going on 2 years old, represent the sharply contrasting strains in the growing literature of "Kissingerology."

For Stoessinger, Kissinger stands as an archetype of the scholar-statesman, a familiar historical figure. Indeed, this view forms the organizational scheme of his book.* The first section contains seven chapters on Kissinger's ideas about statecraft as developed out of his personal experience and academic reflections; the second section consists of six chapters on Kissinger's application of those ideas, convictions, and methods in Indochina, détente with Russia, relations with China, Europe, the Third World, and the Middle East. The book concludes with a chapter reflecting on the "anguish of power."

Stoessinger emphasizes Kissinger's search for stability in the world order, because of his view that stability is requisite to peace, and therefore it should be the first goal of statecraft. The great danger to stability, according

*John G. Stoessinger, *Henry Kissinger: The Anguish of Power* (New York: Norton, 1976), 234pp. index. $8.95.

to Kissinger, is revolution; that is, the ideological pursuit of unlimited objectives in a manner threatening the survival of other states. From this perspective, Stoessinger writes, "peace became a kind of bonus that history awarded to those statesmen who were able to create a stable international equilibrium of states that recognized each other's right to permanent existence."[7] To Kissinger, the end of the cold war and the beginnings of détente flowed from just such a recognition on the part of the United States and the Soviet Union; each state, after 25 years of denying the other's legitimacy, would have to admit that its principal adversary was present to stay in the international arena, and rightfully so. This implied no necessary friendship, no lessening of the need for adequate national security. It merely altered some of the assumptions as to appropriate methods for attaining a more secure environment.

Another major ingredient of Kissinger's statecraft according to Stoessinger was his conviction that effective diplomacy depends on the willingness to use force. In this, of course, Kissinger was not unique. In recent times, Dean Acheson also shared that conviction, and indeed described his actions as attempts to develop situations of strength from which to negotiate. No less a figure than George F. Kennan, so often critical of contemporary American employment of military forces, went on record in the late 1940's saying: "You have no idea how much it contributes to the general politeness and pleasantness of diplomacy when you have a little quiet armed force in the background."[8] This conviction in Kissinger's diplomacy underlay the tough approach of the first Nixon administration to peace negotiations via bombings in Southeast Asia.

Finally, Stoessinger has focused on a paradox that leads, in his opinion, to "the anguish of power": political decision consists in choosing lesser evils over greater ones. Thus the responsibility of power is to choose; the anguish of power is to know that political choices and the actions flowing from them are inevitably evil. He gives Kissinger high praise for refusing simply to avoid decision. Kissinger "knew that abstention from evil did not affect the existence of evil in the world, but only destroyed the faculty of choice."[9]

In all, Stoessinger's volume is a thoughtful—and thought-provoking—treatise on statesmanship as well as on one particular statesman, and the only book on Kissinger to date that deserves to be designated "required reading."

Phyllis Schlafly, an author and journalist, and Chester Ward, a retired Navy rear admiral, certainly agree that Kissinger demolished the structure of American foreign policy that antedated his accession to power first as national security advisor and then as Secretary of State.* Indeed, in their overlong and highly emotional analysis of Kissinger's alleged mental disorders and invidious influence (as the authors see it), they accuse him of having destroyed every important strategic advantage and source of political influence that the United States might have possessed or exercised in the cold war. Kissinger, they write, "conned Richard Nixon with the concept of 'nuclear sufficiency' that Kissinger admits is not sufficient to protect our allies."[10] He "imposed on U.S. grand strategy the theory that strategic nuclear power is not usable."[11] And in what the authors judge to be stupidity, if not treason, he failed to bring about an enlargement of conventional forces corresponding to the increased importance of conventional forces at a time when nuclear capabilities were supposedly unusable.

*Phyllis Schlafly and Chester Ward, *Kissinger on the Couch* (New Rochelle: Arlington House, 1975), 846pp. index. $12.95.

Because of its *ad hominem*, hyperbolic style, *Kissinger on the Couch* received scant critical notice upon its publication; the few early reviews focused on the book's many obvious weaknesses and its rude tone without appreciating that at the same time it was likely to stand as one of the most comprehensive statements of dissent from the principal lines of grand strategy carrying forward from the McNamara years and through Kissinger. The arguments of those opposing SALT are based on concern for the security of the United States, and a belief in the utility for defense and deterrence of some kind of military superiority. They receive bad press, or no press, in the United States at present. This condition is not conducive to the rounded public discussion that such subjects require, so that this book deserves attention as a thoroughgoing critique of what the authors consider to be the prevalent and "unfounded defeatist attitudes about the capabilities of the United States."[12]

Ideas. The ideas prominent in policy discussions at present may lead some observers to suspect that Kissinger's much-vaunted attention to strategic arms will turn out to have been ancillary to his reorientation of American foreign policy toward the so-called "new international agenda." During Kissinger's tenure as Secretary of State, the idea of interdependence came into its own. It is certain to be of the highest importance in coming decades, first because it represents the intellectual framework of Kissinger's move "from confrontation to cooperation" with the world's great powers as well as with the Third World; and second, because it demarks the principal differences in assumptions and methods between the cold war diplomats from Acheson to Kissinger and the policy intellectuals, including Kissinger himself, of the years since 1968.

The word "interdependence" has been used so widely and variously in recent literature that it is perhaps necessary to sort out the principal definitions and to indicate which are most meaningful in consideration of contemporary foreign policy. There are at least four such definitions.[13] One is the idea that all mankind depends on the same biosphere, so that for a healthful environment each person depends on the constructive self-restraint of everyone else. A second meaning of interdependence is the thought that every people and government in the world depends on the nuclear-capable powers to refrain from a mode of warfare that would have catastrophic and global effects. A third meaning is the view that the relationship between domestic and foreign affairs in most countries, and certainly in the major powers, is growing closer. In a fourth definition, the one most important for policy, interdependence is the "global web of transactions" in trade, resources, investment and monetary affairs. The common thread through all of the meanings is the idea that international cooperation is essential.[14]

Conceptually, interdependence represents a thoroughgoing challenge to the assumptions about international circumstances and foreign policy methods characteristic of American foreign affairs since the Acheson years. It has been argued in recent months that the United States shaped the postwar international order by means of the calculated use of threats and pain, that is, a "diplomacy of violence," on the explicit assumption that "force could be productively wedded to diplomacy."[15] In an interesting combination of types three and four of interdependence, as outlined above, some authors have suggested that in the Vietnam and Watergate eras, the external methods of the United States collided with America's traditional internal values and institutions to produce a public "stunned" into a dangerous apathy about issues of national security and national interest.

The amelioration of this condition, so it is argued, can come only through recognition of the realities of interdependence: the United States must bring about greater consonance between the methods of its policy and the morals of the polity; and it must recognize that because human fate is interdependent in many important respects, the injury done to others in foreign affairs ultimately is done to one's self.

The attractiveness of the idea of interdependence has resulted in a "sudden" literature on the subject, a voluminous outpouring of books and articles within a very short time. Some of these books are of enduring worth.

In 1975, Bayless Manning, the President of the Council on Foreign Relations, Inc., New York, delivered a series of lectures at Claremont College concerning the implications of interdependence for American foreign affairs in the coming century. The published version of the lectures remains one of the most graceful and brief statements of the large changes evident in the contemporary international order, as well as of the challenges posed to American diplomacy and indeed to traditional statecraft.*

Drawing lessons from the oil crisis of 1973, recent U.S. economic relations with Japan, and shifts in great power relationships in various specific contexts, Manning notes some of the most salient alterations in the conditions of international concourse from an American perspective. In the coming decades, he notes, the United States is going to have to bargain for what it wants; it will no longer be able simply to announce goals and have opposition bend to America's economic, military, and technical supremacy. Further, the United States is going to have to bargain not only with great states but with lesser states, not only bilaterally but multilaterally. The subjects of such bargaining are less likely to be balance of power and spheres of influence, as in former times, than to be items on the new international agenda: energy, resources, environment, population, the use of space and the seas.

The problems raised by these developments have led Manning to extremely important conclusions, each argued at chapter length in his monograph. He believes it essential that the government communicate to the American public the fact of alteration and the new content of the agenda in international affairs. He pronounces flatly that "separation of the public from foreign policy information will not be an option that is available to the government of the United States. . . . Foreign policy issues are increasingly intermixed with domestic political issues."[16] It is particularly important to explain clearly that under the new circumstances of international diplomacy, the limits of American power—as well as the extent of it—need the most careful understanding. And he argues also for education of the public on the "necessities of negotiation" to reduce public apprehension about American involvement in such processes and to increase public patience.

In another important conclusion, perhaps more timely in 1977 than it was even in 1975, Manning warns that a high degree of ideological content in American foreign policy will not necessarily "produce consensus, eliminate debate, or provide answers to foreign policy problems."[17]

Finally, he points to the problems that the new diplomacy is creating for the old establishment. Sustained negotiation, the internal tension between special interests and general interests in developing coherent negotiating positions, the unsatisfactory state of congressional-executive relations in foreign

*Bayless Manning, *The Conduct of United States Foreign Policy in the Nation's Third Century* (Claremont, Calif.: Claremont College, 1976), 131pp. $4.50.

policy matters, cumbersome congressional procedures in foreign affairs, and bureaucratic problems within the State Department all constitute obstacles to effective American diplomacy amid changing conditions in world affairs.

The changing circumstances of world diplomacy remarked in Manning's essay seem virtually certain to endure at least through the next several decades. The problems of public opinion, ideology, and foreign affairs machinery noted in his essays will assuredly take many years to solve, if indeed they ever are resolved. These considerations assure that his elegant treatment will deserve continued reading.

Another book of essays has made a notable contribution to public analysis and discussion of the issues of interdependence. In 1974 the Arms Control and Foreign Policy Seminar at the Center for Policy Study, University of Chicago, held a conference on the policy choices for the United States demonstrated in part by the new and somewhat uncomfortable dependence manifested in the oil crisis of the preceding year. The papers presented at the conference were published in 1975 under the editorship of Morton Kaplan, the director of the seminar.*

The premise of Kaplan's collection is that the United States faces a "new and critical set of choices . . . that will help shape the world for the next generation."[18] The concern of the group is that as a result of Vietnam and Watergate, discussion seems to be proceeding along the mistaken line that the choices are either isolationism or interventionism. Kaplan and his colleagues propose instead that the more important choice lies between isolationism and interdependence. They reinforce the argument that in the coming years, conflicts of interest are likely to center on economic issues rather than on power politics.

The method Kaplan's group has employed to explore the problems of choice in contemporary American foreign policy contributes notably to the usefulness of the collection. By taking seriously the possibility of American isolation from the world across a "broad spectrum of activities,"[19] the essays attempt to explore the broad, fundamental question of just what America contributes to the world, and, correspondingly, just what the possession of an internationalist orientation contributes to the United States. This technique has not resulted in a set of answers to the policy choices on particular issues raised in the various chapters—security policy, resources, science and technology, economic policy, national development, domestic politics and social welfare; instead, and by design, it has clarified the problems and the choices in each of these areas.

Although much has been published on the subject of interdependence since these essays were prepared, they remain important as a collection. They are unparalleled for the breadth of issues considered from the vantage of American policy. The inclusion of views skeptical of interdependence as unavoidable reality, and serious consideration of the possibilities involved in an American turn away from internationalism and toward economic sufficiency, provide a viewpoint difficult to find elsewhere, but necessary for balanced or thorough consideration of the topic. Finally, the book contains examples of high-quality analytic thought by well-informed individual scholars. The relatively early appearance of these essays testifies to the foresight of the Arms Control and Foreign Policy Seminar, for the topic of interdependence gives every sign that it will continue to increase in importance.

A curiosity of American political life is responsible for the appearance of the

*Morton Kaplan, *Isolation or Interdependence? Today's Choices for Tomorrow's World* (New York: The Free Press, 1975), 254pp. $10.00.

third, and last, book to be considered in this section on ideas in contemporary American foreign affairs.* George Ball, former Under Secretary of State and Ambassador to the United Nations, in the election year 1976 put forward his ideas on recent and future policy in a frank bid for appointment as Secretary of State. Where but in America, one must wonder, could someone aspire to become the first minister of state by literary endeavor rather than, say, by marrying the daughter (or some other relative) of the head of state, mounting a coup, or writing generous checks to various individuals and organizations?

Although Ball did not get the appointment, his book remains of considerable interest. He divides his volume into five sections. The first surveys the Nixon-Kissinger policies and style in "correcting aberrations in past policy,"[20] with principal attention to opening relations with China, the evolution of détente with the Soviet Union, and the prolonged effort to extricate the country from the Vietnam involvement. The second section discusses new aberrations introduced into American foreign affairs in the course of eliminating some old ones, and pays particular attention to the consequences of Kissinger's style (shuttle diplomacy), and to those of inadequate attention to the Western alliance and to Japan. A third section concerns the need for reform of diplomatic and intelligence agencies. The fourth section addresses new problems for American foreign policy arising out of population growth, resource limitations, poverty, and the diffusion of power in the world community—in short, the issues of dependence and interdependence. The fifth section of the book contains Ball's prescriptions and exhortations for improved policy, institutions, and national morale.

Ball's book deserves careful reading for several reasons. First, it is a responsible and restrained critique of Kissinger's diplomacy. Second, the critique is balanced by a sense of what is possible in diplomacy and by considered concern for national interests. Third, the critique is augmented by positive recommendations and alternatives, so that it is not merely an extended exercise in negativism. Finally, and despite the fact that Ball did not become Secretary of State to President Carter, it is the best overall statement to date of the intellectual and moral premises that appear to undergird the Carter approach to foreign affairs.

Ball is skeptical of the results of détente; he is unconvinced that lasting beneficial results will accrue to the United States from relations with the People's Republic of China; he is convinced that the starting point for sound policy is the revival of the Western alliance. He believes that the facts and issues of interdependence, and the new preeminence of economics in diplomacy, herald an era in which sustained negotiation will be the hallmark of American foreign affairs, and he believes it is past time to prepare for that change institutionally. His largest point concerns the need to restore public confidence in America's special capability—and responsibility—to contribute to an improved world order; for only in such confidence does he think essential national unity can be regained. Like President Carter, he believes that human rights and liberal values are the logical and proper bases for such a national spirit and consensus.

As noted at the outset of this section, not only Manning, Kaplan, and Ball, but Kissinger himself has joined in proclaiming interdependence as a reality, and not just a policy or an optional frame of mind. Kissinger stands

*George Ball, *Diplomacy for a Crowded World: An American Foreign Policy* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1976), 356pp. index. $12.95.

a fair chance of going down in history principally as the Secretary of State who first recognized the new importance of international economic relationships, of interdependence. For the realization of the intimate relationship of American well-being to that of the many other states of the world formed the conceptual outline, and therefore the conceptual legacy, of Kissinger's diplomacy.

Yet one suspects that Kissinger may already be in the uncomfortable position that George F. Kennan occupied in relation to containment policy many years ago. In his memoirs Kennan wrote that the reactions to his public enunciation of containment policy had made him feel "Like one who has inadvertently loosened a large boulder from the top of a cliff and now helplessly witnesses its path of destruction in the valley below, shuddering and wincing at each successive glimpse of disaster. . . ."[21] Whether interdependence will mean disaster as policy, one can scarcely tell at present. But it is safe to say that Kissinger's view of the United States as caught up in unavoidable interdependence has informed his view of the meaning of strategic superiority, and vice versa, so that the issues of interdependence will be inextricable from those of strategy, power, and eminence as, in years to come, analysts strive to assess Kissinger's influence on America's place in the world.

Institutions. For many years, one of the most important aspects of American foreign relations received virtually no public discussion: institutions, or organization, for the conduct of foreign affairs. It is one thing to devise policy; it is quite another, and sometimes quite a bit more difficult, actually to conduct foreign relations in such a way as to conduce to the goals of policy and the interests of state. Of course, this is not merely a problem of foreign policy; it is an aspect of the human condition. In the old proverb, it was said that "There's many a slip 'twixt cup and lip." Carl von Clausewitz made a similar, if somewhat more elegant, point in enunciating the idea of "friction," by which he meant all those difficulties arising in the course of an attempt to translate the abstract into reality, as an idea or plan into action.

Neglect of organizational considerations in American foreign affairs has had many causes. It may have been due in part to the intimidating complexity of governmental organizations when viewed from outside. In some measure it may have resulted from unawareness of the important connection between organization and results in such areas. Most of all, that neglect was probably a reflection of the incredible boredom that traditional approaches to organizational history have engendered in students as well as in the general public. Government bureaucracies are, of course, still complex and intimidating—if anything more so than in times past. But there has been an increased public realization that institutional arrangements have something to do with performance, an idea stimulated by renewed congressional interest in policy processes and organizations. In another development, the conjunction of studies in social psychology, modern management, and group biography (prosopography, as it is somewhat ponderously known in the trade) has brought new liveliness and interest to the study of American organization for the conduct of foreign affairs.

The most important development of all bearing on the erosion of traditional neglect of institutional considerations in American foreign affairs has been the emergence of interdependence and a correlative requirement for "multilateral diplomacy." Both Manning and Ball made large points concerning the outmoded nature of American institutions in this context. Some 2 years ago the prestigious Atlantic Council went on

record with the conclusion that there was almost no diplomacy of the old sort remaining. In world affairs, bilateral negotiations, the stuff of which diplomacy formerly had been made, had virtually been superseded by "efforts for multilateral harmonization of policy," for which the State Department, with its geographic and functional bureau organization, was scarcely suited.[22] Recently a functionary at the Department of State noted that in 1976 the United States was represented at more than 800 international conferences, presumably most of them convened for the purpose of thrashing out some problem or another. Seven years ago, in fact, the Department of State concluded in a famous self-study that "at the technical, functional, and developmental levels, international cooperation is the largest 'growth' function in our line of business."[23] Recognizing, or perhaps indicating, that times were changing, on 19 March 1975, the House Foreign Affairs Committee requested and received a change of name; it is now the House International Relations Committee, and seven of its ten subcommittees have the word "international" in their titles.[24]

The writings on aspects of institution and organization in American foreign affairs fall into two main categories. The first is concerned with people in a group, or people as a group. The second category of writings focuses directly on aspects of organization and bureaucracy, rather than on the people within.

Three books concerned with the first category—people in groups—deal with different aspects of professionalism in the diplomatic corps. One addresses the topic of professionalism and policy influence, one that of professionalism and morale, and the last that of professionalism in style and method.

Not until early in the 20th century did the United States establish its diplomatic representatives on a professional basis. According to Robert D. Schulzinger, of the history faculty at the School of International Studies, University of Denver, this development was supposed to ensure two things: The government and its political leaders were supposed to have the confidence that the foreign affairs of the country were in the hands of a competent, experienced, "serene and imperturbable" group of professionals; and the members of that group were supposed to become prominent, even predominant, in the making of foreign policy.*

Almost everything went wrong with that idea. From the 1920's to the 1970's the diplomats tried again and again to achieve paramount influence in foreign affairs, always to fail. Time and again, political leaders found a State Department and a Foreign Service cumbersome, unresponsive, unready for the implementation of Presidential policy. Part of the problem, as is well known, was that many other officials and agencies had legitimate interests in the conduct of American foreign affairs. Part of the problem—and this is the special contribution of Schulzinger's book—was that as a group, the professional diplomats presented too diverse and incoherent a picture to outsiders. As a result, political leaders would never grant "Foreign Service officers complete independence in foreign policy work, because the politicians never knew precisely where the Foreign Service officers stood."[25] At various points in the century, diplomats tried to gain more influence by augmenting their general competence as diplomatic practitioners with specialist knowledge in areas such as international economics. This only rendered them vulnerable to

*Robert D. Schulzinger, *The Making of the Diplomatic Mind: The Training, Outlook and Style of the United States Foreign Officers, 1908-1931* (Middletown, Conn.: Wesleyan University Press, 1975), 235pp. index. $15.00.

competition via the lateral entry of equally qualified, or better qualified, outside experts.

In the 1960's and 1970's, modern management skills were employed within the State Department and Foreign Service in an attempt to bridge the dilemma of "general readiness as against functional specialization," but without much success.[26] It was also a serious blow to the "influence via professionalism" school that Kissinger became Secretary of State in 1973. On the one hand, his appointment demonstrated that "general diplomatic ability was necessary to the direction of foreign policy"; on the other hand, his career showed that "a Foreign Service background was not the only way to learn the diplomatic craft."[27]

Schulzinger's book raises an issue that goes far beyond the dates indicated in his title, and beyond the bounds of the diplomatic profession as well. Military officers just as much as diplomatic officers face the problems of balancing general competence and specialized skills or abilities. Inside the military and diplomatic services, this balancing most often receives attention in terms of career patterns and advancement. The dimension external to the services, however, relates to the issue of how to make public servants as useful as possible in day-to-day work while making them as good as may be necessary in extreme circumstances. There is every reason to think that the experience of the diplomats may be relevant to that of the military in this larger context.

The theme of professionalism and morale is also one of great contemporary interest to the military services. This has not always been the case. It has been fewer than 20 years since an American diplomat opened his memoir, somewhat self-pityingly, by quoting the famous line of the great French diplomatist Jules Cambon: "Unlike the military, the diplomat is not the spoilt child of historians."[28] In the aftermath of Vietnam, the military has been feeling just as much self-commiseration as the diplomats, and probably with about as much justice. Here the experience of American diplomats is both instructive and encouraging. Now, 25 years after the public pillorying of some of the most capable men in the diplomatic service, an entire literature has grown up to celebrate their virtues, their foresight, their sturdy loyalty and high competence.

For about 10 years following 1944, diplomats and others who might conceivably have had anything to do with the success of the Communists in China were abused, persecuted, and humiliated. Many career experts on East Asia were driven from the service after having had their loyalty impugned, primarily because they had predicted Communist success in the Chinese civil war. Their tribulations, of course, were merely one aspect of the prolonged Red-hating, Red-baiting period known as the McCarthy era. The hapless China hands of the State Department became the scapegoats, the incorrect foci of hate, frustration, confusion, and error as the American public and Congress discovered in the difficult aftermath of the Second World War that everything was not going to work out all right. The suggestion here is not that in Vietnam the military was as right as those diplomats in the 1940's who foresaw the triumph of the Chinese Communists; rather, it is that the military similarly has become a scapegoat for much that went wrong in the troubled 1960's and early 1970's.

E.J. Kahn's book about the China hands is the story of the Foreign Service officers caught up in the American reaction—perhaps one should say overreaction—to adverse developments in postwar foreign affairs.* His volume is

*E.J. Kahn, *The China Hands: America's Foreign Service Officers and What Befell Them* (New York: The Viking Press, 1975), 337pp. index. $12.95.

high-quality journalism rather than definitive scholarship, and yet it raises the essential points. The nation lost the services of the only experienced China authorities it had available in the Foreign Service just when Far Eastern affairs most required expert attention. More important, the morale of the service was damaged beyond immediate repair. The consequences, as others have remarked in various writings, were not limited to the issue of China or to the time of the latter 1940's and early 1950's. The service became overly conformist, lost a great deal of independence of judgment, and sought to avoid fire by producing safe analyses and recommendations.

All of this ensured that over the next two decades, the service and the Department would contribute less and less to the formulation of original ideas in American foreign affairs. In 1970, the State Department's self-study observed that "In the Foreign Service, conformity is prized above all other qualities."[29] Upon becoming President Kennedy's Ambassador to India, John Kenneth Galbraith discovered that, as concerned policy recommendations, "Silence was advised."[30] One suspects that constructive departures from containment policy would not have been so long in coming had there been more freedom of latitude for initiative, questioning, and creative thinking in the Foreign Service.

While reading Kahn's book, therefore, military men depressed or annoyed by media coverage critical of the military during the Vietnam years may take some comfort in the hope that they may receive similarly considerate rehabilitative treatment in a mere 20 or 25 years, if only they have the patience to wait that long.

There is a long tradition of writing in regard to the third aspect of professional diplomacy here under consideration, namely, the relation of professionalism, style, and method. At least since the 18th century, diplomatists have been writing about the skills, personal qualities, and other requirements of their profession. To the line of Francois de Callieres, Lord Malmesbury, Sir Ernest Satow, and Sir Harold Nicolson, one might now add William Macomber, who for many years alternated between assignments as ambassador and assistant secretaryships in the Department of State.

Macomber's book is more than a catalog of all the virtues with which a good diplomat must equip himself; it is in addition a very interesting analysis of what has been happening in the American Foreign Service since World War II, and of what must happen to make it more effective in shaping as well as executing policy.* Macomber believes that after the war "diplomats around the world had little trouble in adjusting intellectually to the changed conditions of that world, but they had, and many have had ever since, great difficulty in facing up to the organizational and management requirements inherent in the new circumstances in which they now must operate."[31] Like Manning and Ball, Macomber emphasizes the enlarging role of negotiation in American diplomacy, and notes that American diplomats are weak in preparation and experience for sustained negotiations such as are likely to characterize foreign affairs in coming years. He writes persuasively of the need to use personnel more efficiently, and to develop them more effectively through revised career patterns. And he offers a lot of good advice to anyone making his way in a medium-sized bureaucracy. A professional, he notes, always speaks well of his predecessor as well as his successor. Many nondiplomats could take that advice to heart.

---

*William Macomber, *The Angel's Game: A Handbook of Modern Diplomacy* (New York: Stein and Day, 1975), 225pp. index, glossary. $10.00.

In addition to the focus on people in groups, there is the previously mentioned focus on the characteristics of the groups or organizations themselves. The single most important book to appear on that topic in the last 5 years is unquestionably that by Donald P. Warwick, a sociologist at York University, Ontario.* In the 1960's, largely out of realization of what Macomber points out in his book, the Department of State began large-scale efforts to modernize its management methods. There were three principal approaches, all familiar to today's management teachers and students: sensitivity training, team building for problem solving, and management by objectives and programs. Warwick's study had its genesis in the addition of a fourth factor, outside evaluation of the effects of the first three techniques. He and several associates were hired in 1967 to make and to publish in scholarly articles and books an assessment of management reform in the Department. Interestingly, within a short time the climate in the Department changed to such an extent that the proponents of management reform—the sponsors of the study—were out. The study therefore had to be finished under adverse conditions.

Warwick finds the chief cause of bureaucratic layering and proliferation to be the sense of insecurity that public criticism causes in the members of bureaucracies. The efforts of bureaucrats, he writes,

> to protect their jobs or to buffer themselves against the caprice of political employees seem neither irrational nor nefarious. . . . Bureaucrats . . . are human beings, with much the same motivation for security and self-esteem as the rest of the population. . . . So long as bureaucrats remain a handy scapegoat for public frustration, they are unlikely to relinquish the comforts of a layered structure bedecked with regulations. If the nation wishes to reduce bureaucracy, it must cease beating the bureaucrats and involve them in the process of creating a less threatening, less cumbersome, more satisfying, and ultimately less expensive work environment.[32]

He concludes that effective reform can best come from within a bureaucracy that no longer feels abused and vulnerable. He also argues that a lasting solution to the problem of needless bureaucracy will require a revamping of existing relations between the Congress and executive agencies, because of the demonstrated preference of Congress for "known chaos to uncertain rationality."[33]

Such a thesis, of course, has application outside as well as inside the Department of State. One can only hope that it will receive the consideration it seems to deserve.

Conclusion. This survey of some of the literature shows several trends of topic and analysis that may be expected to continue in prominence. There is an apparent and widespread conviction that Kissinger's years of leadership were indeed years of transition in American foreign policy. It is evident that this transition has had to do with perceptions of a changing world order and of great alterations in America's role, both strategically and economically, within that world order. Finally, it seems that alterations in the conditions and issues of world affairs, coupled with change in America's position, require immediate adjustments in American institutions, methods, and attitudes. The public can expect to see—and should study carefully—much more writing on these related points. Together they bear most

*Donald P. Warwick, *A Theory of Public Bureaucracy: Politics, Personality, and Organization in the State Department* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1975), 252pp, index, $12.00.

intimately on the fundamental questions of national interest, national security, and effectiveness in governance.

NOTES

1. Interestingly, the subtitles of Nixon's second and third reports to the Congress on "U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970's" were "Building for Peace" (1971) and "The Emerging Structure of Peace" (1972).

2. Dean Acheson, *Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department* (New York: Norton, 1969).

3. David S. McLellan, *Dean Acheson: The State Department Years* (New York: Dodd, Mead, 1976), p. 430.

4. *Ibid.*, p. 404.

5. John G. Stoessinger, *Henry Kissinger: The Anguish of Power* (New York: Norton, 1976), p. 227.

6. Phyllis Schlafly and Chester Ward, *Kissinger on the Couch* (New Rochelle, N.Y.: Arlington House, 1975), pp. 11, 12.

7. Stoessinger, p. 12.

8. The quotation is from a transcript of comments following a lecture by Kennan at the National War College, 16 September 1946, Kennan Papers, Box 16, Princeton University Library. I am grateful to my colleague John Lewis Gaddis for making the quotation and citation available.

9. Stoessinger, p. 227.

10. Schlafly and Ward, p. 204.

11. *Ibid.*, p. 197.

12. *Ibid.*, p. 13.

13. Thomas H. Etzold, "Interdependence 1976?" *Diplomatic History*, v. I, no. 1, Winter 1977, pp. 35-45.

14. *Ibid.*, p. 36.

15. James A. Nathan and James K. Oliver, *United States Foreign Policy and World Order* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1976), pp. 5-11. This volume expounds at length the ideas summarized in the remainder of the paragraph.

16. Bayless Manning, *The Conduct of United States Foreign Policy in the Nation's Third Century* (Claremont, Calif.: Claremont College, 1976), p. 27.

17. *Ibid.*, p. 65.

18. Morton Kaplan, *Isolation or Interdependence? Today's Choices for Tomorrow's World* (New York: The Free Press, 1975), p. 6.

19. *Ibid.*, p. 9.

20. George Ball, *Diplomacy for a Crowded World: An American Foreign Policy* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1976), p. vi.

21. George F. Kennan, *Memoirs: 1925-1950* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1967), p. 356.

22. "Decision-Making in an Interdependent World," the first interim report of the Special Committee of the Atlantic Council on Intergovernmental Organization and Reorganization, published in *The Atlantic Community Quarterly*, Summer 1975, p. 137.

23. U.S. Dept. of State, *Diplomacy for the Seventies: A Program of Management Reform for the Department of State* (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1970), p. 474.

24. *Congressional Quarterly*, 22 March 1975, p. 605.

25. Robert D. Schulzinger, *The Making of the Diplomatic Mind: The Training, Outlook, and Style of United States Foreign Service Officers, 1908-1931* (Middletown, Conn.: Wesleyan University Press, 1975), p. 4.

26. *Ibid.*, p. 155. See also Thomas H. Etzold, *The Conduct of American Foreign Relations: The Other Side of Diplomacy* (New York: New Viewpoints, 1977), especially chapters two and five.

27. Schulzinger, p. 154.

28. Charles W. Thayer, *Diplomat* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1959), p. xv.

29. *Diplomacy for the Seventies*, p. 310.

30. John Kenneth Galbraith, *Ambassador's Journal* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1969), p. 29.

31. William Macomber, *The Angels' Game: A Handbook of Modern Diplomacy* (New York: Stein and Day, 1975), p. 84.

32. Donald P. Warwick, et al., *A Theory of Public Bureaucracy: Politics, Personality, and Organization in the State Department* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1975), pp. 214-215.

33. *Ibid.*, p. 214.

BOOK REVIEWS

Chalfont, Alun. **Montgomery of Alamein.** New York: Atheneum, 1976. 356pp.

Of the many World War II marshals placed in the British pantheon by a grateful people and sovereign, only one is recognized as *the* Field Marshal—Bernard Montgomery. Since Chester Wilmot fell under the Montgomery spell and developed the Montgomery formula for victory into the sad refrain of missed opportunities in *Struggle for Europe*, we have been treated to controversy, polemic and apologia on both sides of the Atlantic which alternately adds to or dulls the luster of the Monty legend.

The latest contributor, Lord Chalfont, enters the arena with credentials of note. He was a Regular Army officer and clearly understands the British fighting man and his commanders. As Defence Correspondent for *The Times*, Chalfont was perhaps the ablest of the successors to Sir Basil Liddell Hart. The varied facets of Chalfont's career—regular serving soldier, journalist, essayist and practicing politician—add interest to *Montgomery of Alamein;* but, has Chalfont brought a new perception to the Monty story?

The author states his purpose clearly. Take a man who has practically none of the recognized and conventional requirements for the attainment of high rank in the British Army; then explain how such a man attained the highest rank while arrogantly insulting and disobeying his superiors, cruelly wrecking the careers of good officers, preening in public display and private correspondence like a peacock, openly despising and denigrating his peers, and claiming in all seriousness a strategic genius equal to that of Alexander the Great or Napoleon.

Chalfont, therefore, is not writing a military history of the Montgomery campaigns but rather is essaying an exercise in psychohistory or psychobiography. Predictably, the author finds that Montgomery has an unhappy childhood, is rejected by his mother who, at the same time, imposes a rigid discipline and enforces a spartan life. This very unattractive small boy learns to hate his mother, learns fear—"the fear of rejection," becomes a loner, and early develops an "obsessive determination not to be beaten" in any form of endeavor. Chalfont also finds in these early years a clearly defined "feminine side" to Montgomery's character which, the author opines, also is seen in Lloyd George, Hitler and John Kennedy (a rather strange selection one would think).

When Montgomery goes to Sandhurst in 1907 his entry into the profession of arms "savours of a reflex/swipe at his mother." The young man's part in brutalizing another cadet nearly loses Monty his chance at a military career. Nonetheless, he survives and is posted to India where, lacking private means and social standing, he immerses himself in the single-minded pursuit of his profession. At the age of 26 Monty enters the First World War, is severely wounded, promoted to captain and several times mentioned in dispatches. Montgomery was one of the pitiful handful of regular infantry officers who survived the 1914-1918 massacres but was not "turned off" by what he witnessed and continued in his all-consuming determination to master the profession of the soldier.

His career between the wars first shows him to be no more than a competent battalion commander, but nomination to Senior Instructor at the Army Staff College in Quetta gives Montgomery the opportunity to hammer out his personal military doctrine and recipe for preventing a reply of the military blunders he had seen in France. Chalfont's distillation of the Montgomery essence is clear and concise. The

soldier in the ranks must be trained to use initiative—this is mandatory in modern war. Personal contact must be established between the man in the firing line and his leaders. Clarity in planning and the exposition of the plan requires the establishment of new and higher standards in the military staffing and information process. Training must be tough and continuous so that the few standard and easily discernible acts which win battles will be performed with surety in battle.

Montgomery, a brigadier in 1940, again distinguishes himself in action and after Dunkirk begins to catch the public eye and make a name with the troops. Why did the British soldier take to Monty? He was "colorful, eccentric and unpompous," says Chalfont; troops were impressed with his friendliness and apparent accessibility and appreciated his disregard of spit and polish.

The chapters on Montgomery's revitalization of the Eighth Army and the signal victory at El Alamein are lucidly penned, give an evenhanded appraisal of what Monty himself brought to this victory and what he borrowed from his less fortunate predecessors, and clearly trace "the progression from a somewhat awkward-looking little man to the assured, almost rakish figure which has passed into history."

Chalfont's chapters on Montgomery in the British Army are sure-footed, albeit none too friendly toward the subject. Montgomery's subsequent relationship with an Allied army seems harder for the author to manage—a fault which he sees suffered largely by the Field Marshal. Chalfont lacks a grasp of the extensive American documentation on the problems of Allied strategy and command and perforce relies on the self-serving memoirs and critical exposes of the postwar period. Montgomery, for example, is posed as the true father of the D-day invasion plans in 1944, while Sir Frederick Morgan and Eisenhower, who had outlined the whole package before Monty came on the scene, are relegated to supporting roles. Chalfont seems to accept Montgomery's own belief that he would continue as the supreme commander of the allied ground forces following the breakout from Normandy and expresses surprise that after "victory so utter and complete" the newly made Field Marshal should be reduced on 1 September to the status of 21 Army Group Commander. In fact, Montgomery had been given no such assurance and was engaged in self-delusion (a process abetted by Brooke and the British Chiefs of Staff).

The debacle at Arnhem is charged to Montgomery's account, an assessment by the author which is superficial and not in accord with the contemporary records. As to the relative merits of Montgomery's proposed strategy for a rapid, single thrust on a narrow front to reach Berlin, when contrasted with Eisenhower's "broad front" advance and insistence on the opening of Antwerp as prerequisite to the battle for Germany, Chalfont concludes that Montgomery had shown so little skill in mobile warfare as to promise little hope of victory had he been given the nod (and 40 divisions) for the single, quick thrust to Berlin. Chalfont accepts the conventional—and convenient—view of many Britishers that Eisenhower was "the perfect coordinating, diplomatic Supreme Commander" (with the emphasis on the word "coordinating" while the word "Commander" is suitably muted). But the Field Marshal also receives only two cheers: "By the normal standards of battlefield generalship, Montgomery was a very good commander, if not one of the great captains of history."

At the end of this very readable, interesting—and somewhat disjointed—biography, the reader will find himself wondering what happened to the problem originally posed by the author, "how this man . . . reached the summit

of his profession and earned the affection and admiration of a whole generation." The method of psychohistory has failed–if indeed Chalfont ever applied it–and we are left with as good an answer as we may expect history to provide: " . . . the hour had come and so had the man. The situation was one which needed a Montgomery."

HUGH M. COLE
U.S. Army War College

Dingman, Roger. **Power in the Pacific: The Origins of Naval Arms Limitation, 1914-1922.** Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976. 318pp.

Professor Dingman's thesis is that after the First World War, American, British, and Japanese politicians recognized that peacetime naval policy was not principally a matter of strategy or diplomacy, or even of economics, but that it was essentially an internal affair, a question of domestic politics. He supports this thesis by taking a close look at the developments in America, Britain, and Japan which led to the Washington Conference and the naval disarmament treaty of 1922. From this study of what he calls "the politics of national defense" of the three great naval powers, Professor Dingman has arrived at a general truth about arms control which he believes is as relevant today as it was some 50 years ago. Above all else, he concludes, "arms limitation by international agreement depends . . . on careful, constantly changing, and correct estimates of the domestic risks and opportunities it presents to one's own leaders and to their prospective partners." This is a highly instructive insight, although (as I shall explain later) I have some reservations about its universal validity.

In his preface Professor Dingman tells us that when he began this work, as a Harvard doctoral dissertation, he expected to be writing diplomatic history. He set out to discover why Japan and the United States (to which he later added Great Britain) so suddenly turned away from their mounting naval rivalries after the First World War, to conclude a far-reaching agreement for the limitation of naval armaments at Washington in 1922. He found, to his surprise, that to answer this question he had to move out of diplomacy into the realm of domestic political decisions which determined national defense policies. Professor Dingman notes, for example how in the spring of 1921 Japanese Prime Minister Hara's preoccupation with the political implications of the Crown Prince's engagement made him reluctant to take positions on other issues, while British Prime Minister Lloyd George's preoccupation with Irish negotiations later that same year clearly affected his attitude towards the Washington Conference. Similarly, he reveals how personal political motives–his desire to succeed where Woodrow Wilson had failed, and his need to prove that the generally low estimates of his capacity were wrong–impelled President Harding to work hard and effectively for genuine naval disarmament.

From his extensive research, most notably into the official and other records in Tokyo, London, and Washington, Professor Dingman has produced a compact and carefully structured work which he insists is neither diplomatic nor naval history, but rather "a study in comparative history." As comparative history, the author's work is clear and systematic. The book's three sections deal first with the First World War, then the policy drift in 1919-1920, and finally the new policies of 1921-1922. Each section contains a separate chapter on American, British, and Japanese policy in the period. Although this arrangement somewhat breaks the continuity, it does permit the author to compare and contrast naval policy developments in each country in each period. The chapters on Japan are especially valuable, since the author's

Japanese facility has allowed him to make full use of sources in that language. There is, in fact, not much else available in English on Japanese naval policy in this period, except for some sections of Ian Nish's excellent *Alliance in Decline*. Since a great deal of work has already been done on British and American naval policy at this time, the author's work here contributes more that is new in interpretation than in information. While this book will not make Harold and Margaret Sprout's classic *Toward a New Order of Sea Power* obsolete, Professor Dingman's sources are richer than those which were available in 1940. In their treatment of the American origins of the Washington naval treaties the Sprouts also emphasized the importance of domestic politics, which they analyzed principally from press opinion and congressional debates.

Professor Dingman's comparative approach and his focus on domestic politics make his work an important contribution to the study of international arms limitation. His approach provides a new perspective for viewing previous strategic and diplomatic studies of the period, and he is persuasive in contending that domestic political considerations were central to the formation of the naval policies which brought the United States, Great Britain and Japan to their agreements at the Washington Conference. Nevertheless, an important economic reality underlay these political considerations. In the immediate aftermath of the First World War all three of the great naval powers suffered sharp recessions, which brought public pressure for the reduction of defense expenditures. Moreover, it must be remembered that the Washington naval limitation treaty came at a time when the governments and navies of the great naval powers all generally expected a long period of peace. The British Cabinet's famous "Ten Year Rule" of August 1919, which stipulated that the service departments should draft their estimates "on the assumption that the British Empire would not be engaged in any great war during the next ten years," was only the most obvious example of this attitude. When governments and navies begin to fear that war is approaching, as they did in the 1930's, they behave very differently. It is then, and not in postwar periods like the 1920's—or the 1970's—that questions of strategic planning, weapons technologies, diplomatic balance, and economic power all assume a new importance and urgency in the politics of national defense.

J. KENNETH McDONALD
George Washington University

Dixon, Norman F. **On the Psychology of Military Incompetence.** New York: Basic Books, 1976. 447pp.

Ah, what a treat! What a delight to carry through the passageways of the Pentagon. What a military show stopper! The full sweep of Parkinsonian reaction is evident from passersby before the dust jacket gives way to page 1. What makes the potential reader so nervous about this book? Can it be the title? Can it be something even subtler? Can it possibly even remotely be the hint of criticism? Actually, British psychologist Norman Dixon tenders us the gentle surprise. This is a serious book, with a serious message, and a wealth of historical and organizational data to backstop the author's thesis: Military disasters, short of random chance, follow a pattern based on social psychology and bureaucratic traits, thus, on the one hand individuals may be bred to military life, but these very same men (and now women) may not be suited at all to the standards of military greatness. A dilemma, you say? Not at all. The first lesson learned is that Dixon is as much speaking of any major hierarchy and, certainly, watching bureaucracy on the Potomac as it goes

its merry way, one instantly senses he is also addressing any large modern organization. The bottom line of this fascinating work emerges with force. How can overcontrol, rigidity, and inflexibility mesh with managing the great stresses and crises of world war. It is a chapter right out of tomorrow's lecture: "Managing the modern defense establishment." It is, as an impressed student once muttered, "nonquant all the way!" Dixon spares no one in his candid overview of British military leadership. From the Crimea to Singapore, to Arnheim; from dolts of the battlefield to geniuses; from Nelson to Rommel and Zhukov, they come under his steely and perceptive stare. Dixon should be read. He will make you uncomfortable and insecure. He will make you think. And maybe, just maybe, he will cause us to nod ever so slightly in the direction of change. This is a book no war college worth its competence should be without. Come, let us all be angry together.

ROBERT F. DELANEY
Naval War College

FitzGerald, C.P. **Mao Tse-tung and China.** New York: Holmes and Meier, 1976. 166pp.

Brief and readable, C.P. FitzGerald's most recent book is a good introduction to developments in 20th-century China and Mao's role in shaping these events. Although written by a senior academic in the field of Chinese studies, the book was not written for scholars of East Asia. It contains no footnotes and only a short reading list at the end.

The book is straightforwardly arranged by chronology. The first seven chapters deal with discrete periods of time and articulate Mao's involvement and growth in stature during these periods. The chapters by period are: Youth and Background; The Young Communist; Guerrilla War; Yenan and the Japanese War; The Last Civil War; Mao Tse-tung in Power: 1949-1957; Policy Conflicts: 1957-1966; and The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. During the course of the narrative, the emphasis is sometimes on Mao, sometimes on revolution. As a compromise, the book is neither definitive biography nor complete history, although it does competently cover the major events of the periods reviewed.

FitzGerald's generally sympathetic view of the Chinese revolution gives the work a systematic bias. For instance, the author quotes an unnamed British diplomat's estimate of the number of people executed in the purges of the early 1950's as being between 100 and 150,000. This figure calls into question the more widely accepted figures in Western scholarship of several million executed. A second example is that he is much less critical than many American scholars of the Great Leap forward in the late 1950's, intimating that the droughts of that period would have resulted in mass famine had the Great Leap not taken place at all. FitzGerald's sympathetic views are worth consideration, but they should be weighed against other available studies.

The central thesis in the book is that Mao has been the main force in guiding the Chinese revolution and in making it successful. In the late summer of 1970, at the Second Session of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, Lin Piao and Ch'en Po-ta eulogized the theory of the "genius in history," naming Mao Tse-tung as an outstanding example of the theory in practice. Mao's subsequent speech strongly condemned the genius in history theory, Mao himself seeming to be afraid of what he called "kicks under the table while hiding the feet." The account of these events in the chapter on Lin Piao is one of the more valuable aspects of the book. It shows how the "kicks under the table" turned into an assassination attempt on Mao by Lin, and how the response by Mao was swift and deadly.

FitzGerald seems to opt for the great genius theory:

> If the "rare genius" theory, which Mao himself so fiercely condemns, is not the whole explanation of the transformation, it must be said that the leadership of Mao Tse-tung has contributed a very significant influence and, in the years of full power, has become a dominant factor.

Further on, he again endorses the genius theory:

> The Cultural Revolution was his (Mao's) answer, and yet the very boldness and originality of such a response might be taken as a proof of political skill of such rarity as to be close to genius.

As a proponent of the genius theory, FitzGerald is interested in the problems of succession to Mao, and in whether or not the revolution can continue without his moving genius. The last chapter is devoted to speculations about succession. He dismisses the possibility of an emergent joint leadership as lacking precedent. Of the few names he mentions, Wang Hung-wen's is the most discussed, and Teng Hsiao-p'ing's is the least. Subsequent events have shown that Western speculations have been wrong, and FitzGerald's speculations are no exception.

The epilogue weakens the argument of Mao's primacy in the Chinese revolution. The book was written after the Fourth National People's Congress in January 1975, in which Chou En-lai took prominent part, but before Chou's death in early 1976. The final sentences of the book indicate that Chou En-lai has been as important a figure in China's recent history as has been Mao Tse-tung:

> Mao is endorsed as Chairman and Commander-in-Chief, the highest position in the state; Chou En-lai is endorsed as Prime Minister. Both are old; Chou has been a sick man for nearly a year, and Mao Tse-tung is rarely seen in Peking. Whatever else the Congress may have decided, the great and vital question of who will succeed these two dominant figures remains unanswered.

What now remains unanswered is whether or not it might have been equally justified to have written a genius in history book about Chou En-lai rather than about Mao Tse-tung. The comparative evaluation of Chou's and Mao's places in Chinese history awaits further study by both Eastern and Western scholars.

FitzGerald lucidly describes the ebb and flow of Mao's power over the course of 80 years, half of them spent as the Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party. Chief among Mao's abilities was the ability to survive, whether it be from the rigors of the Long March, from the political isolation he found himself in when Liu Shao-ch'i became head of state, or from the assassination attempt by Lin Piao. As Mao himself put it regarding attacks against him, "the man recovered from the bite, the dog it was that died." Mao might have gone on to point out that after the man died, the dogs would snap at each other.

The introductory nature of *Mao Tse-tung and China* will make it satisfying to those first taking an interest in Chinese affairs, but insubstantial for anyone having already read a good biography of Mao or a history of modern China. It is a book that could be recommended for an introductory course on 20th-century China. FitzGerald is to be commended for writing clearly, with wide knowledge and understanding. The lack of citation of source materials and the inconsistency of the central thesis frustrate someone looking for a more comprehensive work by a Sinologist of long experience.

GRANT F. RHODE
The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy
Tufts University

Gimbel, John. **The Origins of the Marshall Plan.** Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1976. 344pp.

This book could more accurately (though less succinctly) have been entitled *The Effect of French Germanophobia on the American Decision to Implement the Marshall Plan.* It is not, as its title implies, a comprehensive and balanced account of how that initiative came about. Both in this book and in his previous one—*The American Occupation of Germany: Politics and the Military* (1968)—Gimbel has firmly maintained that France, not the Soviet Union, constituted the major obstacle to four-power agreement on the postwar treatment of Germany, and hence must bear substantial responsibility for what now appears to be the permanent partition of that country. Gimbel extends his analysis in this book to assert that the United States proposed the Marshall Plan in the spring of 1947 as a means of countering French objections to the rehabilitation of that part of Germany occupied by the British and the Americans.

Gimbel's argument revolves around the unwillingness of the French to accept any substantial revival of German industry for fear that it might later be used to start a new war. Hence, the French opposed efforts by British and American authorities to put their zones on a self-sufficient basis; French resistance took the form of a refusal to cooperate in the establishment of central four-power agencies for the administration of that defeated country. By 1947, Gimbel asserts, both the British and the Americans had agreed that they would have to allow a level of German industry roughly equal to what had existed in the mid-1930's; as a sop to France, though (and to prevent the possible collapse of the French Government), the Americans came up with the idea of a long-term aid plan for Europe as a whole which would "dovetail" with their plan for the rehabilitation of Germany.

This is an intriguing argument, but a narrow one: What is missing from it is a sense of the larger context in which these decisions were made. French obstructionism over Germany would not have seemed so ominous to the Americans had it not been for fear that the Russians would benefit from it by seizing the opportunity to act unilaterally in their occupation zone. Nor does Gimbel's account convey the danger American officials saw in a general European economic collapse—a real possibility in the spring of 1947—which might tip the balance of power on the continent in the Russians' favor. Gimbel's emphasis on Franco-German issues is not inconsistent with these larger concerns, but it does tend to obscure the broader context in which the decision to implement the Marshall Plan was made.

JOHN LEWIS GADDIS
Naval War College

Griffith, Samuel B. II. **In Defense of the Public Liberty: Britain, America, and the Struggle for Independence—from 1760 to the Surrender at Yorktown in 1781.** Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1976. 725pp.

This new history of the American Revolution has many merits, but two are most noteworthy. First, a great deal of attention is paid to the political events that from 1763 to 1775 marked a growing exasperation on both sides of the Atlantic. Second, there is a conscious pursuit of a balanced viewpoint. The result is a history that reveals the combination of logical reasoning and ignorance that led the British Government to persist in its American policy as well as the sense of righteousness felt by the Americans (who complained much of taxation but paid very little) as they confronted the ominous new trend of British policy. In the armed struggle that ensued, the belief of the Americans that their cause was just, whether seen

in terms of their prior experience under colonial government or in terms of their understanding of the British constitution, was a powerful factor in sustaining the struggle in its darkest hours and ensuring the rejection of British peace proposals. Because this book treats not only the war, but also the cause which brought it on, it is truly a history of the Revolution. The war was indeed undertaken "in defense of the public liberty," and the implication of the book's title is that the military history of the struggle ought to be seen in this light.

The overall plan of the book therefore seems admirable, and because it views things from many sides it has a great advantage over the common run of histories of the American Revolution. Unfortunately the plan is not fully carried out. Regarding the British side, it is carried out fairly well. The British fought to preserve imperial authority and maintain a mercantile system that was believed to be of prime importance to British power. The author effectively exposes Britain's military predicament. Although he relies heavily on the views of George III and Lord North, that works out all right because, while it is true that George III remained "hawkish" long after his subjects had lost enthusiasm for subduing the Americans, it is equally true that Lord North's persistent negativism was well in advance of popular opinion. North apprehended that the British people would quickly tire of the enterprise when it became obviously difficult and expensive. Taken together, then, and with due allowance for timing, the views of these two men (and the author calls on many others to speak as well) do expose the tensions that underlay Britain's commitment to the armed struggle.

Both the king and North believed in the necessity of a rapid, massive military strike to knock out the Continental Army and nip the Revolutionary epidemic in the bud. Practically everyone in the British Government agreed with this broad line of strategy—even though it was one that could not draw effectively upon Britain's well-known financial and naval advantages. Thus the fact that the American war was born of revolution gave it a peculiar shape and invited a British response that could not use Britain's most obvious military assets. The chosen strategy also encouraged British generals to gamble for quick results. Thus Burgoyne and Cornwallis exposed themselves to great risks —of course the risks proved greater than they anticipated because of things they did not know—and although these risks proved to be unwise, and were probably needless, it should be remembered that they were of a sort that the overall strategic plan implied. However, the general whose situation called for the greatest boldness—in whose hands lay the only real chance for success—did not gamble: Sir William Howe's caution ruined the policy of quick pacification; yet quick pacification was the sole rationale for the chosen line of strategy. In this way the book enables us to understand the basic reason for British failure; placing Howe's conduct in context, it exposes its colossal fatuity.

What the book does not reveal is the reason for American success. Indeed, most of what the author presents on the American side of the military struggle can only be used to explain American failure—Washington's early blunders, his difficulties in obtaining supplies from a feeble Congress, his ragged and ill-fed troops, rampant peculation by American contractors for army supplies, generals who were jealous (Horatio Gates) or unreliable (Harry Lee), forces based heavily on militiamen who were both untrained and unwilling to remain with the colors for more than a few weeks, and countless other glaring weaknesses of the Revolutionary war effort. He correctly exposes the romantic nonsense about coolheaded country-bred riflemen mowing down the pretty ranks of red-coated heavy infantry. (It is

indeed a common feature of American historical ignorance to read the Battle of New Orleans back into the American Revolutionary War.) But in view of all this one comes away from the book thinking that the Americans on the whole did very little to win this war for themselves, and really succeeded only because the French had an interest in the outcome and the British were pitifully inept at both strategic coordination and logistical preparation.

There is much to be said for the negative approach to the study of warfare, especially 18th-century warfare, but in this case some very important matters have been left out of the account, or rather not given their proper weight. The trouble with the book is that it does not study the war as a revolutionary war; it studies it as a conventional war. In so doing the author deviates from what seemed at the outset to be his purpose, and thus lets slip the opportunity to show a very important process: how political circumstances shaped Revolutionary America's military liabilities and assets during the war for independence.

What we get instead is the war as seen by generals. Washington wanted recruits, supplies, honorable rewards and incentives for officers, and other ordinary requirements of regular armies. The reader is made to feel that he should have gotten them; of course he did not. But he won. Somewhere out there in a shadowy land which the author's narrative only dimly illuminates lay the resources of victory. If Congress could not raise money, then perhaps money was not the American key to success; if militia forces came and went, perhaps that is one thing that made them so vexing and dangerous to the British; although Americans had difficulty getting suitable travelling and reserve victuals, such as salt meat, perhaps their victualling problem was nevertheless not nearly so serious as that faced by the British, whose efforts to obtain food and fodder from local sources were continually frustrated by Revolutionary activists. (On the serious operational consequences of British supply difficulties there is some good recent scholarship, the most immediately relevant book being Arthur Bowler's *Logistics and the Failure of the British Army in America;** the book is listed in the bibliography, but appears to have had scant influence on the text.) The author's occasional references to American financial difficulties are good for color, but of little value for historical understanding. The Loyalists appear but fitfully (theirs is *not* one of the points of view exposed by the book), yet British strategy, as the author knows, was substantially based on them after 1778.

The author's narrative stops at Yorktown, without postcript, leaving numerous puzzling matters unexplained. Therefore, because it mainly presents a field commander's view of the war the book does not achieve the highest aim of military history. And because the narrative—which stays close to the chronological line, with frequent shifts of scene, especially toward the end—stresses events in the field, it tends to reinforce an idea that this reviewer believes to be false, namely that the outcome of the war was determined by a combination of turns of fate and admirable (or deplorable) instances of military conduct.

About 12 years ago Piers Mackesy published *The War for America.* That book delineated clearly and in detail, really for the first time, the overall shape of the war as seen by the British. (Before that the most intelligent study of this sort was a brief article by William B. Willcox in the *Michigan Alumnus Quarterly Review.) In Defense of the Public Liberty* also makes sense of the British side; we still await a book that makes sense of both sides.

---

*Reviewed, Fall 1976

Whatever its shortcomings as military history, this book has much merit as political history, for it manages to do something that is treacherously difficult. It manages to portray the Revolutionary movement with all its blemishes, and the American heroes with all their warts, yet does so without demeaning them. In other words it avoids both Panglossian patriotism and muckraking sensationalism. The Revolution's leaders come off these pages as fallible human beings who had to work with fallible, weak, and sometimes corrupt "helpers," and in that regard their achievement seems all the more worthy of our respect.

DANIEL A. BAUGH
Cornell University

Halsey, William F. and Bryan, J., III. **Admiral Halsey's Story.** New York: Da Capo Press, 1976. 310pp. Merrill, James M. **A Sailor's Admiral: A Biography of William F. Halsey.** New York: Crowell, 1976. 271pp.

Admiral Halsey's Story, as some of us aging sailors will recall, was first published in 1947. The present volume, coming out nearly 30 years later, is an unabridged republication of the first edition and represents a contribution of the Da Capo Press to the reprint series entitled: *The Politics and Strategy of World War II.*

Looking back over the years, one is tempted to ask if the book might have taken on a different emphasis had Admiral Halsey waited, let us say, another 5 years before writing his story; whether or not he might have become more analytical about that long, grueling naval war in the Pacific of which he shouldered so much of the prodigious burden of combat. If we should succumb to the temptation of asking such a question in the first place, we would no doubt quickly recognize its futility. Any delay in the writing of the book, for the purpose of refining judgments or clarifying perspectives, might very well have deprived the narrative of its spontaneous realism and, most important of all, the Halseyan charisma that flows, often boisterously, from the admiral's personal thrust and sense of immediacy. What we did not get was a strategic study in wartime naval operations. Instead, we got a rich portrait of a tough man of the sea. The book is pure Halsey—the personal yarn of a seagoing, fighting admiral who was forthright, honest, often brilliant, sometimes rash, but who possessed above all else, a natural modesty that enhanced his uncommon valor.

It would not be entirely fair to give "Bull" Halsey (as the wartime press loved to call him) all the credit for the quality of the chronicle he left to naval history. He was fortunate in choosing as his collaborator Lt. Comdr. J. Bryan III, USNR, an established writer as well as a naval officer who had flown combat missions from carriers and shore bases, and who was highly qualified to assist "the old man" in playing the unfamiliar role of autobiographer. It is to Bryan's lasting credit that he not only kept himself entirely out of the text, except for a few brief editorial comments, but that he was able to immerse himself so well in the admiral's idiom that the reader can feel Halsey's presence on every page. Bryan's Introduction, the only place in the book where we are conscious of him, is a delightful but all too short characterization of the admiral, with well-chosen anecdotes that deftly extol Halsey's heroic stature and human warmth.

On the very first page of *Admiral Halsey's Story* we are reminded that the book is not an autobiography, but a report. "Reports," says the admiral, "are the only things I know how to write, since half my time in the Navy has gone to preparing them." Yet, as much as Halsey may have wished to confine himself to "official form," he continuously creates for the reader that

wartime atmosphere of the 1940's in which command decisions were made and decisive operations carried out. There is more spindrift here than strategy and that makes the narrative come alive.

Roughly the first quarter of the book is taken up with Halsey's life from his birth in his grandfather's house in Elizabeth, New Jersey in 1882 to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. It is a capsulized autobiography, unpretentious and anecdotal, which carries us apace through his years at the Naval Academy; destroyer command during World War I; and flight training at Pensacola at the age of 51. The remainder of the volume is devoted to Halsey's activities at sea and ashore from Guadalcanal to Tokyo Bay. He divides his narrative of the war years into three phases: (1) from the time he commanded a carrier task force that was at sea, west of Pearl Harbor, when the Japanese struck, to 28 May 1942; (2) from 18 October 1942 until 15 June 1944, when he was Commander of the South Pacific Area and its Forces; and (3) from June 1944, until August 1945, when he commanded the Third Fleet, a duty assignment climaxed by the surrender of Japan aboard the battleship *Missouri.*

With the exception of an unwanted spell on the Binnacle List in 1942, Halsey was either commanding at sea, or was ashore planning future campaigns. He directed the campaigns in the Solomons and the attacks on the Carolines and New Britain. And when the South Pacific was made secure, he moved into the Central and Western Pacific. It was here where the Navy's 500 warships were used to deceive the Japanese by designating them the "Third Fleet" when commanded by Halsey and the "Fifth Fleet" when they steamed under Admiral Spruance of Midway fame.

The history of the Pacific War, with its own genus of agony and ecstasy has been so much enlivened by Halsey's engaging "report." Beneath his charging spirit there was an essential warmth and candor that made him beloved by his subordinates and respected by his superiors. He was capable, as all great leaders must be, of self-criticism. He admitted that he had been "guilty of an injustice" in relieving the skipper of the *Helena* for abandoning the torpedoed *Juneau,* an injustice which he did his utmost to rectify. At the same time, he was outspoken over our failure to coordinate naval power in the Pacific under a single authority. Such divided command, he pointed out, "was an invitation which disaster nearly accepted."

Perhaps the most controversial of Halsey's decisions was his turn northward, toward the Japanese lure, during the Battle of Leyte Gulf. He stresses the three options open to him at that time, and he argues that "given the same circumstances and same information," he would again have made the same command decision. His strategic judgment was, unfortunately, corrupted by pilots' exaggerated reports assessing the damage inflicted upon enemy ships near the San Bernadino Straits. Time has not exonerated the admiral, to be sure; nor has it condemned him irrevocably for an error of judgment. Those who find fault with his questionable decision at Leyte, or with the orders he issued or failed to issue during the two devastating typhoons that claimed men and ships, should remind themselves that hindsight is not wisdom, and that Halsey's greatness lies not so much in the many honors he received but in the simple fact that he deserved them. Heroes, after all, are mortal.

Admiral Halsey's Story flows at a steady pace and the narrative runs straight and true. The imagery is aided, although not greatly so, by a modest assortment of photographs. The several charts included in the text are instructive, but they are too few in number to

assist very much in clarifying operations for the uninitiated reader. The Index, on the other hand, gets much higher marks. All in all, *Admiral Halsey's Story* managed to survive very well indeed its 29 years of literary hibernation.

The author of *A Sailor's Admiral* is a professor of history and marine studies at the University of Delaware and was in the naval service during World War II as navigator of a seaplane tender in the Pacific. He is also the author of several military volumes, including one on the Halsey-Doolittle raid. These facts would seem to qualify him for the task of writing a biography of the irrepressible Halsey. Unfortunately, Merrill's "biographical" material on the admiral prior to 1941 fills a mere ten pages, while his Epilogue, which carries the story from 1945 to Halsey's death in 1959, is shorter yet. Since the admiral's personal letters to his family were not available, as the author explains in his Preface, the book's subtitle would have been more accurate had it read: *The War Years of William F. Halsey.*

It is clear, almost from the start, that Merrill may be guilty of hero worship. And why not? Halsey was heroic. It is also clear that the author would have to lead us over the same track lines and get us involved in the same battles that Halsey had already told us about in his own narrative. One might suppose that it was just rotten luck for Merrill that his volume came out almost simultaneously with the Halsey reprint, for it is not easy to follow a revival of the admiral's act. Yet, even though there is much repetition of events (what else could there be?), Merrill carries his version off quite well. His pedestrian style lacks the flamboyance found in the Halsey volume, but Merrill's hand is sure and steady, nonetheless, and he succeeds in illuminating some neglected facets of the admiral's image.

For one thing, he gives us a lucid account of Halsey's impromptu expletives denigrating the Japanese which was the admiral's way of "countering the myth of Japanese martial superiority." We are informed, too, that Halsey took a lot of flak from the Methodist Board of Temperance for stowing gallons of bourbon on board his carriers for the tranquillity of his hard-fighting pilots.

Halsey's controversial turn northward during the Leyte campaign is discussed candidly in Chapter X. Especially revealing is the admiral's reactions, described impartially by Merrill, to the criticism his seemingly quixotic gambit at Leyte elicited from Admiral King, Bernard Brodie, C. Bann Woodward and Samuel Eliot Morison. Merrill succeeds well in achieving a fair balance of judgment in the conclusion of his chapter by contrasting the views of Clark Reynolds, who was also strongly critical of Halsey, to those of Stanley L. Falk, who favored Halsey's decision to turn north after Japanese Admiral Ozawa.

Merrill's narrative is equally balanced when it deals with the disastrous typhoon of June 1945, which caused major damage to units of Halsey's fleet and prompted Admiral Nimitz to order a Court of Inquiry. The author notes that the court was "extremely critical of Halsey," but that neither King nor Nimitz was able to recommend disciplinary measures because of Halsey's service to his country and his combat record. Merrill gives the last word to the admiral, who argues that "in both the December 1944 and June 1945 typhoons the weather warning service did not provide the accurate and timely information necessary to enable me to take timely evasive action."

A Sailor's Admiral is short on strategic insight, and we get a grasp of Halsey's ebullient character through inference rather than delineation. But, then, Merrill did not promise anything more than a book for the "popular market." There are some well-selected photographs, the most memorable and

characteristic of which is the one of Halsey eating Thanksgiving dinner with the crew of the *New Jersey* in 1944. The charts although absurdly few in number, are precise and easy for the layman to follow. Numerous key operational dispatches are quoted in full in large type, and Merrill has provided full command titles to explain some of the otherwise cryptic acronyms in general military use.

Unfortunately, both books fail to meet the need for a serious full-length biography of Halsey. The admiral was too emotionally involved with events to be wholly objective in his account of himself, although his salty observation of the war from his pinnacle of command is quite indispensable for a deeper study of the man. Merrill's well-written and engaging book is simply too limited in scope to pass as a biography, although it might very well become a congenial companion to *Admiral Halsey's Story*.

Fleet Adm. William F. Halsey, Jr., USN, was indeed a favorite of the wartime American public. He was at that time, and probably will remain, a controversial personality, but none will deny that he was a great naval leader, whose strongest asset was his audacity in battle. The books reviewed here, one old and one new, revive for us the memory of a great admiral whose time, like the ships he commanded, belongs to the pages of history.

THADDEUS V. TULEJA
Saint Peter's College

Kennedy, Gavin. **The Economics of Defence.** Totowa, N.J.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1975. 251pp.

The literature on defense economics, broadly construed, is voluminous, but there are few good "introductions" to the subject. The continued popularity of Hitch and McKean's *The Economics of Defense in the Nuclear Age* (now in its ninth paperback printing), written almost 20 years ago attests to that fact, although there have been a few more recent general introductory works—for example, Murrary Wiedenbaum's *The Economics of Peacetime Defense*. At least part of the reason that there are few introductions to defense economics is that the array of topics which can be included under that general heading is truly vast, ranging from the practical application of microeconomic tools in a systems analysis framework, to the theoretical abstraction of the economic theory of conflict, to the Marxist proposition that defense spending is a necessary prop to capitalist nations. The British economist Gavin Kennedy has written, in nine short chapters, a good, textbook introduction to an extremely wide range of defense economics topics. The book is an outgrowth of his lectures and seminars at two universities and at the National Defence College in Great Britain in the early 1970's.

The book begins with an interesting chapter on the history of economic thought with respect to defense from Adam Smith to Lord Keynes, followed by a chapter discussing the economic theory of public goods. Defense is the classic example of a "pure public good" in the theory of public finance. Kennedy develops the theoretical models in some detail, including an extensive discussion of the economic theory of military alliances. These two chapters are the most interesting in the book. The subjects, which are treated with clarity, are not covered by other introductory books of which I am aware. Chapter 3 presents worldwide comparisons of defense budgets, and comparisons of the national burden of defense expenditures as measured by the ratio of defense spending to GNP. The methodological problems in such comparisons are carefully discussed, particularly in the context of a U.S.-Soviet comparison. Kennedy concludes that international comparisons are crude and uncertain, but that they have some

usefulness in understanding strategic problems. The fourth chapter, entitled "British Defence Budgets," includes considerable institutional material on the United Kingdom which will be of limited interest to most American readers, but it also contains discussion of the principles of program budgeting and of the economics of conscription versus all-volunteer manpower. The material on the latter two topics is of general interest. The next two chapters treat a wide range of topics relating to defense industry. Chapter 5, which relies almost exclusively on U.S. data, describes the size and nature of defense industry, the degree of competitiveness, and types of procurement contracts. Chapter 6 discusses weapons development, concentrating for the most part on R. & D. Institutional material on the organization of U.K. defense R. & D. is included, but much of the chapter is analytical, and there is an extended case study discussion of the development of Polaris. Chapter 7 presents the broad outlines of systems analysis. It is definitely not a "how to" manual. There is no introduction at all to microeconomic techniques for implementing economic analysis—discounting, capital rationing, techniques for dealing with uncertainty, and the like. This chapter does provide an overview of the economic approach to decisionmaking, and discusses its limitations. Kennedy concludes that the approach leads to more informed decisions, but notes that the final test is whether it leads to better decisions. One guesses that he feels that it does, although he obviously has some misgivings. Chapter 8, entitled "Impact of Military Spending," contains an extended critique of the Marxist Michael Kidron's analysis of defense spending as a drag in capitalist economies; discussion of the regional impact within a country of defense production; and analysis of the economic impact of military aid to the Third World, among other topics. The final chapter discusses the economic effects of a major disarmament program. Kennedy asserts, correctly in my view, that the economic problems of disarmament are entirely short term, and do not constitute an argument against disarmament. The long-term problems are all political ones. *The Economics of Defence* closes with an excellent bibliography to guide the student to the professional literature. The bibliography is organized into 11 topic areas: Arms Race; Military Manpower; Regional Impacts of Defense, etc. Most of the literature cited was written in the United States. A minor criticism: unfortunately, the author does not include, with a few exceptions, his footnoted references again in his bibliography, which is somewhat inconvenient.

It is easy to criticize an introductory book of this kind for what it omits. To the specialist, the treatment of many of the topics will seem somewhat superficial, and some topics of importance are not dealt with at all. Mentioned earlier is the lack of discussion of microeconomic tools for decisionmaking. Other omitted topics include inflation, price controls, and rationing in a war context, and the impact of war on economic growth. There is little mention of the spillover effects of military R. & D., and no mention of the spillover effects of military vocational education. While I might prefer that some of these be included, and that some of those topics Kennedy has chosen to write about be excluded, I cannot say that there are any glaring omissions.

In addition to topic coverage, the reader who may wish to use the book as a teaching vehicle will be concerned about the level of difficulty and the U.K. orientation. The analytical content of the book is not particularly rigorous. A basic course in economics would certainly be useful to the reader of some parts of the book—particularly the chapter on public goods, the material on

military manpower, and the material on regional impacts of defense spending, in which a simple regional model is developed. However, even in reading those parts, most could get by without previous economics background. The level of difficulty is certainly below that in much of Hitch and McKean. The American reader uninterested in the British defense establishment will not find the U.K. orientation a significant drawback. Other than in the first part of Chapter 4, the book is not descriptive of British institutions. In fact, because the research and the literature are so dominated by American scholars, much of the description and analysis is in a U.S. context. My judgment, then, is that the book can be used as a text in an introductory Defense Economics course in the United States, if it is fairly liberally supplemented with other reading.

In short, *The Economics of Defence* is a compact introduction to a great many topics in defense economics. The specialist in defense economics will learn little from this volume—but it is not designed for him. For the economist unfamiliar with the defense sector, it provides an introduction into a range of defense problems to which economics can contribute insight. For the military professional with little or no training in economics, the book provides a good introduction to the applications of economics to national defense. In this regard, Kennedy has written a very useful book.

JOHN E. FREDLAND
U.S. Naval Academy

Lundstrom, John B. **The First South Pacific Campaign: Pacific Fleet Strategy, December 1941-June 1942.** Annapolis, Md.: U.S. Naval Institute Press, 1976. 240pp.

It is probably no exaggeration to say that far more print has been expended on the events leading up to the war with Japan than on the war itself. About the 3½ years of war in the Pacific there are virtually no historiographical controversies. The single episode which has been carefully studied and debated is the decision to use the atomic bomb and this discussion has been concerned more with the origins of the cold war than on the climax of the war with Japan. Other writing about the war generally falls into two categories, a rehash of the official histories or breathless "human drama" accounts which tell the reader exactly how Gunner's Mate Joe Jones was feeling when he shot down his first zero.

The First South Pacific Campaign falls into neither of these tired categories. It is instead a major reinterpretation of the first half year of war in the Pacific which demonstrates that there is still much to be learned about the strategic and operational aspects of the war. Relying heavily on the CINCPACFLEET war diaries and a private translation of the Japanese Self-Defense Agency official history, Lundstrom shows how the South Pacific, an area of secondary interest to both Japanese and American strategists at the beginning of the war, gradually became an area of decisive importance in determining the success of the American "defensive-offensive" during the first phase of the war.

Lundstrom's interpretation differs in a number of important respects from the standard account in Samuel Eliot Morison's *History of U.S. Naval Operations.* For example, in discussing the unsuccessful relief of Wake Island, Morison criticizes Adm. Frank Jack Fletcher for pausing to fuel his destroyers instead of pressing on toward Wake on 21 December 1941 when he could have caught the Japanese invasion force unloading and without air cover. Lundstrom, however, shows that Vice Adm. William S. Pye, who relieved Adm. Husband E. Kimmell as CINCPACFLEET on 17 December slowed down

the timetable for the relief expedition to allow reinforcements to reach Fletcher and specifically "ordered Fletcher to fuel before he approached the island." Lundstrom also shows that Nimitz did not learn of the impending Midway offensive until mid-May and originally expected that the Coral Sea battle would be the decisive engagement with the Japanese carrier fleet. "Coral Sea could easily have been as decisive as Midway, had the Japanese actually committed forces there in the magnitude which Nimitz thought [sic]."

It is impossible within the space of a short review to do justice to all of the author's new and provocative interpretations. Some, such as his discussion of Halsey's operations with Task Force 16, in the Ocean-Nauru campaign, will certainly be the subject of some contention. The heroes of Mr. Lundstrom's book are, not surprisingly, Admirals King and Nimitz. Marshall, Arnold and their staffs come off as a rather inept bunch who never clearly appreciated the danger in the Pacific and "pushed vigorously for premature offensives in northern Europe." This is a view which will probably appeal to Pacific veterans, but may strike others as somewhat unfair. Whatever their views, students of World War II cannot afford to ignore this book.

RONALD SPECTOR
Center for Military History

Rickover, Hyman G. **How the Battleship MAINE Was Destroyed.** Washington: Naval History Division, 1976. 173pp.

The explosion of the U.S. battleship *Maine* at her anchorage in Havana harbor on 15 February 1898 was one of the events which impelled the United States into war with Spain. As a result of victory in the ensuing conflict, the United States acquired a protectorate over Cuba and colonies in the Philippines, Guam, and Puerto Rico. Possession of the Philippines did much to make the United States an Asian/Pacific power and in that sense opened the way to the often controversial 20th-century American involvement in Asia. The importance of the Spanish-American War in shaping the modern pattern of America's global commitments interested Adm. Hyman G. Rickover in the conflict and drew his attention to the aspect of the coming of the war most within his field of knowledge and experience: the sinking of the *Maine*.

The U.S. Navy itself twice attempted to pinpoint the cause of the explosion that shattered the bow of the *Maine*, killed 266 of the 354 officers and men of her crew, and sent the ship to the bottom of the shallow harbor. In March 1898, a court of inquiry headed by Capt. William T. Sampson, a former chief of the Bureau of Ordnance, concluded that the *Maine* had been demolished by the explosion of one or more of her forward magazines and—what was at the time politically crucial—that the magazine explosion had been set off by an initial explosion outside the ship, probably that of a mine planted by persons unknown.

A second Navy board of inspection conducted another, more thorough investigation in 1911 while the Army Corps of Engineers was preparing to raise the wreck. The engineers built a cofferdam around the *Maine* and pumped out most of the water within the dam, permitting close inspection of the exposed hulk before it was raised, towed out to deep water, and sunk to prevent it from continuing to obstruct harbor traffic. This second Navy investigation contradicted the findings of the Sampson court by placing the site of the fatal explosion farther aft in the bow section than had the earlier court but again insisted that a mine had set off one of the magazines. At the time of the disaster and throughout the years that followed, naval officers, experts on ship construction and explosives, and journalists and historians, in the United

States and abroad, expressed doubt that a mine had caused the explosion. The true explanation of the *Maine* disaster has remained an unresolved question.

Adm. Rickover in this compact study comes about as close to settling the question as is possible this far away in time from the actual event. He demolishes the theory that the ship was mined and proclaims that the explosion was an accident resulting from a cause within the *Maine*. To reach this conclusion, Rickover has reviewed the reports, testimony, and exhibits of the two Navy inquiries, consulted naval records and personal manuscripts, searched contemporary newspapers and periodicals, and read a host of obscure late 19th-century technical publications, including, for example, a Navy report on the burning characteristics of various types of coal. For comparison, he reviews the explosion of the French battleship *Jena* in 1907 and the French investigation which ruled it an accident, both from the standpoint of what caused this disaster and from the standpoint of the investigative technique used. Most important, Rickover asked Mr. Ib S. Hansen and Mr. Robert S. Price, two Department of the Navy civilian experts on ship construction and the effects of underwater explosions, to review the evidence amassed by the two previous investigations and to develop their own theory on why the explosion occurred.

Rickover begins his book with an account of the sending of the *Maine* to Havana and of the explosion. Then the author moves to a discussion of the two successive investigations and finally to his own conclusion, based on the report of Hansen and Price, which is printed in full as an appendix. Hansen's and Price's technical analysis and reasoning are the heart of the book and are too lengthy and too complex to summarize here. This reviewer lacks the background and expertise to evaluate most of the technical points raised. However, the reasoning and the conclusions of the Hansen-Price report certainly fit the facts about the disaster which have been established by more conventional historical inquiry.

Hansen and Price conclude that the *Maine* was demolished by the detonation of her forward 6-inch reserve magazine, which in turn probably was set off by a fire started by spontaneous combustion in an adjacent coal bunker. Such bunker fires were common in battleships of the time. Hansen and Price consider the possibility of a mine detonation at length and conclude, first, that a mine explosion was most unlikely to set off a magazine and, second, that neither the condition of the wreck nor the recorded observations of crew members and other eyewitnesses contain any conclusive evidence of an external explosion. Hansen and Price also describe in detail the almost insurmountable difficulties of planting such a mine while the *Maine* lay at anchor.

Rickover sharply criticizes the conduct of the two Navy investigations, especially the first one under Sampson. The Sampson court, he notes, based its conclusions entirely on testimony from the officers and men of the *Maine* and from other persons in Havana, and on the reports of divers working on the wreck under very unfavorable conditions. The court did not call for the advice of the available contemporary technical experts, many of whom, even then, doubted the mine hypothesis. Further, the court made no effort to review comparable catastrophes in other navies. Rickover strongly implies that many influential individuals in the Navy Department had made up their minds about the cause of the disaster before the investigation even started. Indeed, the warlike Assistant Secretary, Theodore Roosevelt, denounced an American scientist for taking the Spanish side because he publicly expressed doubt that a mine could detonate a ship's magazines.

Rickover also has some sharp words for the *Maine's* commander, Capt. Charles D. Sigsbee, whom Rickover calls brave but unfamiliar with his vessel. The 1911 board of inspection, which, according to Hansen and Price, correctly located the source of the explosion within the ship, comes off better than the Sampson court, but Rickover insists that the later investigation reached the wrong conclusion on the cause of the explosion for unsound, possibly political, reasons.

This book will not radically alter the historiography of the coming of the Spanish-American War. Most recent historians of the conflict have assumed that the *Maine* probably was destroyed by accident. Rickover's analysis simply furnishes expert confirmation of that assumption. How decisive the sinking of the *Maine* was in bringing on the war remains questionable. The Spanish position in Cuba would have been untenable, regardless of whether the *Maine* exploded. The American effort to find a peaceful solution to the island's troubles was a search for a middle course when neither side was interested in a middle course. The Spaniards were unable or unwilling to grant Cuban independence; the Cuban rebels would settle for nothing less and knew that public opinion in the United States supported their demand. Given this stalemate, sooner or later a mixture of democratic and humanitarian idealism, jingoistic nationalism, and strategic calculation likely would have brought about American intervention. Probably, then, the sinking of the *Maine* did little but hasten the inevitable by a few weeks or months. It is worth noting that President McKinley, in his message of 11 April 1898 asking Congress for authority for armed intervention, mentioned the *Maine* only in passing and based his request on the generally intolerable situation in Cuba.

Aside from its effect on diplomacy, the *Maine* disaster offers the historian the chance to examine late 19th-century military and governmental institutions at work under stress. Rickover does not avail himself of this opportunity. He merely touches upon the political and bureaucratic interplay of forces in relation to the disaster, and his book thus is a scientific treatise rather than a full and complete historical study.

Rickover's narrative abounds with unanswered administrative and political questions of interest to the historian. Why, for example, did Secretary of the Navy John D. Long first allow Rear Adm. Montgomery Sicard, Commander-in-Chief of the Atlantic Squadron, to appoint a court of inquiry of relatively junior officers to investigate this major and politically sensitive incident? And then why did "someone in Washington" overrule Sicard and select a board of more senior officers under Sampson? The roles of President McKinley and Secretary Long are but lightly treated, and Assistant Secretary Roosevelt emerges as a man committed to a "political truth" before the investigation even started.

All these facts, and indeed many others, call for a thorough reexamination of the primary sources to reconstruct the full interplay of administrative, political, personal, and technological factors in the *Maine* incident. Admiral Rickover's useful but limited analysis deals with the disaster primarily in terms of what went wrong with the machines. Another study remains to be done on the human elements in the situation—the men and institutions responding to the crisis. The definitive account of the fate of the *Maine* remains to be written.

GRAHAM A. COSMAS
History and Museums Division
Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps

Rose, Lisle A. **Roots of Tragedy.** Westport, Conn. and London: Greenwood Press, 1976. 249pp.

The tragedy is the failure of American policy in Asia and the roots are in

the response of the United States to Asian rebellion against imperialism from 1945 to 1953. This response is examined in the cases of Indonesia, Indochina, Korea and China in those years. The conclusion is that the response was "... to assume the exhausted and irrelevant burden of the white man's rule...." Tragedy makes its appearance in the book's closing lines, a quotation from an irreverent Marine Corps' ditty from the Hungnam battle:

"So put back your pack on
The next stop is Saigon."

Put starkly, this thesis has an apparent sequence and coherence. Put in Mr. Rose's almost seductive prose, it seems to have persuasion and power. Examined closely, it may be all a bit too easy.

Mr. Rose is a historian in the State Department and as such his emphasis is on the diplomatic documents, largely from the American side in keeping with his purpose of writing "... an American, not an Asian history and one sharply limited in scope and scale." Both the documentation and the narrative seem to stop at 1950, not 1953, but the author could argue that after the Chinese intervention in Korea U.S. policies toward the People's Republic and toward the Vietnamese revolution were set, not to be changed until the Nixon visit in one case and the Carter administration's tentative resumption of contact in the other.

One large question nags, as it always does in any diplomatic history of American-East Asian relations–just how much difference could the United States realistically make in the working out of the problems of nationalism and social change in these land-bound, traditional societies on which Europeans had grafted a few urban centers, some technology and a smattering of Western ideas? This question was not asked in 1945–Shanghai was just to be raised up to the level of Kansas City, as one Senator put it. From this failure of inquiry flows Mr. Rose's lively account of our preoccupation with Europe (Acheson claimed the French "blackmailed" us into support for Indochina), with domestic politics (who lost China?) and with the myth of monolithic communism (China as a Slavic Manchukuo). Now, when we think we have liquidated our costly failures, Mr. Rose gives us a good guide to how we now see the roots. One hopes we now also see the main question.

J.K. HOLLOWAY
Naval War College

Roskill, Stephen. **Naval Policy between the Wars, Vol. 2, The Period of Reluctant Rearmament 1930-1939.** Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1976. 525pp.

This magisterial and encyclopedic account describes in detail how British naval policy in the 1930's labored under the burdens of a climate of opinion engendered by attempts to achieve naval arms limitation and then disarmament, stringent budgets and widespread pacifism. As he did in the first volume of this authoritative series, Captain Roskill has reviewed thoroughly the extensive documentary evidence from which he quotes freely and at some length.

Whatever may have been its success at the time, the standards established by the 1922 Washington treaty limiting naval arms were soon eclipsed by differing perceptions of national needs and the criteria for establishing those needs, particularly between the Royal Navy and the U.S. Navy. If the 1927 Geneva Conference marked the nadir in relations between the United States and the United Kingdom, at least as far as naval matters go, the 1930 London Conference saw a remarkable improvement for which Captain Roskill graciously credits the tact and negotiating skill of Adm. William V. Pratt, USN. If any lesson is clear from this now largely neglected, but complex series of events it is the

necessity to relate numbers, types and sizes of ships to specific and individual national requirements. Absolute standards are, therefore, all but impossible to achieve.

After 1930, disarmament and even arms limitation became increasingly irrelevant. Even so, it was not possible and perhaps it would not even have been prudent in the first years of the decade to embark on a major building program. Public opinion in Britain would not have tolerated it. In the United States the Vinson-Trammell Act of 1934 sought only to build up the U.S. Navy to treaty strength.

Conventional economic wisdom at the time required balanced and even reduced budgets. The 1931 Invergordon Mutiny was a dramatic and unequivocal reaction in the fleet to proposed pay cuts pursuant to what was seen as fiscal necessity. Roskill chronicles this unfortunate event and describes in detail how the Admiralty in London and the fleet commanders dealt with it.

Waning enthusiasm for arms limitation and the very real treaty obligations in force, along with fiscal stringency and a largely pacific public, were influences over which the Royal Navy had no control. Nevertheless, in these difficult circumstances, it did a creditable job in preparing for the war that became all but inevitable as the decade wore on. Roskill has almost unlimited praise and boundless admiration for the First Sea Lord, Adm. Sir Ernle Chatfield, to whom he ascribes the virtues of foresight, tenacity, professional competence and skill, and superb leadership. Chatfield's tenure shows that one man can indeed make a difference.

There are frequent and sometimes lengthy quotations from a multitude of documents, papers, reports and correspondence which many American readers may find tedious. Indeed this tendency to focus narrowly adds detail and thoroughness to this study, but at the price of slighting the broad context in which British naval policy was created and executed, and without which that naval policy cannot be understood.

Captain Roskill frequently refers to parallel events in the U.S. Navy and in doing so he provides much useful comparison. The most dramatic example is the fate of naval aviation in the Royal and U.S. Navies. Following World War I the Royal Navy's air arm was placed under the R.A.F. This arrangement proved not only inefficient and unsatisfactory (at least to the navy) but it also gave rise to extensive interservice bickering. In the nick of time on the eve of World War II the Royal Navy finally obtained full control of its fleet air arm, but not land-based VP aircraft. However, thanks to the tireless and dedicated efforts of Rear Adm. William A. Moffett, aviation had become a permanent and integral part of the U.S. Navy by the time of his death in 1933. Roskill regrets the British did not follow the American example.

This solid, scholarly account makes one point abundantly clear: Despite the mammoth problems and difficulties of the 1930's, the Royal Navy was reasonably well prepared to fight World War II, which it fought well, thanks to the intangible, but crucial, human factors of confidence bred of a long tradition and the professional competence of the officers and men.

B.M. SIMPSON III
Lieutenant Commander, U.S. Navy

Sheridan, James E. **China in Disintegration: The Republican Era in Chinese History, 1912-1949.** New York: The Free Press, 1975. 338pp

Jordon, Donald A. **The Northern Expedition: China's National Revolution of 1926-1928.** Honolulu: The University Presses of Hawaii, 1976. 341pp.

Both these books attempt to explain the failure of republican government

and the success of a Communist regime in China. The authors proceed in different ways. James Sheridan takes a wide view, describing the events of 37 years of extremely eventful history in only slightly more than 300 pages. Donald Jordan, on the other hand, focuses on a brief period of the epoch and then generalizes from his investigation.

Despite their differing approaches, both authors successfully delineate the events and, in most cases the causative factors, of why the Chinese Revolution proceeded as it did. In reaching their conclusions, Sheridan and Jordan each utilize an analytical framework of national integration.

Sheridan is more explicit than Jordan in explaining this concept. Relying on the work of political scientists such as Hans Kohn and Karl Deutsch, he defines national integration as the crucial economic, social, and political processes leading to the development of an effective, centrally controlled nation-state. Sheridan avers that imperial China (Ch'ing) (1644-1911) was only weakly integrated and that the 1911 revolution marked the onslaught of a process of national disintegration which reached a high point during the warlord era of the 1920's. He further argues that the mildly reintegrative processes initiated by Chiang Kai-shek's government were greatly intensified and became successful under the post-1949 Communist regime.

Jordan agrees with Sheridan's general scheme but does not utilize it in as rigid an analytical fashion. Instead, Jordan uses the 1926-1928 Northern Expedition to illustrate the developing political process in 20th-century China.

The Northern Expedition was the campaign by the Nationalist Party—the Kuomintang (KMT)—to defeat the various warlords and to unify China. From the outset, in Canton in 1925, the KMT was a factionalized party, with the Communist-led left being opposed by an initially amorphous right wing. The Communists were closely controlled by the Moscow-based Comintern and the KMT as a whole received extensive Russian aid and advisory assistance.

A major strength of Jordan's book is his discussion of the role played by Russia, Stalin's lack of understanding of the situation in China, and the resultant failure of Soviet policy. Stalin far more directly "lost" China in 1928 than did the United States in 1949.

Jordan also provides excellent descriptions of the military and political events of the Northern Expedition. He discusses in detail the internal politics and organization of the KMT and the Communist Party (CCP).

Both authors emphasize the importance of the disintegrative warlord system in China. The more extensive discussion of this subject is provided by James Sheridan, who is an acknowledged authority in the field. In fact, over one-third of his book is devoted to the warlord phenomenon.

Sheridan believes that the success of the Chinese Revolution depended upon unification of the widely divergent social and economic classes of that country. In his view, the urban-oriented KMT of Chiang Kai-shek not only failed to lessen class differences but actually exacerbated them. The KMT had the "right" ideology but failed to implement it. The CCP eventually was successful because it adopted a rural perspective and put into practice an ideology which lessened class differences and promoted significant socio-economic unity on a national level. It should be noted that Sheridan fails sufficiently to qualify his conclusions regarding the efficacy of the Communist regime; he does not acknowledge the disintegrative tendencies of recent years, particularly the Cultural Revolution of the 1960's and the recent unrest which followed the deaths of Chou En-lai and Mao Tse-tung.

Jordan agrees with Sheridan on the

reasons for the republican government's failure in China. However, he more strongly emphasizes the importance of the Northern Expedition, which effected the military unification of China if not the political centralization of its government.

Jordan also notes the urban orientation of the KMT as a critical weakness in an agrarian country. He and Sheridan both emphasize that while Chiang Kai-shek's policy of coopting the warlords into the KMT was successful in the short run, it sowed the seeds for continued discord and eventual failure of the republican government. Chiang was never able satisfactorily to control these disparate elements.

The reason for this failure, according to Jordan, was the Japanese invasion in 1937. Sheridan does not discount the importance of Japan's actions, but places greater emphasis on the failure of the KMT to implement successfully an ideology which would reduce the political and economic inequities within China.

Both authors mention the importance of military strength in the Chinese Revolution. The Northern Expedition—Chiang Kai-shek's major success—was to a large degree a political movement. However, in the final analysis (and contrary to the Communist historical view) it was military force rather than any rising of the proletariat which determined the outcome of this expedition and of the revolution as a whole.

The CCP's leaders, particularly Mao Tse-tung and Chu Teh, learned through early failures in Kwangtung and Hunan Provinces that while political action and ideology were vital, they could not succeed without strong military means.

Sheridan and Jordan agree that the Communists won out in China because they were able to carry on a process of reintegration through relatively rapid implementation of a rural-oriented ideology of political, social, and economic unification. *China in Disintegration* and *The Northern Expedition* are both well-written, although the latter work is the better organized of the two. Jordan also provides a series of helpful maps.

James Sheridan's work, because of its readability and inclusive coverage, is a good starting point for gaining a knowledge of 20th-century Chinese political history. Donald Jordan's book is more for the specialist in Chinese studies but provides a greater understanding of 20th-century China than its title indicates. Both these works are valuable additions to the bibliography of the Chinese Revolution.

BERNARD D. COLE
Lieutenant Commander, U.S. Navy
Auburn University

Smith, Myron J. **World War II at Sea: A Bibliography of Sources in English.** Metuchen, N.J.: Scarecrow Press, 1976. 3v.

Myron Smith proved in his 6-volume *Bibliography of U.S. Naval History* that he is a careful and inclusive compiler and indexer. Coverage in those volumes ended with 1941, and in this new set Smith treats the years of American naval activity in the Second World War.

This set is divided into three parts: Volume I covers the Pacific Theater; volume II deals with the European Theater; and volume III includes "General Works" and a variety of specialized topics: shipbuilding, hardware, administration, personnel, medicine, and a chronology of naval events. Smith lists each item in the bibliography alphabetically by the author, provides necessary cross-references when an item includes material on more than one topic, and concludes the work with one cumulative index organized by key terms or names and another for authors. It is, perhaps, the frailty of the former index which is the least satisfactory portion of this work. On the positive side of the

ledger, many of the most important listings are annotated which is a great aid to the student.

One of the principal benefits of Smith's bibliography is that he includes nearly everything. Especially important for the scholar of naval affairs in World War II is his exhaustive rendering of articles in magazines and journals published during the war which suggest many vital issues of public policy largely ignored by postwar historians. Examples include the great "Steel Crisis," the economic impact of Navy procurement practices, and the militarization of innocuous aspects of daily life.

In sum, Smith has compiled a valuable research tool which has long been needed by naval historians. All should hope that his series will conclude with a subsequent set on the U.S. Navy and the cold war.

ROBERT WM. LOVE, JR.
U.S. Naval Academy

Weigley, Russell F., ed. **New Dimensions in Military History.** San Rafael, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1975. 419pp.

The greatest schools of professional military higher education have always stressed the importance of military history. Military history is an indispensable substitute for direct experience in preparing the soldier for the problems and crises of leadership at the highest command levels. The object of military historical studies is not to develop a set of precise rules or a checklist with answers to political and strategic problems. Rather, the historical approach is designed to make the student aware of a great range of problems and to acquaint him with a variety of approaches and attempted solutions. Military history also seeks to make the student aware of the complexities of military-political problems and strives to create suspicion of simple answers and analogies.

This anthology, edited by Russell F. Weigley, consists of lectures delivered in the New Dimensions in Military History course, an elective given at the Army War College. Individual articles naturally cover a wide range of topics including studies of warfare in the 17th century, the problems of the Hapsburg multi-ethnic army, and studies of the problems of counterinsurgency. There are articles dealing with problems of national security and the military role in politics and diplomacy.

Despite the wide variety of topics and subjects there is a consistent and largely successful effort to focus attention on broad general themes and problems. The authors avoid trying to create predictive models. They do not seek to provide concrete rules for solving current problems. Instead they present a broad range of situations and problems. They describe the efforts of individuals and institutions to cope with these problems in order to demonstrate the scope, diversity, and complexity of issues that the modern soldier will have to face. Professor Weigley's anthology does indeed demonstrate that an officer cannot know what path to tread in the future unless he knows where he has been and what paths his and other armies have followed in the past.

STEVEN ROSS
Naval War College

Wright, Edward Reynolds, ed. **Korean Politics in Transition.** Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 1975. 412pp.

For a region whose political fate has been so substantially enmeshed in American foreign and domestic politics for the past three decades, the current level of specialized and popular knowledge on Korea is appallingly low. Serious scholarly effort remains limited to a virtual handful of American universities, and while substantial works have appeared, they pale by comparison with virtually any other area of comparable significance. The journalistic realm fares

even worse: Not a single American newspaper has a regular correspondent literate in Korean assigned to the peninsula. Not surprisingly, then, past and present judgments on this sensitive topic frequently reflect opinions derived from politics in other societies and regions, rather than a considered view of the Korean situation itself.

This volume is directly and effectively addressed to this gap in perception and information. Eight of the eleven contributors are Koreans, each of whom exhibits sensitivity both to Korean society and to the broader issues which Korea's postwar experience reflects. Of the three American authors, two (including the editor) have lived in Korea for extended periods, and the third conducted much of his research there. Their combined efforts have produced a highly readable and long overdue survey of institutional, political, and economic developments in the Republic of Korea since its establishment in 1948. Several of the contributors focus more broadly on various cultural and historical legacies which continue to affect recent politics. The inattention to the North, while regrettable from the perspective of comprehensiveness, is understandable. Korea's division at the end of World War II created antagonistic and highly distinct political regimes, and such differences are not easily bridged, either politically or intellectually.

Although the book is divided topically into five separate sections, two unifying themes recur throughout the various essays. First is the issue of historical continuities and discontinuities. By asserting in his title that Korean politics are "in transition," Professor Wright explicitly recognizes the importance of this question. None of the contributors are presumptuous enough to attempt an answer to the obvious corollary—transition to what? It is more appropriate that they have focused on basic factors contributing to this evolution. While this process can be viewed as a battle of "tradition versus modernity," a more satisfactory description is that of a competition between indigenous and external values and cultural norms.

Although most of the authors stress the resiliency of the Korean past, it is also clear that enormous changes have been wrought. Indeed, the volume as a whole conveys the mixed results of this process. Particular dimensions of present politics—e.g., the lack of high institutionalized forms of political competition, the seeming passivity of the citizenry, and the apparent acceptance of centralized, highly authoritarian political rule—seem largely reminiscent of the politics of the Yi Dynasty (1392-1910) and of the Japanese occupation (1910-1945). However, specific dimensions of post-1945 politics reveal behavior for which no ready historical analogues exist. Student participation in domestic politics, analyzed in a discerning essay by Byung-hun Oh, constitutes one such example. While many remain influenced by their Confucian heritage, educational opportunity is no longer narrowly restricted to a privileged socio-economic elite. Moreover, the issues of paramount concern to students, e.g., nationalism and democratization, are hardly interpretable within a traditional context.

Similar conclusions pertain with even greater force for the Korean military, the dominant political actor for more than a decade. As John Lovell makes abundantly clear in his essay on the military in postwar politics, the creation of the South Korean Armed Forces is entirely attributable to American initiative. Equally important, the progressive emergence of military leaders and institutions as decisive factors in the political equation is wholly divorced from historical precedents. The determination and single-mindedness with which Park Chung-hee and his colleagues have sought to restructure the nation's polity, society, and economy—all self-

consciously emulative of other military modernizers of the past century—further reveals an enormous gap with Korean traditions.

Judgments about the wisdom of compelling such far-reaching changes are not easily offered. Clearly, the present governing elite feels that Korea has no alternative if it is to develop the wherewithal to develop and prosper. In aggregate terms, the results of Korea's modernization effort of the past 15 years (discussed by Princeton Lyman and Jungsae Kim) are apparent and, compared to most other developing states, singularly impressive. Yet the social and cultural costs of this effort are often more subtly conveyed. Pyong-choon Hahm's depiction of the traditional Korean value structure—in particular, its suspicion of those who aggressively sought power and wealth—is particularly revealing. One need not accept the entirety of earlier norms to recognize the pervasiveness of the changes which have been instituted, often with little attention to the resulting consequences.

The second key theme concerns the broader impact of the external world upon Korea. As Youngnok Koo amply demonstrates in his discussion of foreign affairs, Korea has been the perennial object of great power competition, usually compelling indigenous elites to assume a largely passive role in relation to the major powers. Thus, Soviet and American interventions in postwar Korea are only the latest in a long history of such involvements.

The influence of external powers has been proportional to their ability to mold developments within Korea—a more enduring consideration than simply affecting the style of Korea's overall diplomatic relations. The United States is merely the most recent state seeking to effect key transformations in the Korean polity. Yet our ability to direct this transformation must be deemed increasingly suspect. Whatever Korea's past dependencies upon American military, economic, and political power, they too are now in transition, with the ultimate results far from certain. What remains unavoidable is to recognize American responsibility for what has transpired, even as our capacity to make further changes is progressively reduced.

Regrettably, no one was given the task of systematically addressing this consideration. Careful historical reconstruction was a far more realistic and manageable task, and at this level the authors have succeeded admirably. For those interested in a well-documented and noticeably dispassionate analysis of Korea in the past three decades, the Wright volume is an excellent choice.

JONATHAN D. POLLACK
Harvard University

RECENT BOOKS

Selected Accessions of the Naval War College Library

Annotated by

Ann Hardy, with Kathleen Ashook
Doris Baginski and Mary Ann Varoutsos

Binion, Rudolph. **Hitler Among the Germans.** New York: Elsevier, 1976. 207pp. $12.00

A psychohistorical analysis of Hitler's motivations and anti-Semitic trauma, showing the nature, power, and relevance of his appeal to post-World War I Germany, which was suffering from its own trauma of defeat.

Bissell, Allen M., et al. **Shipboard Damage Control.** Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1976. 169pp. $15.95

Seventh in the *Fundamentals of Naval Science Series,* this guide for division officers and text for midshipmen and officer candidates treats the concepts of ship stability; organizational principles and practices; damage control systems and equipment; and computer support. Emphasis is placed on training and cross-training members of the crew.

Bruce-Gardyne, Jock and Lawson, Nigel. **The Power Game; an Examination of Decision-Making in Government.** Hamden, Conn.: Archon Books, 1976. 204pp. $17.50

The authors use four case histories of economic decisionmaking in Britain during the sixties in order to determine the distribution of power and influence among the Prime Minister, the Parliament, the civil service, and other private and governmental groups.

Carter, G.A., et al. **User's Guide to Southeast Asia Combat Data.** R-1815-ARPA. Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand, 1976. 541pp. $10.00

This detailed guide to data collections related to U.S., Allied, and enemy combat activities in Southeast Asia from 1945 to 1975 was prepared jointly by The Rand Corporation and Battelle Memorial Institute. It includes information on the location, content, structure, and availability of each machine-readable or textual data file and cross-indexes them by subject.

Cline, Ray S. **Secrets, Spies and Scholars: Blueprint of the Essential CIA.** Washington: Acropolis, 1976. 294pp. $10.00

In this personal account of his 30 years as an intelligence officer for the Central Intelligence Agency, the author provides an outline of the CIA's history and development since its inception shortly after World War II.

De Vylder, Stefan. **Allende's Chile: the Political Economy of the Rise and Fall of the Unidad Popular.** Cambridge, Eng.: Cambridge University Press, 1976. 251pp. $13.95

Though it was not solely responsible for the fall of Allende's Government, the failure of the Unidad Popular's economic program played a significant role. This work offers a detailed analysis of Chile's economic policies from 1970 to September 1973, taking into account the existing political and economic environment.

Doyle, Michael and Straus, David. **How to Make Meetings Work.** New York: Wyden, 1976. 299pp. $8.95

The authors are proponents of the Interaction Method, and in this book they provide a step-by-step study of how this problem-solving approach can be applied to making meetings more effective and fair to all participants.

Dzirkals, Lilita, et al. **Military Operations in Built-up Areas: Essays on Some Past, Present, and Future Aspects.** R-1871-ARPA. Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand, 1976. 102pp. $7.00

The four essays that constitute this Rand report address the problem of urban, suburban, and exurban defense, focusing on past examples, present status, and future projections—particularly in Europe. Special attention is directed to the general attitude toward such operations.

Farber, Samuel. **Revolution and Reaction in Cuba, 1933-1960: a Political Sociology from Machado to Castro.** Middletown, Conn.: Wesleyan University Press, 1976. 283pp. $15.95

Farber studies Cuban society and politics between the Revolution of 1933 and the Revolution of 1959, to provide a context of time and place which he feels is lacking in historians' attempts to understand the nature of Fidel Castro's rise to power, his style of government, and the effect upon Cuban society.

Fifty Years of Light and Dark: the Hirohito Era. Tokyo: Mainichi Newspapers, 1975. 464pp. $12.00

A lively, popular-press style is featured by the staff members of the *Mainichi Daily News* in this narrative history of the 50 years of Hirohito's emperorship. The first half of the book treats the state action prior to and during World War II and the country's reaction to the defeat, while the last part concentrates on the miraculous regeneration of Japan to become an industrial and economic world leader—a position entailing its own price and frustrations.

Griffith, Ernest S. **The American Presidency: the Dilemmas of Shared Power and Divided Government.** New York: New York University Press, 1976. 241pp. $13.50

Based largely on a Conference on the Institutional Presidency held in 1974, this book depicts the circumstances and problems of an institutionalized Presidency entangled in the intricacies of a web of relationships spun by a diffuse pluralism which enmeshes the White House in various strands consisting of departments, commissions, bureaucracy, foreign policy programs, national goals, party politics, the media, etc. Advice to the President is offered, and the recommendations of the Conference are presented in Appendix B.

Hacker, Frederick J. **Crusaders, Criminals, Crazies; Terror and Terrorism in Our Time.** New York: Norton, 1976. 355pp. $9.95

Hacker, a psychiatrist whose expertise was solicited in the Munich Olympic Games massacre and the Hearst case, examines and analyzes both terror—a controlling force exerted by the powerful—and terrorism—the weapon of the lower ranks aspiring to power. The terrorists are classified by type and cause;

the victims are viewed through their reactions to their exploiters; and various and contrasting responses to the challenge of terrorism are considered case by case. A final section recapitulates the aims and techniques of terror and terrorism.

Harsch, Ernest and Thomas, Tony. **Angola: the Hidden History of Washington's War.** New York: Pathfinder Press, 1976. 156pp. $9.00

In this study of recent events in Angola the authors explain their views as Revolutionary Socialists, and condemn an American involvement in African affairs.

Hochman, Sandra with Wong, Sybil. **Satellite Spies: the Frightening Impact of a New Technology; an Investigation.** Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1976. 212pp. $8.95

The layman's guide to satellite systems which appears in the appendix section is one of the most useful parts of this book. Hochman, a poet and novelist, and Wong, an investigative reporter, collaborated to write this personal exploration of the problems of satellite ownership, controls, uses, and possible abuses. Military applications are also discussed.

Homze, Edward L. **Arming the Luftwaffe: the Reich Air Ministry and the German Aircraft Industry, 1919-39.** Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1976. 296pp. $14.95

The German aircraft industry, under the vigorous patronage of the Nazis, achieved a sensational recovery from its moribund condition under the prohibitions of the Versailles Treaty. How this progress in production was managed, mismanaged, and overestimated by the Hitler Reich and the Luftwaffe is portrayed in this extensively documented account that discloses the managerial and technological weaknesses of the highly favored Luftwaffe leadership, which failed to mobilize and coordinate the industry. Chapter 9, "The Balance Sheet," is an enlightening evaluation.

Hornstein, Harvey A. **Cruelty and Kindness: a New Look at Aggression and Altruism.** Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1976. 154pp. $7.95

Although the author feels that environment is the determining factor in human behavior and that instincts provide only the potential which is shaped by surroundings, his thesis is that both altruism and aggression are basic instincts and that the human capacity for either is equal.

Hoyt, Edwin P. **The Lonely Ships: the Life and Death of the U.S. Asiatic Fleet.** New York: McKay, 1977. 338pp. $9.95

Here the reader is presented with the romantic history of the U.S. Navy's Asiatic Fleet, which operated in the Far East from 1850 until 1942, when it was destroyed by Japanese bombing as it fought to defend the Dutch East Indies, with aging ships, a few submarines, and no air support.

Kaplan, Morton A. **Justice, Human Nature, and Political Obligation.** New York: Free Press, 1976. 283pp. $12.95

Dr. Kaplan employs systems analysis in identifying the good and the just in this philosophical and sociological treatise which surveys the differences between theory and praxis, suggests how to arrive at a suitable, dynamic

conception of justice, and from these findings evolves a theory of political obligation. Throughout this work he counters the position of Toulmin and Rawls that values are not objective; he believes that "justice is not something that exists, but must be created," man interacting with nature and society.

Laqueur, Walter Z. **Guerrilla: a Historical and Critical Study.** Boston: Little, Brown, 1976. 462pp. $17.50

Drawing a distinction between guerrilla warfare and terrorism, Laqueur reviews the history of guerrilla warfare and the development of guerrilla doctrine from the individual small-unit operation to the 20th-century revolution and wars of national liberation. He notes the confusion in the semantics and the political background of guerrilla warfare, though he finds a number of patterns common to many such movements. He concludes that the current era of guerrilla warfare is at an end.

Maccoby, Michael. **The Gamesman: the New Corporate Leaders.** New York: Simon and Schuster, 1976. 285pp. $7.95

Psychoanalyst Maccoby treats the relationship between work and character and the problem of how business manangement could improve human development as well as company goals. Utilizing a questionnaire and interviews with over 200 managers, principally in two great multinational giants, he typifies these directors as craftsmen, jungle fighters, company men, or gamesmen- the last being the most important today; to this group he devotes the major part of his interesting book. The questionnaire is presented in the appendix.

Middleton, Drew. **Submarine, the Ultimate Naval Weapon—Its Past, Present and Future.** Chicago: Playboy Press, 1976. 256pp. $15.95

The military editor of *The New York Times* offers a profusely illustrated guide to submarines from the pleasure-boat concept of the early 1600's through their devastating effectiveness in the two World Wars and the increasing sophistication of submarine warfare, up to the currently projected Trident ballistic missile submarine program. Both the strengths and shortcomings of the burgeoning Soviet submarine fleet are explored.

Rasor, Eugene L. **Reform in the Royal Navy; a Social History of the Lower Deck, 1850-1880.** Hamden, Conn.: Archon Books, 1976. 210pp. $12.50

An in-depth study of the changes undertaken by the British Admiralty during the third quarter of the 19th century to improve the physical, mental, and moral welfare of enlisted men.

Stavrianos, Leften S. **The Promise of the Coming Dark Age.** San Francisco: Freeman, 1976. 211pp. $8.95; paper $4.95

In this appraisal of the future of modern, industrial society, the author describes four manifestations of regeneration which will accompany the inevitable disintegration of our civilization. Basic to this emerging social and political order is the worldwide desire for self-determination.

Teller, Edward, et al. **Power & Security: Critical Choices for Americans.** Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1976. 205pp. $12.95

This is the fourth volume of a series being published by the Commission on Critical Choices for Americans, in which authorities from various fields

research topics which are of importance to contemporary America. In these three essays, Edward Teller writes on energy, Hans Mark on technology, and John S. Foster, Jr. on defense.

Yoshino, Michael Y. **Japan's Multinational Enterprises.** Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1976. 191pp. $12.50

In order to understand the process by which Japanese corporations evolved the multinational strategies enabling them to take a commanding position in the world export market, the author has isolated changing elements in the environment, the strategy, and the structure of the multinationals for analysis and comparison with similar processes in the United States.

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE

CONTINUING EDUCATION INFORMATION

"Reading maketh a full man, conference a ready man and writing an exact man." Those words of Francis Bacon are as relevant today as when they were first penned centuries ago. The Naval War College presents an opportunity for growth toward these goals and for most naval officers it is the capstone of their formal career development. Although not every officer has the opportunity to attend the Naval War College, all can participate through nontraditional programs administered by the Center for Continuing Education. These programs afford the nonresident student a chance to become involved in resident curricula through recently revised and shortened correspondence courses. These courses have been designed to assist in developing naval leaders. They provide professional enrichment and broadened perspective that will greatly reward the student and the Navy.

CURRENT PROGRAMS. The resident curricula for the Colleges of Naval Warfare and Naval Command and Staff place maximum emphasis upon three core subjects: Strategy and Policy, Defense Economics and Decision Making, and Employment of Naval Forces. Resource allocation is the common thread that binds these three core subjects together. In order to best accomplish the Naval War College mission, "to enhance the professional capabilities of its students to make sound decisions in both command and management positions . . . .," each of the core subjects seeks to expand the student's logical reasoning capability and his ability to analyze the elements of choice rather than mere familiarization with factual material.

The one-diploma correspondence curriculum parallels courses offered in residence and serves to fulfill the mission of the Naval War College.

COURSE DESCRIPTION. The Correspondence Course Program is organized as follows:

(1) Strategy and Policy
(2) Defense Economics and Decision Making (Management)
(3) Employment of Naval Forces
(4) Electives Program: International Law and International Relations.

The total time required to complete the diploma course has been reduced approximately 600 hours. This reduction was initiated to make completion of each course more easily achievable and to encourage active-duty students to complete one subject area each year. The shortened courses should be more attractive, particularly to fleet personnel.

The Strategy and Policy course serves to illustrate comparative requirements of the old and revised curriculum:

	Old	New
Number of courses	7	9
Total actual/estimated hours of study	450(a)	249(e)
Total pages of reading	7,000	3,800
Total essays required per course	2-3	1
Total number of pages required in each essay	10-15	5-10*
Total number of pages of writing required for entire subject area	220	45-90*

Although students are not obligated to pursue the entire diploma program through to completion they are encouraged to do so. Completion does not bar one from eventual assignment to the Naval War College as a resident student.

PROFESSIONAL RECOGNITION. Correspondence courses are career enhancing as evidenced by the March 1974 Officer Personnel Newsletter (NAVPERS 15892):

> Reporting seniors are encouraged to document, in the comments section of fitness reports, individual efforts at self-improvement. Such documentation should include correspondence courses from various service colleges; . . . This information is important to Navy Department personnel managers and is often an item of consideration by selection boards.

BUPERSINST 1611.12D contains guidance on how such information should be incorporated into officer fitness reports.

Letters of completion are issued for each course via the student's reporting senior; copies are sent to the Chief of Naval Personnel or other appropriate authority for the student's selection jacket. Certificates are issued upon successful completion of all courses in a subject area, and the Naval War College Correspondence Course Diploma is awarded when the entire course is completed. The course is listed in the "Manual of Navy Officer Manpower and Personnel Classification" (NAVPERS 15839C) and the diploma should be noted on the Officer Data Card.

ELIGIBILITY AND APPLICATIONS. Naval War College correspondence courses are available to all commissioned officers of the U.S. military services (0-3 and above) on active duty or in the inactive Reserve. Selected Government employees of the grade GS-10 (or equivalent) and above may also enroll. Waivers may be granted for qualified individuals in lower grades. Students may enroll in only one course at a time. Applications may be by the application card provided or by letter. Applications from U.S. personnel requiring waivers may be by card or letter via commanding officer or command maintaining service record.

Direct enrollments are available to international officers at cost. Up to five students may be accepted from each country eligible to send officers to the Naval Command College and Naval Staff Course. Student selection is at the discretion of the country concerned, and all correspondence and material are transmitted through the appropriate U.S. agency incountry.

SUMMARY OF COURSES. The Center for Continuing Education offers the following correspondence courses:

*The number of pages is at the discretion of students. Other core subjects and electives have been similarly reduced in reading and writing requirements.

STRATEGY AND POLICY*

The overall objective of these nine courses is to provide students with the opportunity to probe into strategic problems in sufficient depth to understand the complexities of the issues and factors relevant to decisions. Estimated hours of study and retirement point credits for those Reserve officers not on active duty are also shown.

Course S 61 The Classical Prototype: Athens Versus Sparta (27 Hours/9 Points)

This course deals with the Peloponnesian War between Greek city-states in the 5th century B.C. The basic text is Thucydides, one of the most noted of all historians. The book covers many of the great issues with which mankind has been grappling since its beginning—the nature of man, the nature of power, what is right, what is wrong, what is justice, and what are the causes of war. The course is the first of nine case studies that will be dealt with in the subject area of Strategy and Policy. The reader will undoubtedly associate the issues and problems faced then with similar situations confronting various 20th-century leaders.

Course S 62 Land Power Versus Sea Power: The Struggle Against French Imperialism (27 Hours/9 Points)

This course covers the effects of the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars on the evolution of modern warfare and strategic thought. The leading naval personage of the period, British hero Horatio Nelson, is also studied in some detail in order to develop fully the relationship between and interdependence of land and seapower.

Course S 63 Strategic Theory: Clausewitz, Corbett, and Mahan (27 Hours/9 Points)

This course examines the theoretical foundations of the study of warfare in general. Clausewitz, a philosopher of war, is significant for his treatment of war as a whole, his analysis of the relationship of force to policy, and his discussion of the role of human factors in war. Corbett, a naval strategist, built a theory of naval warfare on the fundamentals of Clausewitz. Mahan achieved greatness as a strategist and as an evangelist for seapower. These authors provide a point of departure for all subsequent studies of warfare, ashore and afloat.

Course S 64 Balance of Power Diplomacy and Limited War: Metternich and Bismarck (24 Hours/8 Points)

This course takes up the relationship between strategy and foreign policy. Firstly, it examines a classic case of balance of power diplomacy as achieved by Austrian Prime Minister Metternich in concert with other European statesmen. Secondly, the course examines how Metternich's balance was destroyed as Bismarck successfully unified Germany through a series of limited wars. Bismarck's assertion of civilian over military authority is also studied as an example of the subordination of strategy to policy.

---

*All courses are prerequisites to those that follow.

Course S 65 Strategy and Policy in Total War: Origins and Lessons of World War I (27 Hours/9 Points)

This course uses an investigation of the long-range and immediate origins of World War I to focus on the modern phenomena of armed peace, accidental war, and the escalation of local war. The role of imperialism, revolutionary nationalism, technological developments and armaments races, and increasingly rigid alliance systems will all be examined. The course also analyzes how the duration and intensity of the war, coupled with the entry of additional participants, resulted in novel conditions within which national leaders were required to coordinate policy (war aims) with military strategy.

Course S 66 The Origins and Conduct of World War II: A Study in Coalition Strategy and Policy (30 Hours/10 Points)

This course first shows how Western democracies, the United States in particular, sought security by various means following World War I. It was during that period that the relationship between the development of new weapons and strategic doctrine on one hand and the formulation of defense and foreign policy on the other was especially important. The course then focuses on the primary issues confronting the United States in hammering out, with Great Britain and Russia, a coalition strategy that fit war aims and postwar aspirations, and in agreeing on the allocation of national resources to use in prosecuting the global war against Germany and Japan.

Course S 67 From Coalition to Bipolarity: The Cold War (30 Hours/10 Points)

This course examines the difficulty in reordering the international political structure after a total war fought with unlimited means for unconditional ends. The collapse of the wartime Grand Alliance and the confrontation of the United States and the Soviet Union as postwar superpowers combined to produce a situation in some respects unprecedented in international politics.

Course S 68 From Bipolarity to Multipolarity: The Era of Détente (27 Hours/9 Points)

This course examines the developments in Soviet/American relations of the past decade and a half. It focuses particular attention on the changing Russian-American-Chinese balance of power, the emergence of détente, the American involvement in the Indochina War, and the issues of polycentrism in a changing world.

Course S 69 Strategic Uses of Sea Power: The United States and the Soviet Union (30 Hours/10 Points)

This course examines Soviet maritime progress, traditional interests, and probable intentions regarding the employment of seapower. It also covers recent developments within the U.S. Navy and such questions as how U.S. naval capabilities can best be employed to support national policy objectives.

DEFENSE ECONOMICS AND DECISION MAKING*

The Defense Economics and Decision Making area emphasizes the problems associated with translating national strategic goals into force levels and the required specific weapons systems. Estimated hours of study and retirement point credits for Reserve officers not on active duty are also shown.

*All courses are prerequisites to those that follow.

DEDM 1 Nonquantitative Factors (60 Hours/20 Points)

This course focuses on relationships among people in organizations and on the nature of decision making, especially as related to defense matters. It covers human values and perceptions, group and individual interaction, and the interrelationships of organizational systems and subsystems. Organizational models for decision making are introduced, and their explanatory and predictive values analyzed.

DEDM 2 Quantitative Factors (81 Hours/27 Points)

This course focuses on microeconomics and decision making under uncertainty in order to develop the theoretical bases for analysis. It examines various tools (e.g., optimization and estimation) useful in the implementations of this theory. Theoretical developments are included to provide general knowledge of the techniques and to examine the philosophic insights into decision making that they provide, as well as to develop a basis for evaluating any specific application of the technique. Applications are examined in order to further study the usefulness of the theoretical technique, to examine the problems that arise when an analyst attempts to develop an analytic model of a large problem, and to develop the manager's ability to extract from an analytic report useful decision making information.

DEDM 3 Decision Process (60 Hours/20 Points)

This course covers systems analysis as a process (i.e., an organized, rational approach that helps the manager to relate all the important factors in a situation requiring a decision) that may be applied to various kinds of decisions. Systems Analysis, as discussed in various textbooks, assists the decision maker in structuring his investigation of the factors relating to the decision making situation.

DEDM 4 Management Control of the Process (69 Hours/23 Points)

This course addresses the setting within which national strategies are made. The use of analysis in management decision making are also examined to include resource allocation at the national and Department of Defense levels.

EMPLOYMENT OF NAVAL FORCES (ENF)*

The ENF subject area is designed to expand the student's understanding of how tactics are developed and implemented in support of naval missions. It teaches those fundamental principles for the employment of weapons systems applicable to present and future naval operations. Estimated hours of study and retirement point credits for Reserve officers not on active duty are also shown.

ENF-1 Fundamentals of Naval Weapons Systems (39 Hours/13 Points)

Through the use of selected readings, written assignments, and problems, the student examines the fundamental physical properties, capabilities, and limitations of naval weapons systems, sensors and platforms. Written assignments require the student to consider the effect these characteristics have on tactical employment of systems, sensors, and platforms.

*All courses are prerequisites to those that follow with the exception that ENF-3 and ENF-7 may be taken at any time.

ENF-2 Engagement Analysis (36 Hours/12 Points)

The tactical employment of naval forces is analyzed in one-on-one, many-on-one, and multiunit engagements. Practical problems use current U.S./U.S.S.R. weapons systems, sensors, and platforms.

ENF-3 Military Planning Process (36 Hours/12 Points)

The student examines problem-solving techniques as applied to military planning. Emphasis is on the "Commander's Estimate of the Situation." The student will use the military planning process format to solve a hypothetical military problem.

ENF-4 Sea Control Study (54 Hours/18 Points)

This course examines the Navy's mission area of Sea Control. The problems of sortie, rendezvous, and ocean transit of a carrier task force are studied. The employment of weapons, platforms and sensors and the tactical decisions required to protect the hypothetical force from multithreats are included.

ENF-5 Projection Study (54 Hours/18 Points)

This course examines the Navy's mission of Projection of Naval Power ashore through the use of amphibious operations and the employment of naval air, the relationship between Sea Control and Power Projection, and the effectiveness of tactical airstrikes as a conventional deterrent.

ENF-6 Peacetime Naval Operations (42 Hours/14 Points)

This course identifies the operative factors in a politicomilitary diplomatic operation, compares and contrasts various tactics employed in the naval presence role, and evaluates the use of naval forces in a presence role during international crises.

ENF-7 Strategic Deterrence (39 Hours/13 Points)

The strategic deterrence course uses essays to identify past and present U.S. nuclear deterrent policies, the contribution of the elements of the TRIAD toward deterrence, and the key issues in Strategic Arms Limitations negotiations.

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS*

These new courses in International Relations seek to provide the student with fundamental concepts and principles of international affairs and with a knowledge of international political processes. As international relations greatly influence policies of national security and subsequent national strategies, students of these courses may significantly enhance their professional qualifications. The course may be credited toward completion of the discretionary phase of the diploma program or may be pursued separately without regard to attainment of the diploma.

Course IR-1 The International System: Its Actors and Their Behavior, and the Role of Power (30 Hours/10 Points)

A study of the fundamental concepts of the contemporary international system including the dynamic forces (such as economics, diplomacy and armaments) which affect the relations of nations.

*All courses are prerequisites to those that follow.

Course IR-2 Mediating Factors in the Politics of Power (21 Hours/7 Points)

A study of international organizations and international law in modern world politics and conflict resolution.

Course IR-3 Foreign Policy (30 Hours/10 Points)

A study of policy objectives of the U.S.S.R., the PRC and the developing nations as these relate to the future goals and challenges to the United States.

INTERNATIONAL LAW FOR THE NAVAL COMMANDER*

The International Law course aims at enhancing the military officer's capability to make sound decisions involving the application of international legal principles. Upon completion of the course students should have acquired an understanding of basic principles of international law and a means of analyzing their applicability to areas of our potential military operations. The International Law courses have been completely revised and are now principally problem-oriented.

The courses may be credited toward completion of the discretionary portion of the diploma program, or may be pursued separately without regard to attainment of the diploma. Estimated hours of study and retirement point credits for Reserve officers not on active duty are also shown.

Emphasis in IL-1 through IL-3 is on practical questions that may confront the naval commander.

Course IL-1 International Law for the Naval Commander: Sea Control (30 Hours/10 Points)

This course considers problems of deployment from a U.S. port for relief of a naval communications station. It involves the law of the sea, air and space law, asylum, the law of armed conflict, and command responsibility. The "situation" is adapted from the one used in the Employment of Naval Forces ENF-4, Sea Control Study.

Course IL-2 International Law for the Naval Commander: Projection (36 Hours/12 Points)

This course continues into problems of shore bombardment, blockade, mine warfare, airstrikes, prisoners of war, occupation of foreign territory, and command responsibility. The problem situation has been adapted from the one used in the Employment of Naval Forces ENF-5, Projection Study.

Course IL-3 International Law for the Naval Commander: Peacetime Problems in International Law (36 Hours/12 Points)

This course considers status of forces agreements, terrorism, constraints on the warmaking power, mobilization, environmental law, and legal review of weapons under the law of armed conflict.

*All courses are prerequisites to those that follow.

Course	Title	Hours	Points
S 61	The Classical Prototype	27	9
S 62	Land Power Versus Sea Power	27	9
S 63	Strategic Theory	27	9
S 64	Balance of Power Diplomacy and Limited War	24	8
S 65	Strategy and Policy in Total War	27	9
S 66	The Origins and Conduct of World War II	30	10
S 67	From Coalition to Bipolarity	30	10
S 68	From Bipolarity to Multipolarity	27	9
S 69	Strategic Uses of Sea Power	30	10
	Totals	249	83
DEDM 1	Nonquantitative Factors	60	20
DEDM 2	Quantitative Factors	81	27
DEDM 3	Decision Process	60	20
DEDM 4	Management Control of the Process	69	23
	Totals	270	90
ENF 1	Fundamentals of Naval Weapons Systems	39	13
ENF 2	Engagement Analysis	36	12
ENF 3	Military Planning Process	36	12
ENF 4	Sea Control Study	54	18
ENF 5	Projection Study	54	18
ENF 6	Peacetime Naval Operations	42	14
ENF 7	Strategic Deterrence	37	13
	Totals	300	100
IR 1	The International System	30	10
IR 2	Mediating Factors in the Politics of Power	21	7
IR 3	Foreign Policy	30	10
	Totals	81	27
IL 1	International Law for the Naval Commander: Sea Control	30	10
IL 2	International Law for the Naval Commander: Projection	36	12
IL 3	International Law for the Naval Commander: Peacetime Problems	36	12
	Totals	102	34

CENTER FOR CONTINUING EDUCATION
U.S. NAVAL WAR COLLEGE, NEWPORT, R.I. 02840

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

APPLICATION FOR CORRESPONDENCE COURSE (NAVWARCOL 1550.5)

Authority to request this information is derived from 5 United States Code, section 301, Departmental Records, and 44 United States Code, section 3101, Records management. The purpose of this form is to enable individuals to provide the necessary information to the Center for Continuing Education, U.S. Naval War College for enrollment in a specific correspondence course.

The information provided by you will become a permanent part of your Naval War College correspondence course record. The information provided will be used to enroll you in a specific correspondence course and to report your successful completion of that course to the appropriate higher authority.

Completion of this form is entirely voluntary. Failure to provide your social security number may prevent the report of your completion of a correspondence course from being entered in your official service record. Failure to provide your education/experience qualifications will result in an inability to consider a request for a waiver of rank or grade requirements for enrollment in a Naval War College correspondence course. If the other information is not provided, enrollment cannot be accomplished.

PLEASE RETAIN THIS COPY FOR YOUR FILES